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FOREWORD
The negative impact of plant closings and relocations on
individuals and communities is of growing public concern as
the frequency of these phenomena increases. Joblessness
associated with plant closings now appears to contribute to
national unemployment statistics.
In this comprehensive review of the plant-closing research
undertaken over the past two decades, the authors attempt to
identify conceptual and methodological limitations of past
research, areas where policy needs to be developed, and
directions in which programming efforts should move. It is
intended as a compendium of information which could pro
mote the formulation of a new research agenda and assist
policymakers and planners who might wish to review past ef
forts in order to find directions for the present and future.
Facts and observations as presented in this monograph are
the sole responsibility of the authors. Their viewpoints do
not necessarily represent positions of the W. E. Upjohn In
stitute for Employment Research.
E. Earl Wright
Director

Kalamazoo, Michigan
November 1981
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PREFACE
The purpose of this study is to summarize and synthesize
the results of the most significant plant-closing studies
published during the past two decades. This review was
undertaken with two major objectives in mind. First, a sim
ple summary of the literature and a convenient compilation
of research findings would be, it was hoped, helpful to those
who wish to pursue research in this area as well as to those
who are concerned about the policy and program implica
tions of industrial relocation. Second, and perhaps more im
portant, we have attempted to review the literature in terms
of several critical questions, such as reemployment ex
periences of displaced workers, community responses to
plant closings, and mental health outcomes of unemploy
ment, so as to identify what advances in our understanding
have been made over the past two decades. The natural
results of that approach have been the identification of areas
where research is either nonexistent or inadequate, sugges
tions about the causes of these lacunae, and recommenda
tions about the conceptual and methodological approaches
which would be most productive.
This review focuses upon the standard plant-closing study,
which is typically a case study or a collection of case studies.
The organization of this research summary follows the plantclosing event in a chronological fashion. We proceed from a
first section, which considers the state of plant-closing
research and the concerns and options of the groups involved
in a shutdown, to a second chapter, which views the manageVll

ment decision in a series of economic contexts: international,
national and local. Next, the immediate and intermediate
responses of management, the union or unions, and the com
munity are considered, together with some related material
about recent state and federal legislative initiatives and a
brief outline of how European countries respond to
economic dislocation. The second half of this volume is con
cerned with the experiences of the displaced workers, their
job search behaviors and subsequent labor market ex
periences, their participation in programs designed to
facilitate reemployment and the outcomes of those pro
grams, and the effects of job loss on mental health. A con
cluding section reflects upon the aims and objectives set out
earlier and proposes concrete research projects as well as a
general research agenda. It also summarizes the research
findings and outlines the implications for policy and prac
tice.
The studies we have selected for intensive review do not
represent, as noted earlier, the entire plant-closing literature
of the past two decades, although the vast majority of
studies are included. Also, some research reports which are
not standard plant-closing studies and therefore do not ap
pear in our list of studies reviewed are cited extensively. This
research from more general areas, such as unemployment
and mental health, community and political action, and the
impacts of shifts in investment patterns, is interwoven with
the results of plant-closing studies to further validate, con
firm, and illuminate those findings as well as to raise ques
tions about them. Our analysis is heavily reliant on 27 plant
closings reported in 20 studies. These studies appear early, as
in Dorsey's study of the Mack closing in 1963. Others are
very recent, such as the Aronson and McKersie comparative
analyses from upstate New York completed in 1980. Some of
the studies are accounts of industrial dislocation in New
England, for example, the five studies of Devino,
vin

Raphaelson and Storer as well as the Lipsky analysis of interplant transfer, while New York state is represented by
Foltman's study of the difference between blue-collar and
white-collar workers in response to job loss. All but one of
the studies are American. (We have included Portis and
Suy's study of the impact of early notification of the closing
at the Kelvinator plant in London, Ontario.) Several studies
of the midwestern experience, notably Aiken, Ferman and
Sheppard and Palen and Fahey, as well as Root, are included
and the South is represented by McCrea's study of Roanoke,
the Shultz analysis of the Fort Worth program, and Walter
Strange's study of Saltville, Virginia. Geographic diversity is
paralleled by industrial diversity: Aiken, Ferman and Shep
pard as well as Palen and Fahey studied automobile
manufacturing; McCrea studied the fabric industry; and
Stern and others studied the transformation of the meat
packing industry. More recent studies, such as Aronson and
McKersie, feature newer industries television tubes and
photographic equipment.
It is important to note that there is little unity among these
studies. This diversity is real. It does not simply reflect a dif
ferent industry in a different area studied at a different time.
Methodology and conceptualization of the several studies
differ substantially. The approach and focus of each study is
different. Several, such as Stern and Lipsky, are actually
program evaluations, while others, such as Root and
Strange, stress the noneconomic consequences of closures
but in very different ways. While the unity is often more ap
parent, because of similar subject matter, than real, the con
sistent results or concerns that emerge are emphasized.
This review is, in several important respects, a continua
tion and update of work begun by William A. Haber, Louis
A. Ferman, and James Hudson in the early 1960s and
published by the W. E. Upjohn Institute for Employment
Research as The Impact of Technological Change: The
IX

American Experience in 1963. Like that volume, the present
study concentrates upon the standard plant-closing situation
captured at the time of the closure. It emphasizes the after
math of the management decision, the labor market ex
periences of the displaced workers and the effectiveness of
programs mounted to assist with the transition. However,
the concerns of researchers in this area have changed, and
the focus of the present review reflects that change. We see,
for example, a new preoccupation with community response,
with the unemployed family rather than the unemployed in
dividual alone, and with programs which attempt to vary at
an early point. Still, since the general approach of plantclosing studies has remained the same, and since plant clos
ings have always been difficult experiences for individuals
and communities, it is reassuring that the more recent studies
continue to confirm earlier findings. On the other hand, that
some similarities continue to exist between this review and its
1963 ancestor is a matter for concern, especially since in
dustrial relocation is no longer viewed as a sporadic set of
events characteristic of a growing and expanding economy,
but rather as uncomfortably frequent symptoms of an
economy undergoing an uncertain period of transition.
Some of the same recommendations for research, policy
development, and program implementation found in the
earlier study are repeated in this volume. It is our hope that
this volume will be generally useful and that the research,
policy and program recommendations which have become
even more important after more than 18 years will, at long
last, be implemented.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The State of Plant-Closing Research
Until recently, plant closings have been a relatively
neglected area of research. While several case studies date
back to the Great Depression and even before, and the threat
of automation aroused considerable interest in the field in
the 1960s, the fact that the national economy has been ex
panding has made the problem of industrial relocation ap
pear to be a temporary phenomenon. While industrial
relocation has meant disruption for individuals and com
munities, ultimate benefit was seen in the industrial growth
that plant closings and relocations heralded. Considering the
quantity of research on other employment problems, the
literature on plant closings remains modest. Nevertheless
analysis of the findings we do have can pinpoint areas where
research is most urgently needed, areas where policy needs to
be developed, and directions in which programming efforts
should move.
There is now enormous public concern about the problems
of plant closings, and this concern is reflected in the growing
need of workers for reassurance as to the security of their
jobs. Communities also are worried, especially those cities in
the Northeast and Midwest that are losing old industries
while failing to attract new facilities. Indeed there is ap
prehension on a national scale as an increasing fraction of
the world's manufacturing capacity is being located abroad
because of the cheaper labor markets available there. In-
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terest has been keen in efforts by employees and/or com
munity members to purchase plants slated for closing and to
continue operations. At every level of government, serious
problems arise as workers displaced by plant closings move
to enroll in government programs that will compensate them
for their losses or prepare them for effective labor market
reentry.
Two additional factors contribute to the need for research
on plant closings. The United States lags behind the other in
dustrialized nations of the world in the development of a na
tional employment policy, particularly of a policy directed
toward the orderly management of the investment and
disinvestment process. Various proposals have been brought
before Congress and legislative initiatives on the local level
are moving rapidly in some areas. Many states are consider
ing bills requiring plants to give advance notice of closings.
This legislative action is, however, taking place without ade
quate knowledge of the scope of the plant-closing problem
and its long term effects, still less the appropriate strategies
for reducing the costs incurred by industrial and economic
dislocation.
Furthermore, we are still without information that is
critical, not just to formation of national policy, but to ef
fective development, implementation, and administration of
ad hoc programs designed to confront economic emergen
cies. We do not have data on the prevalence of plant clos
ings, on how many facilities shut down during any given year
or for what reasons. We do not know the number of workers
affected or the scope of the effects on communities. We do
not know to what extent companies that move benefit from
this investment strategy, and we have no clear idea of the
available interventions or of their cost-effectiveness.
While the negative impact of plant closings upon in
dividuals and communities has seldom been dismissed light-
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ly, it has been possible to develop an argument that
unemployment associated with plant closings is a relatively
insignificant portion of the total national unemployment pic
ture. Cross-sectional data to document the reasons why in
dividuals are unemployed at a particular time are not
available. Case study data, the staple of plant-closing
research, reveal a great deal about unemployment in par
ticular instances but have no wider applicability. There have
been assertions that research, policies, and programs need
not be developed especially for plant closings since the extensiveness of the problem does not justify widespread concern,
but arguments as to the permanence of the termination
associated with plant closings have been stressed to justify
concern. Data are still not available to indicate clearly what
percentage of those unemployed at any specific time are
jobless because of plant shutdowns, but recently collated in
direct evidence shows joblessness associated with plant clos
ings now contributes significantly to the statistics on national
unemployment. Business Week1 estimates that two million
jobs have been lost as a result of plant closings over the past
five years. Bluestone and Harrison2 examine the National
Longitudinal Sample (NLS) and cite the findings of Parnes
and King over the 7-year period 1966-73 for 4,000 males over
the age of 45. Men were selected who had served at least five
years with their employers and their employment histories
were followed. About 4.6 percent of the sample, represent
ing men over 45, experienced permanent involuntary separa
tion from employment during the study period. These data,
while far from comprehensive, confirm that plant closings
provide a substantial part of the total unemployment figures.
Research in plant closings has been confined to the case
1. Business Week, March 12, 1979, p. 41.
2. Barry Bluestone and Bennett Harrison, Capital and Communities: The Causes and Con
sequences of Private Disinvestment (Washington, DC: Progressive Alliance, 1980),
p. 19 ff.
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study and evaluation tradition and that as a consequence
there is no comprehensive listing of plant closings and no
statistics concerning the extent of unemployment directly or
indirectly attributable to plant shutdowns.
While we have come to understand some of the conse
quences of plant closings for individuals and communities
better than we did some two decades ago, we are coping with
these consequences in much the same ways that were com
mon then. The earlier solutions were designed as stop gap
measures for victims of short-run problems created by an ex
panding economic system ultimately expected to benefit all.
Even these limited goals were not met with a high degree of
success; but this was not considered a serious deficiency, for
this was a period when economic growth and job oppor
tunities were expected to be in an upward spiral that would
go on indefinitely.
Research on plant closings has always been undertaken
with a strong orientation toward policy and program
development. In fact, the literature is primarily concerned
with the evaluation of programs. It is therefore particularly
striking that in the years between 1963, when the first series
of plant-closing studies were analyzed, and 1980, no really
new approach has been tried. Benefits paid are higher, more
attention is given to various provisions of collective bargain
ing agreements designed either to assist with plant-closing
problems or to be adapted to meet that situation, and early
retirement options have increased, but all these responses
were available in one form or another in the early 1960s.
Thus the past two decades have seen program amplification
rather than program change. Despite the fact that these
measures were never designed to attack a problem at its root,
but simply to ease the difficulties in a transition period, they
were not particularly effective in achieving even their stated
and limited goals. Over the past two decades, they have been
elaborated, extended, and evaluated. During the same period
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the plant closing, often a healthy sign of growth and change,
has become a symptom of a stagnant economy; measures
designed to ameliorate the negative impact of plant closures
have become less and less well adapted to that end.
Plant closings have a widespread rippling effect, and par
ties concerned have a repertoire of responses available to
them. Once the decision to close has been made, manage
ment, unions, individuals, communities, local agencies, and
elements of the government all have their own particular in
terests and priorities. If these parties view their problems as
similar and agree on strategies for coping with them, a clos
ing can take place with minimal difficulty. Yet, even in the
best circumstances, it is clear that each of these groups will
perceive a different part of the problem or often a different
problem altogether, and that no single framework for
understanding the full implications of plant closings current
ly exists. It is scarcely surprising then that no coherent
policies or programs have been developed.
The design and implementation of policies and programs
to deal with problems associated with plant closings in
evitably promote suggestions about the development of a na
tional policy in fundamental opposition to the basic
assumption that a capital market operates perfectly and that
to intervene in this process risks serious disturbance of the
market. This conflict, which is seldom made explicit in the
plant-closing literature, is at the root of most of the observed
inadequacies of research, policy development and program
design, implementation and evaluation.
Although the national economic climate, the general in
dustrial environment, and local realities and constraints are
all significant both to the plant-closing decision and to its
aftermath, plant-closing studies tend to be focused on the
aftereffects of the decision. The decision in its general and
specific context will be considered below at some length, but
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the emphasis in this review will be placed upon the actors in
the plant-closing situation, the repertoire of responses
available to meet their concerns, whether and in what ways
these concerns and responses are conjoined, and how this
conjunction or lack of its affects final outcomes. The actors
in a plant-closing situation are usually (1) management,
(2) the union or unions, (3) the individual workers, and
(4) the community. Within the idea of community, it is ap
propriate to group the local population in the most general
sense: merchants whose sales will drop off; teachers whose
jobs may be eliminated as the tax base is reduced; persons
who provide services to affected workers, as well as those
who join in a community effort to take action that may be
deemed appropriate to the crisis. Local government, in
cluding both the service sector and industrial development,
can also be assigned community membership, despite fre
quent strong links between local, state, and federal agencies.
The fifth actor, often intimately involved with some or all of
the others, includes state or federal agencies. Each actor has
a specific set of concerns and a number of possible responses
from which to draw actions that may be considered ap
propriate to the particular situation. It must once again be
stressed that plant-closing research continues in the case
study tradition and that the time dimension of these studies
seldom extends beyond a year or two at most. Such studies
never assess the problems beyond the narrow scope of one
closed plant, because there are theoretically numerous ways
in which the closing of a plant can proceed. Thus we can
draw only upon limited evidence for a limited number of
closings, but that evidence does suggest that certain
responses by the several actors involved can minimize the
costs associated with economic dislocation, while other
responses can exacerbate the initial disturbance.

Introduction

Management Post-Decision Concerns
Whatever reasons are advanced for plant closings,
management will have much the same concerns during the
shutdown period, whether the action is a closing or a reloca
tion.
One major concern is to keep productivity as high as possi
ble from the time the decision is announced until the time of
actual closing. During the phase-out period, another
management concern is to avoid public opprobrium. While
this concern is directed chiefly toward workers, it includes
the community at large, and to both groups management
wishes to validate its competence in decisionmaking. It is im
portant for management to avoid court suits that may be in
itiated by workers or the community. This priority is close to
another management concern: that is, keeping industrial and
local peace involves both avoiding local disapproval and
restricting costs. Maintaining the physical integrity of the
facility is crucial; a building must be in good repair if
management plans to sell it. Maintenance of equipment is
also important, whether that equipment is to be moved to
another location or for the use of an eventual purchaser.
Good relations must be maintained between management
and the community to avoid possible tax penalties and to
enlist the cooperation of local leaders in the sale of the facili
ty. If the plant is moving to a new location, management
must regard a smooth transition as one of its priorities, for
such a transition will be obviously less costly. It is at this
point that encouragement is given to certain key personnel to
transfer with the plant, while inducements are offered to less
valued workers to remain behind.

Union Post-Decision Concerns
A major priority of labor unions is to maintain the viabili
ty of the organization in the face of loss of membership. To
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some degree this priority is consonant with labor's other
aims during the phase-out, most if not all of which concern
the affected workers. First, the unions attempt whenever
possible to delay closings or to avoid them completely. Since
either attempt is usually futile, the unions then move to
maintain job security for members through transfer.
Whether or not such transfers can be arranged, labor tries to
maintain the income level of members as far as possible.
Labor also is concerned about the trauma inflicted on
unemployed and employed members of the union alike, step
ping in to assist with problems associated with unemploy
ment. Labor is concerned, as a first priority, with obtaining
for members all the benefits to which they are entitled and
additional benefits if possible.

Community Post-Decision Concerns
Local communities faced with the prospect of a closing
plant look first to maintaining the population and industrial
base of the area. In one sense, this concern is closely tied to
that of maintaining the tax base at its preclosing level. Often
communities, like management, wish to delay the closing to
insure a smooth change and avoid the flare-up of conflict
and hostility that might endanger life and property. Local
communities also hope that the physical plant and its equip
ment will remain intact and so they also wish to maintain a
high level of services in the community for, even though the
tax base may be jeopardized by the announced closing, com
munities are keenly aware of the important role that good
services, roads, public safety, and schools can play in at
tracting and retaining industry.
Individual Post-Decision Concerns
Individuals wish above all to maintain economic and
social security during the phase-out period. They need infor
mation about a range of issues bearing on job security and
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income maintenance, as well as a sense of certainty about
what plans are and are not feasible under the circumstances.

Governmental Post-Decision Concerns
Concerns of local, state, and federal government and the
various agencies specifically mandated to respond to
employment-related crises are roughly similar, although dif
ferent levels of government and government agencies un
doubtedly have different priorities depending upon the situa
tion at hand. However, most levels of government would
agree that, if possible, the ideal solution would be to prevent,
delay or at least minimize the effects of closings. Failing
that, concern shifts to recompensing workers for lost in
come, and to efforts toward their reemployment, such as
training or retraining. However, local, state, and federal
agencies have recently become aware that the problem of
unemployment encompasses more than income maintenance
and reemployment; the entire area of physical, emotional,
and social consequences of unemployment and a changing
industrial environment has become a matter for serious
discussion. Finally, a continuing concern is to rebuild the
economic base of the community after the shutdown.
Each group affected by a plant closing has at hand a reper
toire of responses. Which responses are selected by any one
group depends in part upon the choices of the other groups.
The responses settled upon by the different groups and their
interaction determine the nature of the plant-closing ex
perience.
Management Repertoire of
Post-Decision Responses
Management may elect to provide the workers and the
community with advance notice. Early notice is required by
law in some areas, and many states have legislation now
pending that would require a substantial payment to be made
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if insufficient notice is given. Often management refuses to
provide much if any advance warning, lest property damage
be done to the facility and its equipment. Management may
delay closing to permit certain community actions to take
place, or it can stagger layoffs so that the labor market is not
flooded with job seekers at any one time. Union collective
bargaining agreements often insist that management provide
transfer rights, and in some cases management is willing to
give active help with transfer. For workers who do not
transfer, management can offer placement assistance.
Severance pay, which may or may not be required by con
tract, may have various conditions attached to it. Postclosing negotiations with labor and the community will be
smoother if management elects to participate in the transi
tion from full production to closing. Management can also
inform the community about plans for the facility and can
solicit help with the sale of the plant.

Labor Post-Decision Responses
The unions affected by a closing can respond in a variety
of ways, depending often upon management's post-decision
actions. Responses to management can range from strike ac
tivity at one end of the spectrum to a position where virtually
no contact with management is maintained. Often at a mid
point in this spectrum, ad hoc bargaining is tried. Going over
management's head by invoking political power is a response
occasionally found, but recourse to political initiatives is
usually considered a strategy by a union rather than a tactic
by a local. In addition to seeking all possible benefits for
members, unions respond externally with strenuous efforts
to build coalitions.

Community Post-Decision Responses
A community faced with an imminent plant closing has
available to it a wide range of activities that can minimize the
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impact of the closing upon the economic and social wellbeing of community members. While one group or
another the mayor's office or local social service agencies,
for example can accomplish limited objectives, com
prehensive actions can be taken effectively only by a wellorganized, carefully coordinated effort involving represen
tatives from many sectors of the community.
Fundamentally, there are only five areas in which
responses can be made by a community. The first priority is
commonly an attempt to prevent the closing or, in the event
that the shutdown is inevitable, to vary the conditions and
timing of the closing in order to minimize its impact. Com
munity assistance here is peripheral, although cities and
counties are occasionally eligible for certain kinds of federal
assistance that may be of help to the workers. The second
important community response is directed to reemployment
of laid-off workers. Community leaders and agencies can
often cooperate with other local groups to provide job refer
ral services or can work with local employers to this end.
Third, training and training-related assistance are areas in
which communities often take an active role and inventories
may be made of local training institutions. Fourth, informa
tion about present and future labor needs may be gathered
and matched with the abilities of the displaced workforce.
Funds for such efforts can be acquired from several federal
sources. Finally, the assembling of such labor market infor
mation often becomes the basis for a continuing effort to
monitor the local economy in order to maintain the stability
of local employers and to rebuild and develop the economic
base of the community.

Individual Post-Decision Responses
In theory, a whole range of responses is available to those
individuals who are thrown out of work by a plant shut
down. Depending upon personal characteristics, the actions
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of other workers, and the state of the labor market,
however, the unemployed worker may in fact have a limited
range of options. At one extreme, the worker may im
mediately become reemployed at a similar job or, at the
other extreme, may enter upon a period of prolonged and/or
recurrent unemployment. Intermediate responses include
retraining, relocation, temporary employment, or the
development of a new strategy to maintain family income. In
some cases responses include retirement or early retirement.
Economic deprivation is associated with prolonged and
recurrent joblessness, and a wide range of physical and men
tal health problems may be the outcome of the plant shut
down.
For those workers more seriously affected, response to the
closing can be seen as a process, beginning perhaps with
denial of the fact of the closing and continuing with vain
hopes of a reopening of the facility and a recall to the old
job. There is some evidence to suggest that many workers
react passively after this initial phase and begin seriously to
look for a job only after benefits have been exhausted, a time
when the labor market is apt to be at its least receptive. Con
tinued unemployment or, perhaps even worse, intermittent
employment marked by the acceptance of jobs at lower pay
and lower status may ultimately leave these workers at risk
for mental and physical illness.

Government Post-Decision Responses
The plant shutdown is a classic situation in which income
security, a major goal in American society, is no longer pro
vided by private enterprise; the government response is a
patchwork of income supports. When plant shutdowns are
particularly threatening to localities already suffering high
rates of unemployment, the federal government accepts
residual responsibility on an ad hoc basis for assisting com
munities with special grants and for dispersing certain sorts
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of income assistance accompanied by retraining and reloca
tion assistance. Attempts to pass legislation on the federal
level to prevent or delay plant shutdowns or to levy fines for
late notification have not been successful. To some degree,
federal funds provide income for families with no means of
support after unemployment benefits have been exhausted.
Both state and federal agencies support a certain amount of
intervention as well as research directed toward determining
the most advantageous deployment of intervention funds.
There has been no continuity of effort in this area, mostly
because the negative effects of economic dislocation were,
until recently, considered minor in comparison to the
benefits associated with economic change.
This inventory of concerns and post-decision responses to
plant shutdown sets out the limits within which intervention
may be designed to minimize the impact of plant closings
upon individuals and communities. That these concerns,
responses, and potential interventions exist should not imply
that informed and active programs are commonly initiated
or that even those that are undertaken are documented and
analyzed. Still less should there be any implication that the
literature suggests the costs of economic dislocation should
be borne by any parties other than the affected individuals
and the local communities, supported in part by some
federal assistance. But it is now generally recognized in the
policies, programs, and literature since 1963 that con
siderable costs are associated with plant closings, and accor
dingly attempts will be made to spread these costs across
society.
Most responses of the groups concerned in a plant closing
are rational ones when considered in the light of each
group's special concerns. Some responses, like the call of a
strike by a union, are only marginally helpful, while others
(the rapid and early formation of a community coordinating
council, for instance) serve the purposes of several groups
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well. It is important to note, however, that the concerns and
the responses of any one group may conflict with those of
another group or may simply not seem worthwhile. What
this indicates, in addition to the usual adversary process at
work between management and labor, is a fundamental
disagreement about the relations between these groups and
their place in the larger economy.
Inevitable conflicts accompany industrial relocation, and
nearly every plant-closing study will resound with one or
another of them. For example, while arrangements are
necessary to provide an acceptable level of subsistence dur
ing the adjustment period, it is equally necessary to motivate
workers to seek employment and return to work as rapidly as
possible. These goals are sometimes contradictory.
Moreover, it is equally difficult to balance the competing
claims of management to the rights to which it is entitled and
of social responsibilities toward workers and communities
which management is sometimes expected to assume. The
problem lies in the belief that intervention in other than a
superficial ameliorative fashion would inhibit the operation
of a free capital market.
These conflicts surface frequently in debates about
specific policy suggestions. For example, requiring advance
notice of plant closings may be supported by individuals and
community groups on the grounds that their joint interests,
such as rapid reemployment, retraining, relocation, or
employee-community attempts to purchase the plant, can
thus be dealt with more expeditiously. Management, on the
other hand, may object to providing any substantial period
of advance notice on the grounds that productivity might
drop before closing or damage be done to the physical plant
and equipment. Yet a more profound disagreement may
underlie this dispute. Advance notice may be perceived by
community, unions and individuals as indicating that the
closing decision could yet be reversed, while management

Introduction

15

may feel that both the decision and the timing of its an
nouncements are rights inherent in ownership. On another
level, those favoring advance notice may argue that it acts as
a brake on industrial movement and support this as a
favorable outcome, while those who oppose it may also see it
as a brake on industrial mobility but as therefore destructive
to the functioning of the capital market.
This study will follow the plant-closing experience
chronologically. First it will explore the international, na
tional, and individual environments in which the plantclosing decision is made. Then the post-decision experience
will be analyzed in terms of the responses discussed above.
Specific issues will receive attention. Severance pay, for ex
ample, is part of the industrial context in which the decision
is made; it is also both a management and a union response
to the plant-closing decision, and it has an impact upon the
individual and the community alike. Throughout, the con
cerns and responses of the major actors management,
labor, individuals, communities and government will be
shown as interacting, sometimes in conflict and sometimes in
cooperation, to result in that complicated phenomenon, a
plant closing.

Chapter 2
Economic Contexts and
Management Decisions in
Industrial Relocation
and Plant Closing
Reasons for Industrial Relocation
The relocation of industrial facilities and the permanent
closing of plants are characteristic features of the American
industrial scene. There have been many reasons for reloca
tion. For example, the movement of the textile industry from
New England to the South before and during World War II
is usually thought to have been impelled by the search for
nonunion labor. Historically, management has sought to
reduce costs in order to maximize profits, and numerous fac
tors other than cheaper labor can contribute to that end.
Transportation costs, incurred in the acquisition of raw
materials and the marketing of finished products, have
become an increasingly important determinant of plant loca
tion in the face of energy shortages and increased energy
costs. Shifts in demand or changes in production patterns
may bring about the closing of a facility or its reduction in
size. Changes in consumer preference are rapidly translated
into shifts in the labor market. Technological change, rang
ing from the limited introduction of new machinery or new
17
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systems of management to the transformation of an entire
production process, often means industrial dislocation.
Very seldom are all the factors involved in a specific deci
sion to close a plant or move an industrial facility known
outside the managerial cadre in which the decision is made.
The objective of management is to improve the company's
competitive position and, since some factors clearly are con
ducive to that improvement while others are not, it can be in
ferred which factors are involved in a given decision. But it is
often impossible to know how much weight was assigned to
each element. Plant-closing research has tended to focus on
events that occurred after the closing decision, so that the
literature on dislocation neither emphasizes the decisionmaking process not analyzes the reasons for it.
The 27 plant-closing cases covered by the 20 studies
analyzed in this report reveal a wide range of reasons given
for closings; in a number of cases, no reasons whatsoever
were given. For two major automobile company clos
ings Studebaker and Packard the cause was clearly the
failure of the firm. At least three closings were related to
shifts in product demand or demand reduced by competi
tion. Technological change was implicated in six studies that
dealt with the meat-packing industry in the period of the
Automation Fund's work. 1 In two of those cases, consolida
tion combined with technological change to cause the clos
ings. In the Mack case, technological change was also a fac
tor, as was the recognition that an outmoded wage structure
could be replaced by one more advantageous to management
in another location. Reasons cited in other closings included
1. In the late 1950s and early 1960s, fears that automation would cause large-scale
unemployment in areas ill-prepared to deal with the consequences of joblessness were
widespread. A tripartite committee was developed including management, labor and
government representatives to assess the problems, to devise solutions and to monitor the
resulting programs. While the apprehension was premature and the results were mixed, the
Automation Fund remains a model mechanism for creating a climate in which programs
can be developed.
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proximity to markets, union discipline, inability to meet
mandated pollution standards, and the takeover of the facili
ty by another enterprise. While this spectrum of causes was
given for 17 closings, ten of the closings studied cited no
reasons at all. Considering that studies associated with the
Automation Fund form the core of plant-closing research
during the 1960s, it is probably fair to say that a random
sample of plant closings might show that few managements
ever make public their reasons for closing. Even in this array
of studies, enriched as they are by Automation Fund pro
gram evaluations, 37 percent of the plants studied gave the
researchers no reasons for closing. The absence of informa
tion tends to mask the differences among closings. A failure
is a very different matter from a situation where consolida
tion of three facilities into two, for example, is perceived to
be the optimal management strategy.
Some of the elements in plant-closing decisions can be
identified only by going beyond the standard plant-closing
literature, such as the case studies below. Other literature,
while scarce, can still be divided into three categories: inter
national economics; the individual location decisions; and
the prevailing labor-management climate. These categories
are only general guides to the primary emphases of the
studies. The fact that investment flows away from the older
industrial areas of the United States into less industrialized
centers in this country or abroad is closely related to the local
labor-management climate and to the developmental stage of
the establishment concerned.

International Economic Context: Capital,
Production and Technology Transfer
Various approaches can be discerned in the "flow of in
vestment" literature: the transfer of capital; the transfer of
production; the transfer of technology; and the displacement
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cost of foreign competition. The recent Bluestone and Harrison study, Capital and Communities, 2 views the shift of
capital from the older industrial areas of the United States as
less striking than the shift of investment by American con
glomerates to enterprises abroad. From this perspective, the
highly visible plant closing is the final phase of the
disintegration of a facility from which capital has been
withheld by a conglomerate, or as Bluestone and Harrison
phrase it, "a corporation exhibiting conglomerate
behavior." The capital no longer invested in obsolete
facilities is being invested in American branches of foreign
companies or in foreign enterprises. Such large-scale enter
prises may also display a pattern of facility coexistence,
where a newer plant or operation outside the older industrial
areas continues operation while another facility in the older
area declines gradually. In contrast, smaller companies
display what Bluestone and Harrison call a "sequential pat
tern," as an old facility is shut down and a new one opened.
In addition to linking American investment abroad to plant
closings in the Northeast and Midwest, Bluestone and Har
rison also point to the findings of David Birch, who main
tained that "the rate at which large established manufactur
ing establishments have shut down was actually higher in the
South than in any other part of the country." 3 A case in
point is the textile industry. While the initial shift in textile
manufacturing from New England to the South was spread
over several decades, the later shift, mostly from the South
to overseas, has taken place much more rapidly.
While some objections can be raised about the interpreta
tion of data presented by Bluestone and Harrison, the invest
ment shifts that they identify undoubtedly have had enor2. Barry Bluestone and Bennett Harrison, Capital and Communities: The Causes and Con
sequences of Private Disinvestment (Washington, DC: Progressive Alliance, 1980), pp.
19-61.
3. David Birch, The Job Generation Process (Cambridge: The M.I.T. Program on
Neighborhood and Regional Change, 1979), pp. 7-9.
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mous impact on plant closings. Their work also draws atten
tion to a critical point in the decision-making process; the ac
tual ownership of the business in question. Small indepen
dent businesses are more vulnerable to the business cycle and
may fail more frequently than large corporations. The clos
ing of a branch plant is often part of a corporate strategy to
improve profits or to eliminate subprofitable plants.
Other research that addresses the problems encountered
by American business in international economic change is
found in The Impact of International Trade and Investment
on Employment, proceedings of a 1976 conference published
in 1978. 4 A major article by Robert H. Frank and Richard T.
Freeman, in which a 1970 input-output table was used,
estimates the indirect manufacturing job loss due to multina
tional overseas investment as some 105,000 jobs. 5 Indeed this
micro- and macroeconomic analysis was used extensively by
Bluestone and Harrison. Frank and Freeman note:
In all cases, direct foreign investment produces a
decline in both the real wage and the share of na
tional income going to labor. . . . Even by relative
conservative estimates, however, the wage income
is reduced by more than 3 percent. 6
Frank and Freeman assume that the original motive for
direct foreign investment was to procure a higher return on
capital, and in fact their analysis demonstrates that the in
come accruing to capital is significantly increased by foreign
investment. Frank and Freeman present their findings
cautiously, since they and their discussants note that a
4. William G. Dewald, ed., The Impact of International Trade and Investment on Employ
ment (Washington, DC: Bureau of International Labor Affairs, U.S. Department of
Labor, 1978).
5. Robert H. Frank and Richard T. Freeman, "The Distributional Consequences of Direct
Foreign Investment," in William G. Dewald, op. cit., pp. 153-170.
6. Ibid., p. 164.
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satisfactory model for the distributional consequences of
direct foreign investment has not yet been developed.
Moreover their calculations show that in 1970 indirect
unemployment associated with overseas transfer of produc
tion activities lasted between four and eight weeks. It is clear
that the acceleration of overseas investment when added to
other factors make 1970 and 1980 years in which widely dif
ferent situations obtained.
Technology is another factor only recently receiving atten
tion for its role in the impact of international trade and in
vestment on domestic employment and plant closings. What
is meant here, however, is not robotization or other
automated equipment to replace human labor, but the
transfer of technology. Jack Baranson reported at the same
conference that several levels of concern have been expressed
about the release of proprietary technology. 7 While refusal
to release technology may safeguard American industry,
multinational corporations can minimize losses in income,
trade, and employment at home by judicious licensing and
investment in foreign facilities. To ignore this opportunity
may close those markets completely to American suppliers.
Giving foreign enterprises access to American technological
advances assumes that the United States holds a significant
lead in these areas, that investments will continue to be made
in research and development to maintain and lengthen the
lead, and that there is little anticipation of competitive
threats from newly industrializing countries. On the other
hand, arguments have been made that American firms have
contributed to the deterioration of the trade balance of
America and to the loss of its technical leadership by the
licensing of technology to foreign manufacturers. Baranson
analyzes technology transfer in relation to 25 case studies in
five industries aircraft, automotive, computers, consumer
7. Jack Baranson, "Technology Transfer: Effects on U.S. Competitiveness and Employ
ment," in William G. Dewald, op. cit., pp. 177-203.
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electronics, and chemical engineering and stresses that
American industry owes some of the difficulties under which
it is now laboring to a lack of available domestic investment
capital.
While Baranson acknowledges that his case studies may
not adequately emphasize the short-run benefits to the U.S.
economy of technology transfer, he concludes that such
transfer to noncontrolled foreign enterprises may:
(1) cause erosion of job opportunities in key American
industries; and
(2) weaken the competitive position of United States sup
pliers of technology over the long term. Such effects
are particularly significant:
(a) under adverse domestic economic conditions (low
growth rate, high unemployment, inflation, declining
productivity, balance of payment difficulties); (b) in
the absence of substantial improvement in labor
market adjustment mechanisms (to relocate and
retrain displaced production workers); and (c) in an
economy where technologically dynamic industries
(or services) are not expanding at a rate sufficient to
absorb labor displacement from declining industrial
sectors. 8
While realizing that prohibition of technology transfer
would be counterproductive, Baranson finds it essential to
view such transfers in terms of their domestic economic im
pact and argues for an early warning system of adverse
economic impact so that a smooth adjustment can be made.
Still another major element of the international economic
context is the effect upon employment and earnings caused
by .increased sales in the United States of foreign goods.
While it has been generally agreed that the American
8. Ibid., p. 206.
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economy benefits from relatively unrestricted trade, quotas
and tariffs have become a particularly delicate political issue
as more and more American industries encounter stiff com
petition from foreign makers and resulting job displacement
occurs.
Louis S. Jacobson's article in the conference proceedings
deals with earning losses of workers who have been displaced
from manufacturing industries, drawing in part upon data
specific to the 1960s, for example the steel industry in Penn
sylvania from 1962 to 1965 (report completed 1976). 9 Using
the Social Security system's Longitudinal EmployeeEmployer Data (LEED) file to examine both earning loss
and number and characteristics of displaced workers, Jacobson studied 11 industries: petroleum refining, aerospace,
electronic components, television receivers, steel, autos,
meat packing, toys, women's clothing, shoes, and cotton
weaving. Some of these industries display high average earn
ings as well as a relatively stable work force. Fundamentally,
the study measured the earnings of workers permanently let
go during an employment reduction and compared them
with the earnings of those not so displaced during the cut
back. Since the sample was chosen to provide national
representation, the study provides a comparison of workers
unemployed after a plant shutdown with workers sharing
similar demographics in the same industry who were not in
volved in a shutdown. Similar comparisons were made for
those caught in a large contraction resulting in permanent
layoff and those not laid off. The differences were substan
tial. In the case of steel workers, the difference amounted to
about $17,000 (in 1964 dollars) over the affected workers'
lifetimes.
While transfers of capital, production and technology
abroad, currently contributing to permanent workforce
9. Louis S. Jacobson, "Earning Losses of Workers Displaced from Manufacturing In
dustries," in William G. Dewald, op. tit., pp. 87-98.
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reductions and plant closings, are relatively recent, the harm
ful effects of foreign competition upon domestic manufac
turers have been felt for at least two decades. Foreign com
petition was not cited as a reason for closing in any of the
studies reviewed here, yet it could clearly play a major role,
directly or indirectly, in decisions to relocate domestically.
Baranson argues that technology transfer often occurs
because venture capital is more readily available abroad than
at home, while Bluestone and Harrison and Frank and
Freeman would point to increased levels of American invest
ment abroad productive of high return on capital. The incen
tive provided by cheaper labor in areas outside the Northeast
or Midwest, as well as increased competition, would pro
mote a larger capital investment in the form of new
technologies and new plants to house them. Expanding pro
duction and production facilities that take advantage of
economies of scale become more important during periods
of heightened competition. Consequently, international
economic conditions influence relocation decisions made
within the United States.

National Economic Context: The
Location Decisions of Finns
The plant-closing decision, as Roger Schmenner points
out, 10 often rests on the search for the least expensive site,
and an ill-advised decision can be as disastrous for the com
pany in the long term as it is in the short term for displaced
workers and the community. Commonly the search for a
new site, plans for relocation, and the final closing of the old
plant are undertaken because of the needs of the company
for, or because a change in production techniques requires, a
new facility. Therefore, a closing because of relocation is
most apt to occur when the company is thriving or when new
10. Roger W. Schmenner, "Look Beyond the Obvious in Plant Location," Harvard
Business Review, January 1979, pp. 126-132.
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technology adopted in a timely and orderly fashion promises
continued and increased profits. Schmenner's study involved
interviews with 30 companies and surveys of over 1,000
facilities; more than 200 had recently relocated and about
150 were new plants. The evidence indicates that, despite the
common perception that plants are moving and closing con
stantly, only about one-third of the moves contemplated are
finally undertaken. Actual relocation occurs (or did occur
through 1978) at a rate of only 3 percent per year in
manufacturing establishments of all sizes, and less than 1
percent per year in plants employing more than 100
employees.
Schmenner's data also indicate that larger companies tend
to establish new branch plants; undoubtedly some of them
are the "parallel facilities" identified by Bluestone and Harrison. 11 Each year between 3 and 6 percent of the existing
stock of plants is added as branch plants.
There are five identifiable strategies for plant locations. In
a product plant strategy, a facility concentrates on a product
or a narrow range of products. This offers a simplicity and
an economy of scale not obtainable in a multiproduct facili
ty, but such facilities often find themselves in difficulty if
they continue to expand. A market area plant strategy
responds to consumer needs and minimizes transportation
costs. Some corporations are so large that they can utilize
both strategies, developing product and market area-specific
manufacturing facilities, generally in industries that make
products that are consumed everywhere. Some large cor
porations use either market area or product strategies,
depending upon the subsidiary involved. Yet a fourth
strategy, one commonly associated with complex industries,
is the process strategy, used where individual facilities make
one or another component of a finished product and are
11. Bluestone and Harrison, op. tit., p. 27.
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therefore a kind of supplier or feeder plant. Finally, the
general purposes strategy, usually associated with defense
contractors, demands a high degree of flexibility in the
change of product demands, plant configuration and
employee assignment.
The availability of cheaper land, lower tax rates, better or
cheaper materials, and lower wages often provides incentive
for the corporate decision to move South, to Mexico or Latin
America, or to the Far East, but the contribution of these
new benefits to the corporate balance sheet must be com
pared with the possible costs associated with diverging, if
that is required by the move, from the current plant location
strategy. Moving a process plant too far from other plants
within the same production system, despite savings from low
wages in the new site, may prove costly in transporting the
products of that process to the final completion site.
Finally, Schmenner points out that plant relocations are
difficult for management and, according to his data, will be
avoided if at all possible. In respect to plant closings or
relocations, he has found that:
Overwhelmingly, it is the small, growing plants,
often independent of particular suppliers, markets
or labor sources, and pressed for more production
space, that move to larger, more modern quarters,
and in the process alter their production
technology, sometimes in fundamental ways. The
vast majority of relocations are over short distances
(less than 20 miles) which helps ensure continuity of
labor force and retention of customer and supplier
contacts. To a lesser degree, relocations also occur
to consolidate two or more plants into a new single
facility and to escape from high site costs (wages,
land values, taxes).
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It is the plants whose profits are hurting the most
that see relocation chiefly as a means of lowering
costs. These plants are also the ones most likely to
move distances of greater than 20 miles in search of
these lower costs. 12
It is important to note the decision to close a plant in order
to move to a new facility or to consolidate production is
seldom made lightly or in haste. It is the last in a stream of
decisions.

Plant-Closing Decisions and the
Labor-Management Climate
The labor-management climate is a major factor in the
decision to close or move a plant. One codification of this
employment relationship may be found in the collective
bargaining agreement in force at the time of the decision. At
this point, two kinds of provisions become important both to
the decision-making process and to the affected workers:
those designed specifically for the shutdown situation and
those designed for other eventualities which can be adapted
to the problems associated with a closing.
As Stephen Mick notes:
Analysis of data compiled by the Bureau of Labor
Statistics on 1,823 contracts applying to collective
bargaining units with at least 100 employees shows
that most contracts contain very few provisions
related to plant shutdowns and movement. In
descending order of percentage of specific contract
provisions related to plant shutdowns are interplant
transfer to another plant or company (32.1
percent), severance or layoff pay (29.6 percent),
relocation allowances (11.1 percent), transfer of all
12. Schmenner, op. tit., p. 129.
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or partial seniority (9.9 percent), income
maintenance (5.1 percent), advanced notice of
move (3.7 percent), union notification or participa
tion in management decisions to move plants (3.3
percent). 13
Mick also points out that less than one-fourth of organized
labor seems to be covered by such provisions. Since less than
one-fourth of the American labor force is organized, it is
likely that the provisions apply to only about 6 or 7 percent
of the workforce. Because all the studies analyzed in this
report are concerned with plants having union representa
tion, many of them in major unions, such provisions are im
portant here.
Other provisions, not originally designed for postshutdown adjustment, can be applied: supplemental
unemployment benefits (SUB), individual account security
plans, and regular or early retirement. SUB, now a major
feature of many collective bargaining agreements, were
designed to help smooth out income in industries where
seasonal and short term layoffs were common. Today SUB
no longer retain their purity of purpose and have come to be
used for a variety of purposes including severance pay,
health insurance during layoffs, relocation allowances, and
even supplementary pay for workers transferred to lowerrated jobs. Both SUB and individual account security plans
often are transformed into severance payments if the
necessary funds do in fact exist at the time of closing.
Provisions designed for the shutdown situation are un
doubtedly considered in the decision-making process.
Management can influence how union members participate
in job security provisions by the timing and style of the
13. Stephen S. Mick, "Social and Personal Costs of Plant Shutdowns," Industrial Rela
tions, Vol. 14, No. 2, May 1975, p. 205.
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plant-closing announcement. The Mack case14 is an example
in which interplant transfer was an option available to
workers whom the company did not wish to retain. Manage
ment made a series of announcements regarding the im
plementation of the transfer provision in a manner which
deterred those workers from taking the transfer option. In
contrast, workers in Lipsky's study15 were encouraged to ac
cept the interplant transfer option by the timing and style of
management's announcements. However, the fact that the
way the decision is made and announced can have a substan
tial effect upon the participation rate in interplant transfer
programs is not direct evidence that the presence and condi
tions of such transfer rights have a direct effect upon the
shutdown decision itself.
Severance payments, a form of compensation for perma
nent job loss after protracted employment, is a collective
bargaining provision particularly sought by unions whose
workers are threatened by continuing technological change.
Audrey Freedman quotes a letter from Joseph A. Beirne,
President of the Communications Workers of America, in
1956:
However, because of intensive and extensive
mechanization constantly taking place and
resulting layoffs, we have carefully negotiated,
over the years, a well-defined system of termination
benefits. . . , 16
Mick's analysis of over 1,800 collective bargaining
agreements indicates that about 30 percent included some
form of severance payment. The studies we reviewed in this
14. J.W. Dorsey, "The Mack Case: A Study in Unemployment," in Studies in the
Economics of Income Maintenance (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1967).
15. David B. Lipsky, "Interplant Transfer and Terminated Workers: A Case Study," In
dustrial and Labor Relations Review, Vol. 23, No. 2, January 1970, pp. 191-206.

16. Audrey Freedman, Security Bargains Reconsidered: SUB, Severance Pay, and
Guaranteed Work, Report 736, The Conference Board, 1978.
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report do not always emphasize all points of interest in plant
closings. Only four studies mention collectively bargained
severance payments, while twelve studies show that such
benefits were available, whether specifically noted as
bargained or not, although it is more than likely that all such
provisions were bargained. Eight studies record that workers
participated in this benefit, most of them receiving payments
between $1,500 and $2,000.
Severance payments have usually been designed for
precisely those situations to which the Communications
Workers were responding: permanent layoffs of individuals
rather than plant closings. So, despite the rather low levels of
payments, the presence of a severance payment clause can
help to postpone or even prevent a plant shutdown. If a plant
is closed as a result of serious financial difficulties and it is a
single facility, severance payments may simply not be forth
coming or may be much reduced because of the financial
condition of the company. As Freedman shows, a company
that closes a facility of 500 employees, averaging $5.60 an
hour with an average seniority of nine years, and that has a
relatively standard format for distributing modest severance
payments may actually have a liability for about $1 million
for those payments. More commonly, the wage rate is
higher, the seniority is longer, the severance payment more
generous and the liability larger. Clearly the liability involv
ed in a severance payment, a type of plan that is almost
always unfunded, can have a major effect on the decision to
close a plant. An attractive option for management would be
the immediate sale of the facility to a buyer who would rehire
the workforce. Indeed the attractiveness of employee
buyouts may be related to the liability represented by
severance payments. Nevertheless, there is no evidence of the
precise role that a severance payment provision plays in the
decision to close a plant.
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Other types of provisions described by Mick include
relocation allowances and transfer of all or partial seniority.
These are associated with interplant transfer rights and rein
force the attractiveness of that option for workers. Once
again, as the contrast mentioned above between the Mack
case discussed by Dorsey and the General Foods case analyz
ed by Lipsky shows, such considerations must bear on the
decision-making process and may alter the manner of the
decision. Still other provisions, such as some form of income
maintenance and union notification or participation in
management decisions, would undoubtedly influence the
decision, although no studies (with the possible exception of
Stern) have addressed that point except tangentially. 17 Ad
vance notification of closing, if required by union contract,
is normally accompanied by other provisions such as the
right to interplant transfer.

Influencing the Decision to Relocate
At least two major groups involved in a plant-closing have
a substantial interest in influencing the decision the
workers and the local community for both have a great
deal at stake. The struggle over advance notification re
sounds less with concerns about timing and its impact on ad
justment costs than with the possibility of reversing the deci
sion. Obviously those groups who hope to influence the deci
sion must know that such a decision is under consideration.
While there is no exhaustive list of management actions to
enlighten a concerned group about impending closure, Julius
Majoros 18 provides valuable insights into some of the steps
17. James L. Stern, "The Consequences of Plant Closure," Journal of Human Resources,
Winter 1972, pp. 25-31.
18. Julius Majoros, "Early Warning Signs of a Plant Closing: One Worker's Views," in
Industrial Exodus, Edward Kelly, ed. (Washington: The Ohio Public Interest Campaign,
1978).
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taken by management prior to closure that may furnish a
clue.
1) Company may make changes in key personnel in the
higher echelons of the plant. Younger workers may be
moved to company headquarters and replaced with
men near retirement.
2) Discipline is relaxed.
3) Maintenance policy can become of the patchwork
variety.
4) Maintenance personnel may not be replaced.
5) Rumors of an impending shutdown may increase.
6) Company may be slow in announcing a negotiating
team for normal contract talks.
7) Non-hurry-up policy during negotiations may be
adopted.
It is not clear what actions by workers or the local com
munity might conceivably alter the decision. Theoretically,
labor subsidy or capital subsidy could reduce the costs of re
maining at the original site and expanding it to the point at
which other options become less attractive. Although labor
subsidies have not yet been documented in the literature, the
wage concessions made by Chrysler workers are a form of
labor subsidy, applied here to a situation far more serious
than a threatened plant closing or relocation. Recent
research at a Michigan manufacturing facility includes con
sideration of the entire closing negotiation process. In the
end, the local union bargaining team offered to accept a con
siderably reduced wage level as an incentive for the plant to
remain. 19 But, the management decision was to consolidate
operations in another state, despite the fact that the wage bill
proposed by the Michigan facility was much lower than the
wage bill at the relocation facility. In general, labor subsidies
are not a common form of incentive.
19. Transcript of February 18, 1981, interview with Bargaining Committee, AP Parts,
Grand Haven, Michigan, by Sean P. McAlinden.
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Capital subsidies, on the other hand, which have been
available through a series of federal programs mounted in
association with urban areas, primarily the Urban Develop
ment Action Grant Program (UDAG), may have some im
pact on location decisions. If, for example, UDAG
assistance with land clearance and infrastructure was made
available, capital subsidy might be an appropriate
mechanism for the local community to use in coordination
with the federal government in order to influence a reloca
tion decision. 20 Further, since Schmenner has found that
firms prefer on-site expansion, 21 capital subsidies for such
expansion in urban areas might well have helped central
cities by providing incentives for new construction at lower
costs. Since the future of UDAG is uncertain, no assessment
of its potential for altering or influencing a relocation deci
sion can be made.
Another strategy, that of local tax subsidies, is in the
hands of the local communities and may appear at first sight
to be an effective method of influencing a relocation deci
sion. However, Harrison and Kanter have found that local
tax subsidies have little influence on the location of firms,
except perhaps in the case of small businesses. 22 Their work
indicates that large scale, technologically oriented firms are
not sensitive to local tax subsidies and that tax abatements
(given either together with or without other federal grants)
are questionable in any case. They do not significantly affect
a relocation decision, yet they rob the local municipality of
badly needed funds. But it is quite possible that capital sub
sidies could promote more rapid change to new technologies
20. Susan S. Jacobs and Elizabeth A. Roistacher, "The Urban Impact of HUD's Urban
Development Action Grant Program or, Where's the Action in Action Grants," in N.J.
Glickman, ed., The Urban Impacts of Federal Policies (Baltimore: The John Hopkins
University Press, 1980), pp. 335-362.
21. Schmenner, op. tit..
22. Bennett Harrison and Sandra Kanter, "The Political Economy of States Job Creation
Business Incentive," AlP Journal, October 1978, p. 23 ff.
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within firms that are, in contrast to present technologies,
capital- rather than labor-intensive.

Summary
Business failure, the search for cheaper land taxes and
labor, the introduction of new technology, changes in
market, products and processes all continue to play impor
tant roles in a management decision to close or relocate a
manufacturing facility.
As the American economy becomes increasingly in
tegrated into a developing world economy, the contexts in
which relocation decisions are made are accordingly expand
ed. Substantial transfer of capital, the production process,
and the impact of technology upon management now loom
larger than could have been imagined when most of the
plant-closing research reviewed in this study was done.
Foreign competition made for significant reductions of the
workforce and an increase in plant closings more than 15
years ago, and that trend has not only continued but has in
creased markedly. But it is important that a relocation deci
sion conform with the firm's location strategy, since even the
most attractive wage bill cannot compensate for increased
costs associated with an ill-designed plant location.
Early notification about moving a plant, whether required
by law or by a collective bargaining agreement, or inferred
from warning signs at the threatened facility, provides an op
portunity for a possible reversal of the decision. The scant
literature indicates that capital subsidies may be able to alter
some decisions, but that tax subsidies are seldom successful
and are at the same time very costly to local economies.
Finally, while considerable attention has been paid to
legislative initiatives requiring early notification and some
combination of other provisions favoring a more equitable
distribution of the costs associated with closing, no legisla-
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tion has been enacted except in Maine and Wisconsin, and
the Wisconsin legislation has yet to be implemented. Few
collective bargaining agreements contain an early notifica
tion provision, and fewer still require any consultation dur
ing the decision-making process. Finally it is instructive to
note that, despite the complexities associated with capital
shift and technology transfers, when plants are opened in
new locations they are less likely to be unionized than their
sister facilities. The decision to close or relocate a manufac
turing facility is a private decision based on economic effi
ciency. The responses to the decision are generally attempts
to reduce the social and public costs of these private deci
sions and to introduce some social equity.

Chapter 3
Responses to Plant
Shutdowns and Relocations
While the decision to shut down a plant or to relocate is a
unilateral one, it creates a situation to which several groups
must respond. Management, unions, social service agencies
and local community leaders all have available to them a
wide range of options for dealing with shutdown problems,
some of which can help to reduce the accompanying social
and psychological difficulties and minimize the economic
costs involved.

Assumptions, Perceptions, and Roles
in Plant-Closing Responses
Each group that responds to a specific plant shutdown or
to the prospect of one tends to respond in a generalized man
ner, based upon assumptions concerning its rights and
obligations and on perceptions as to the appropriate, per
missible, or feasible point of intervention.
Management maintains that capital mobility is essential to
the survival of certain enterprises and that efforts to restrict
mobility and to intervene in the decision-making process are
inappropriate. Management has the right to make its own
decision and publicize it at its own discretion. Accordingly, it
is difficult to predict what steps management will take,
although the most benevolent managements will probably
37
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take only those steps that will both safeguard corporate in
terests and ensure an orderly transition for workers and com
munities.
The unions have, at least theoretically, the option of
negotiating during each contract round for shutdown provi
sions. They may attempt to secure access to the decisionmaking process, although these attempts have so far proved
unsuccessful. Union officials also assume that management
has, in most cases, the right to a closing decision, and are apt
to concentrate upon a favorable closing process, including
early notice, employment continuity, income maintenance,
adjustment assistance, and pension protection. The union
response may be seen as an ongoing response to the closure
threat and the appropriate intervention point may be seen as
the immediate post-decision period.
Communities have traditionally responded to plant clos
ings well after the fact. The initial post-decision period is
usually filled with discussion and concern with various at
tempts to determine what can be done with the resources
available. Generally, the appropriate, permissible, and feasi
ble time for communities to intervene is after the decision
has been made. Intervention focuses on worker and com
munity adjustment assistance and occasionally on attempts
to develop or enhance already existing forms of economic
development. Once again, it is assumed that the decision is
the province of management and that the communities are
constrained to adopt reactive roles.
If the assumption of all the actors affected by a plant clos
ing is that management has the initiative and other groups
can respond only after the fact, post-decision intervention is
obviously the only appropriate reaction. Since the interests
of the reactive groups can best be served just after the deci
sion and before the closing, pressure has often been brought
to bear to move the time of disclosure as close as possible to
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the time of decision. This pressure from unions and from
community agencies and groups has not usually had a
decisive impact.
Legislative initiatives constitute yet another group of ac
tivities that aim to facilitate community and worker adjust
ment through early notification, provisions for continuity of
employment, maintenance of income, and the offering of
services that will make for a smooth transition and rapid
reemployment. Legislative initiatives stem in part from a re
jection of the argument for capital mobility, and so they at
tempt to constrain unilateral investment and disinvestment
decisions on the part of management, as well as its tradi
tional privilege of convenient, and often late, notification. It
is in this context that new efforts to provide subsidies and
technical assistance for community-employee buyouts have
surfaced. While numerous members of this broad coalition
will continue to accord management the prerogative of
closure decision, there is a strong movement to restrain
management's modes of disinvestment and the timing of
disclosure.
It will become clear below that new responses to plant
closings have appeared only recently. Few new responses
have been studied, thus few evaluations are available. For
example, the traditional plant-closing literature reviewed
here contains no information about management-sponsored
private sector employability development programs, and lit
tle research on the intervention efforts of public interest
groups or on employee buyouts. Consequently, while a cen
tral focus of this chapter is the standard plant-closing
research literature, emphasis will also be placed on other
analytical and descriptive, and even legislative, literature.

Management Response to Plant Closings
Once the decision has been made to close or relocate, the
policies chosen by management can either facilitate or hinder
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the successful adaptation of employees and communities.
Two major studies, Portis and Suys 1 and Shultz and Weber, 2
emphasize the importance of early notice as a necessary in
gredient of any successful attempt to reduce the negative im
pact of the closure. In certain situations, it is argued, such
advance notice is crucial. In plants where the educational
level of the workforce is low, workers will be at a con
siderable disadvantage in the labor market. Consequently,
extensive retraining is necessary to prepare these displaced
workers to compete. Advance notice provides time for such
training to take place. Where jobs are not easily available or
where openings are clustered in certain occupational areas
that require previous training, advance notice provides time
to assess the current labor market, to mount counseling pro
grams (within the plant to be closed and elsewhere) so that
workers can find the most advantageous training and enter
these programs. Portis and Suys3 indicate that advance
notice provides workers with an opportunity to search for a
job while still employed, with the obvious benefits of addi
tional time for the search. Advance notice permits unions to
take an early and active role in advising their members on the
options available to them, minimizing confusion and hard
ship.
Management can also play an important role in
cooperative efforts by unions and communities to enhance
the effectiveness of assistance programs offered to displaced
workers. The most significant analysis of a positive effort by
management is the study of the Omaha plant closing by
James L. Stern. 4 An advance notice provision had been a
1. Bernard Portis and Michael Suys, The Effect of Advanced Notice in a Plant Shutdown:
A Case Study of the Closing of the Kelvinator Plant in London, Ontario (London, Ontario:
School of Business Administration, The University of Western Ontario, 1970).
2. George P. Shultz and Arnold B. Weber, Strategies for the Displaced Worker (New York:
Harper and Row, 1969).
3. Portis and Suys, op. cit., p. 27.
4. James L. Stern, "Evolution of Private Manpower Planning in Armour's Plant
Closings," Monthly Labor Review, December 1969, pp. 21-28.
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feature of the collective bargaining agreement between Ar
mour and the Amalgamated Meat Packers since 1961, a pro
vision that had been extended from 90 days to 6 months in
1967. When the plant finally closed, the 6-month period had
been extended by 3 months at the request of community
leaders. The role assumed by Armour during that period was
extremely helpful, and a comprehensive private manpower
training program was developed. Not only did Armour pro
vide a company assistance office and permit inplant counsel
ing, but it participated in the training and subsequent place
ment of former employees and took the initiative in gaining
the cooperation of other Omaha businesses who might ab
sorb the displaced workers. Frequently, severance pay
schedules are such that workers find them a disincentive to
early job search. The Armour plan, in contrast to most
management strategies, gave workers who found employ
ment elsewhere or who wished to enroll in federal training
programs the opportunity to start their new ventures before
the plant closed without the loss of severance pay. But the
Armour case is by no means typical. Moreover the generally
good outcomes for Armour workers were undoubtedly
related to local labor market conditions; unemployment
stood at about 3 percent in the Omaha area at the time.
A very different management response and one disadvan
tageous to the workers can be found in John Dorsey's study
of the Mack case. 5 It is plant that the management at Mack
did not wish their production workers to transfer to the new
facility. The initial announcement was made over a year
before the actual closing, and during that time management
sought to design a workforce that it wanted to keep at the
new facility. Production workers were discouraged from
transferring, while supervisory and white-collar employees
5. John W. Dorsey, "The Mack Case: A Study in Unemployment," in Studies in the
Economics of Income Maintenance, Otto Eckstein, ed., (Washington, DC: Brookings In
stitution, 1967).
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were encouraged to do so. Those who did not transfer had
considerable loss of earnings; about 23 percent of the sample
were still unemployed 10 months after the closings, despite
the advance notice. There is some reason to believe that the
length of post-shutdown unemployment is positively
associated with the size of the separation payment, although
the age of the worker and the size of the separation payment
are so closely tied that distinguishing between them is im
possible in this study.
The role played by early notice in alleviating problems of
workers was also investigated indirectly in several studies.
Lipsky's study of General Foods emphasizes transfers and
their outcomes, but it indicates that even a drawn-out period
of advance notice (here more than two years) did not affect
the duration of unemployment because the time was not used
effectively by workers for job search. 6 Indeed few sought
jobs seriously at all. Foltman7 noted that white-collar
workers take much greater advantage of the advanced notice
period for job search than do blue-collar workers; Portis and
Suys make the same point.
Management can also elect to provide opportunities for
workers to transfer to another plant. A fuller discussion of
this strategy, developed through union collective bargaining,
is included in a later section. In general, workers who
transfer do not seem to undergo the same difficulties as their
co-workers who do not transfer. Yet, as the Lipsky study
shows, many workers are reluctant to move despite en
couragement to transfer. Other studies, including Foltman,
emphasize the reluctance of blue-collar workers in particular

6. David B. Lipsky, "Interplant Transfer and Terminated Workers: A Case Study," In
dustrial and Labor Relations Review, January 1970, pp. 32-38.
7. Felician F. Foltman, White and Blue Collars in a Mill Shutdown (Ithaca, NY: New York
State School of Industrial and Labor Relations, 1968).
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to move. Strange8 and Levinson9 both, in different ways,
emphasize the ties to locality and community that bind
workers to areas where job possibilities are not promising.
Returning to the Stern study, it is clear that any one
management strategy for reducing the impact of plant clos
ings upon workers is often ineffective. Some combination of
early notice, inducements to transfer for those who wish it,
company intervention in the local community on behalf of
displaced workers, and opportunities for counseling, retrain
ing,, and job search must be provided to achieve positive
results. Generous severance payments and benefits also seem
to be necessary to ease the transition, although these ar
rangements can actually work to delay labor force reentry
for some workers.
For industries undergoing technological change, especially
those with relatively favorable labor relations, possibilities
exist for creative, inexpensive, and helpful programming.
Currently, as Business Week10 reported, efforts are being
made by Goodyear to use the services formerly reserved for
professional and supervisory personnel to assist permanently
displaced rubber workers in two sites. The program has just
become active, and data are not available for blue-collar
workers, although such assistance has apparently helped
white-collar and professional workers. Documentation and
analysis of these new outplacement programs, especially in
comparison to performance for upper-level workers, will be
important in determining which variables are crucial in the
reemployment of semi-skilled workers and others who have
historically borne the brunt of plant closings.
8. Walter Strange, Job Loss: A Psychosocial Study of Worker Reactions to a Plant Closing
in a Company Town in Southern Appalachia (Springfield, VA: National Technical Infor
mation Service, 1977).
9. David Levinson, "Displaced Pottery Workers' Adjustment to Layoff," in Weathering
Layoff in a Small Community, BLS Bulletin 1516, 1966.
10. Business Week, February 4, 1980, p. 86.
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A facility with a hostile labor relations climate, a seriously
failing industry, or a small facility with virtually no resources
might be unwilling, and in some cases unable to provide
assistance to displaced workers. But overall, management
policies before, during and after the closing can make a
significant difference in the shutdown experience.

Union Response to Plant Closings
The union response to economic dislocation and plant
closings is a direct outgrowth of the difficulties inherent in
labor's position as a conservative force in industrial change.
As indicated earlier, provisions of the bargaining agreement
are an important consideration in the decision to close a
plant. The decision, therefore, means that whatever
payments are specified in the event of shutdown are regarded
as acceptable costs to management, or at least as
unavoidable losses as in bankruptcy. Management can of
course come to the bargaining table aware of the possibility
of a closing during the life of the contract, and can therefore
make concessions about certain issues in exchange for pro
tection in case of shutdowns. The unions' concern is to be
sure that workers do indeed enjoy those benefits secured by
bargaining. But if labor is not informed about the possibility
of closing, it may not engage in hard bargaining concerning
that possibility or concerning the security provisions that
might be called for in that eventuality. On the other hand, in
those industries where technological change is common and
jobs often threatened, job security bargaining is a first
priority. Such industries and agreements can be found
throughout labor history: in the railroads, the press rooms,
and among the communication workers. The great problem
is that a union faced with a closing often has a contract that
does not address the issue at all. This is apparent in the
literature, with the exception of the Automation Fund Com
mittee work.
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In the standard literature, the usual closing occurs in a
unionized plant. Certain closings are chosen for study
because access can be gained to both plants and workers.
Unions are usually cooperative, seeing that much can be
gained, for the membership at large if not for the affected
workers, by such a study. Large unions are particularly at
tracted to research projects, partly because they support
substantial research efforts in similar areas themselves and
see researchers as powerful advocates.
All plants in the studies reviewed were unionized (although
not all unions are named), and major unions such as the
United Automobile Workers, the Textile Workers, the
Amalgamated Meat Cutters, and the United Steel Workers
predominated. An independent union, the United
Automobile Workers (with one exception) either did not
have a plant-closing provision in their bargaining agreement,
or such a provision was not mentioned, indicating that any
provision that existed must have been weak. Five studies in
dicated special early retirement provisions. Only in those
cases in which the Automation Fund Committee was active
had provisions been routinely included for early notice, interplant transfer, relocation assistance, and retraining. At
tention will be directed in chapters 4 and 5 to the translation
of these provisions into post-shutdown benefits. Never
theless, it is fair to say that collective bargaining has not been
successful in providing adjustment assistance to displaced
workers.
While organized labor seeks in the collective bargaining
process to provide the basis for a proactive position if and
when the plant closes, such bargaining is not always suc
cessful nor does it always receive high priority in negotia
tions as compared with other issues. Although most collec
tive bargaining agreements do not contain provisions re
stricting plant closings, the National Labor Relations Board
and the courts have extended to unions the right to such
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bargaining in some situations. A case in point is a recent
study by the Illinois AFL-CIO Manpower Assistance Pro
gram:
An employer only has to bargain over a reloca
tion decision that does not change the basic scope
or nature of the business. Such a decision usually
will involve a proposal to subcontract part of a
plant's operation, or relocate operations to other
plants producing the same products with similar
equipment. In some cases, unions have argued that
although specific provisions that prohibit an
employer from moving are not contained in the
contract, an implied prohibition exists based on the
substance of other related clauses in the contract.
[The National Labor Relations Act] requires the
employer to bargain over the effects of a planned
move or shutdown, even if no specific clause in the
contract has anticipated this situation. The
employer must negotiate, should the union request,
over issues such as severance pay, pensions, and
transfer rights. Failure by the employer to bargain
in good faith over these issues constitutes an Unfair
Labor Practice under Section 8(a) (5) of the Act.
The request by the union must however be timely,
and should the union fail to make a request, it gives
up the right to bargain over these issues. An
employer is further required to provide the union
with details about the relocation of bargaining unit
work, including 1) where the work is to be transfer
red. 2) the job classifications at the new site, 3) the
number of jobs at the new site, and 4) the com
parative costs of the operations. Should the
employer refuse to bargain, or only bargain in
superficial fashion over these areas, the union can
file a charge with the NLRB, who will then conduct
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a thorough investigation of the matter. However,
should an employer be found in violation of the
Act, remedies are seldom stringent enough to pre
vent an employer from shutting down, and indeed
the decision may well support the union and
workers, but come long after the plant in question
has locked its gates. Even where an employer's ac
tions are found by the Courts to be unlawful, vin
dication rarely comes without years of litigation.
Most often however, negotiation over the closing is
common and occurs fairly routinely.''
Recently it has become clear that the existence of a provi
sion requiring ad hoc bargaining in the closing situation can
help to bring about a favorable closing bargain. Indeed, a
new militant attitude, including threatened and actual resort
to the courts, has pervaded plant-closing bargaining, and
some benefits have accrued to workers as a result. There is a
dearth of evidence about ad hoc bargaining at the time of
closing, which may reflect the lack of bargaining or of
results. Research priority should be given to the investigation
of agreements concluded at the time of closing, to a close
analysis of their relationship to the contract in force at the
time, and to the process involved, since this type of bargain
ing, will surely become more common and more militant.
Within the literature reviewed there is also a lack of
evidence (indicating lack of activity) in respect to union sup
port services. In two cases, placement programs were begun.
In some other cases, notably the Automation Fund studies,
the unions were represented, if not heavily involved, in the
program. However, recent discussions with union represen
tatives indicate that the union representative can serve as a
facilitator, counselor, and a support system to laid-off
workers. Once again, this matter requires further study.
11. Preliminary Report on Plant Closings, Illinois State AFL-CIO Manpower Assistance
Program, 1980, p. 26.
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What the literature does indicate is significant for
American experience with plant closings in the past.
However, the future, with the new attitude toward closing
bargaining, may be different. But the changes which are oc
curring in the area of community response, and which are
sometimes effective, highlight the fact that one new role of
the union is that of partner to community members and to
local groups and agencies. In two cases below the union pro
vided facilities for one community program and cooperated
with another. Labor has also undertaken continued and
heightened involvement in legislative and other political in
itiatives.
Only a little evidence of this heightened activity on the part
of organized labor has surfaced in print. One example of
where labor took the leading role in the coordination of
available resources can be found in the Illinois State AFLCIO Manpower Assistance Program associated with the
closing of the Rochelle, Illinois, Swift Meatpacking Plant. 12
In summary, when confronted by a plant closing, unions
react by referring to the bargaining agreement in force, by
engaging in ad hoc bargaining, by forming coalitions within
and outside the community, and by pushing toward
legislative enactment of those provisions that have not been
achieved through collective bargaining. These reactions cor
respond closely to the range of activities that organized labor
normally undertakes. The new role taken by some groups in
organized labor, and the degree to which that role reflects
organized labor's interest in and talent for building coali
tions, is the most positive element in the union's reponse to
plant closings.

12. Ibid., pp. 31-37.
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Community Response to Plant Closings
In contrast to the roles of management and labor, which
have remained relatively unchanged over the past several
decades, communities beset by plant closings have taken
some new steps in recent years. Two decades ago, com
munities were mentioned in the plant-closing literature only
in reference to such variables as community size, local labor
market conditions, and the community's history of job loss.
In other words, communities were affected by plant closings
but remained relatively passive.
The recent active measures taken by communities in
response to economic dislocation are reflected in a certain
amount of the research, although this does not always ap
pear in the literature. Most of the material upon which the
following section depends comes from research reports,
lengthy memoranda, and other unpublished materials. There
are three general areas of community-centered studies. The
first focuses on community costs and the associated question
of what should properly be considered within the community
cost-accounting system. There is, therefore, some continuity
between studies of actual dollar amounts lost by com
munities through a closing and increased costs generated by
sponsoring services for a growing number of unemployed. A
second type of study reports on what happens after a closing
and can include discussion of worker-ownership and other
less developmental interventions. What distinguishes such
studies from standard plant-closing program evaluations is
the emphasis on the community as adjustment agent, rather
than the displaced workers, and on the programs designed to
assist them. Finally, a major study on the coordination of
community services after a shutdown is reviewed. While the
emphasis of this study is on interorganizational linkages and
the barriers to effective resource utilization, the underlying
problem is, of course, financial. Effective coordination of
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services is vital when resources for all services are increasing
ly constricted.
Policies and programs developed to assist the temporarily
unemployed and to aid disadvantaged groups in general have
not, for the most part, relied on local monies. However, the
increased demands on local services of all kinds during times
of high unemployment and economic dislocation places
communities and agencies within communities in a vise; just
as demand for services increases, funds to provide such ser
vices are cut. Kopolow and Ochberg spell out the conse
quences of this situation with respect to mental health ser
vices. 13 But the problem encompasses several other losses to
the communities as well. Jobs from the plant are lost and,
depending on the type of facility, a greater or lesser number
of other jobs in supplier plants may quickly follow. Should
the crisis last long enough, and the displaced workers'
residences be concentrated within the community, a
downturn in local commercial and business establishments
will also follow. A final ripple can occur in public sector
employment as lowered tax revenues force the layoff of
public employees.
Assessing community costs of plant shutdown is a research
area only now opening up. Although the complexity of the
research and the lack of precision to be expected in early
pilot studies are discouraging to deal with, two valuable
preliminary studies have been completed. In one, Carlisle
and Redmond14 outline the indicators by which they measure
community costs of plant closings; and in a companion piece
they present methodology, sources of data, and preliminary
13. L.C. Kopolow and Frank M. Ochberg, "Spinoff From a Downward Swing," Mental
Health, National Institute of Mental Health, 1976.
14. Carlisle and Redmond Associates and C & R Associates, Measuring the Community
Costs of Plant Closings: Overview of Methods and Data Sources, Federal Trade Commis
sion Report, May 1979; and Indicators for Measuring Community Costs on Plant Closings,
FTC Report, 1978.
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findings about the effect of plant closings on the cities of
Bridgeport, Connecticut and Durham, North Carolina.
While they do not attempt to estimate all the costs, they have
developed methods and indicators for this purpose. Current
ly, three research efforts are underway to assess total
costs in New England, in Youngstown, Ohio, and in
several Michigan communities. 15 None of these studies has
progressed beyond the data collection and analysis phase,
but it is expected that they will be developmental in nature
and that their publication will stimulate further work on the
costs to communities of plant shutdowns.
From the community perspective, services to assist in
worker reemployment and to smooth the transition period
are important in the short term, but community economic
development is obviously a long-term strategy to be prefer
red to adjustment to community reduction. Workercommunity purchases of industrial facilities threatened with
closing have, during the 1970s, given many communities
hope, for keeping a plant open obviates the need for dif
ficult, painful, and costly adjustment.
There is substantial literature on worker ownership; Stern,
Wood and Hammer, 16 and Whyte17 concentrate upon this
process, while Conte and Tannenbaum18 continue to
monitor the fiscal health of employee-owned enterprises.
Three brief case studies suggest that the new trend toward
15. Elliot Sclar at Columbia is completing one study while Jemadari Kamara is conducting
a cost study as part of dissertation research in The University of Michigan's Urban and
Regional Planing Program. Data are currently being analyzed by Scan McAlinden on the
costs of human services provided after a closing in Grand Haven, Michigan.
16. Robert N. Stern, K. Haydn Wood, and Tove Helland Hammer, Employee Ownership
in Plant Shutdowns: Prospects for Employment Stability (Kalamazoo, MI: The W.E. Up
john Institute for Employment Research, 1979).
17. William Foote Whyte, "In Support of Voluntary Employee Ownership," Society,
September/October 1978, pp. 73-82.
18. Michael Conte and Arnold Tannenbaum, "Employee Owned Companies: Is the Dif
ference Measurable," Monthly Labor Review, Vol. 101, No. 7, July 1978, pp. 23-27.
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employee ownership depends upon the local community and
upon the formation of a coalition of community members,
workers, local banks, federal agencies and scholars involved
in research in the area. An employee buyout of South Bend
Lathe (South Bend, Indiana) survived the first stage after
buyout, that is, the demonstration of sufficient continued
profitability. But, as William Foote Whyte has remarked,
there are two stages to such development, and all too fre
quently managers, in their effort to establish and maintain
profits, neglect labor-management relations just when such
relations should surpass ordinary corporate efforts at
cooperation. 19 At South Bend Lathe, problems mounted
over several years and have resulted in a well-publicized
strike, seen by many as one in which workers were striking
against themselves. With the settlement of the strike, steps
are being taken to reduce labor-management problems. A
similar disillusionment has occurred at Saratoga Knitting
Mills and the Mohawk Valley Community Corporation's
venture at the Library Bureau at Herkmer, New York, both
of which are reviewed by Zwerdling. 20 In neither case were
labor-management tensions eased by the buyout. After an
initial period of euphoria, management continued to func
tion as before while workers, sometimes in conflict with their
union and sometimes in concert with it, expressed discontent
with a system fundamentally unchanged. These situations
have convinced some observers that worker-ownership
should be accompanied by greater worker participation in
decision-making, if not by worker-management. Conte and
Tannenbaum have given support to those who see workerownership as a response that saves communities from the
losses incurred when a major manufacturing facility closes
by noting that profitability, at least on a modest scale if not
on the scale of a multinational corporation, is maintained by
19. Whyte, op. cit., pp. 78-80.
20. Daniel Zwerdling, Workplace Democracy (New York: Harper Colophon Edition,
1980), pp. 65-80.
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employee-owned businesses. 21 It is not clear what impact bad
labor-management relations characteristic of the second
stage of employee buyouts will have on profitability. Fur
ther, there is little as yet on the few situations in which
employee buyouts are combined with increased levels of
worker participation. Finally, as the section on legislative in
itiatives explains, employee buyouts, formerly funded in part
by federal agencies, will probably have to depend in the
future on state government or the private sector or both for
financial and technical assistance.
While it can be assumed that all communities are concern
ed about a shutdown and its consequences, not all com
munities respond in the same way. In the economic disloca
tion impact inventory, the U.S. Department of Labor's Of
fice of Trade Adjustment Assistance studied three cities after
shutdown: Talladega, Alabama; Horseheads, New York;
and Mansfield, Ohio. 22 Although the differences are strik
ing, certain similarities dictated the choice of study sites. The
plant closings were all removed from large labor markets and
were in cities of 100,000 population or less, where the
workers lived nearby. The closings resulted in unemploy
ment higher than the national average, for each location was
an established manufacturing area currently experiencing
long-term decline and stagnation. In each case, a significant
portion of the local population was heavily dependent upon
the affected industry. Further criteria for selection involved
eligibility for Trade Adjustment Assistance and the presence
of collective bargaining agreements with major national
unions, including contracts with seniority provisions inap
plicable elsewhere. All had health and pension plans and the
plants in Horseheads and Mansfield had both SUB and termination benefit plans. The displaced workers were mostly
21. Conte and Tannenbaum, op. cit., pp. 27-28.
22. Economic Dislocation Impact Inventory Study: A Pre-Test in Three Cities
(Washington, DC: Office of Trade Adjustment Assistance, Bureau of International Labor
Affairs, U.S. Department of Labor, November 1979).
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unskilled and had a limited education, and the manual skills
they did possess could not readily be transferred.
The studies sought to identify individual needs not met by
traditional forms of assistance, to obtain assessments of the
problems specific to the locale of the displaced workers, and
to identify local resources and explore whether these could
be mobilized to assist workers and the community. Despite
some difficulty in collecting data, the studies did present a
clear picture of economic dislocation in three cities, one par
ticularly important here in relation to the community's
responses.
The study team's interviews in Talladega revealed that in
dividuals and groups within the community expressed con
cern, but that practical results were limited. Local economic
development effort was stepped up, but the results of that in
creased activity, if indeed there were results, could not be
observed by the team in a short term investigation. Either the
nature of this increased activity was not explained to the
team, or the efforts had not taken shape by the end of the
study. There appears to have been no important community
agency, group or institution that did not express verbal sup
port, but there were limits to community action, and no
fruitful community response was observed.
In Horseheads, New York the impact on the community
was not especially severe, except for the loss of employment
and earnings. The secondary impact was limited, partly
because many workers commuted fifty or sixty miles to work
and the economic dislocation was spread outside the im
mediate area of Horseheads. While there were reports of the
usual social problems divorce, depression, and substance
abuse consequent upon unemployment, free counseling
was a help in alleviating them. The negative impact was also
minimized because some families had savings and some
workers were married women and thus secondary wage
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earners. The workers were reemployed eventually. Skilled
workers relocated, others retrained, and during the period of
adjustment the community expressed a sense of support. The
study team felt that the experience of recovery from the 1972
floods in the area may have helped the community to
organize for economic dislocation. Operation Help, organiz
ed by a joint effort of the union and the local community ser
vice groups, provided information on available assistance
programs and arranged for family and financial counseling.
The Chemung County Chamber of Commerce took an active
role in assisting workers with their creditors and helped to
identify possible jobs. The local community college organiz
ed a program to prepare workers to enter appropriate ad
vanced training programs even before trade adjustment
assistance certification was issued, with the understanding
that if certification was not issued, the program would pro
ceed without charge to the unemployed workers. Unfor
tunately a dispute arose, primarily jurisdictional in nature,
with the New York Department of Labor. General com
munity response in this situation was properly directed, and
difficulties arose only because of limited coordination ef
forts among groups who were involved in the plant closing
but outside the immediate community.
Mansfield, Ohio exhibits certain features of a classic plant
closing. The community is contracting by some 3.6 percent
each year. While younger workers in the area, which had an
unemployment rate of 7.9 percent when the closing was an
nounced, decided to leave Mansfield, many older workers
did not. A significant portion of the workers were in their
forties or fifties, and their adjustment became a matter of
concern for the community. Even before Trade Adjustment
Assistance became available, the community responded with
counseling, training, and job placement services, while other
agencies were mobilized and coordinated to offer special ser
vices.
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The Mansfield experience has received attention because
of its emphasis on retraining. The proposal that a program
be developed was made by Henry Fallerius, President of
North Central Technical College, and from that proposal
came Project Care, directed to the rubber workers affected
by the plant closing but open to all the unemployed in the
county. Counseling, training, and job placement were all
gathered under the Project Care umbrella. Centers were set
up throughout the area in schools and post-secondary in
stitutions and the union hall. Local schools contributed the
services of their counselors and the space and facilities for
classes. The Project appears to have been designed for the
skill level and career aspirations of the unemployed workers
and the needs of the local labor market. The first objective
for the retrained workers is to acquire jobs, and it is
understood that some may be obliged to leave the area to do
so.
The study of these three communities suggests that a sense
of concern is the first response of community members,
groups, and agencies to a plant closing, but that it cannot, in
itself, accomplish a great deal. The mobilization of groups
and resources to provide tangible support is the next essential
step, and communities that have had experience in previous
disasters, such as Horseheads, fare well in this phase of
response. Perhaps the question should be asked whether a
community should wait until disaster strikes to develop coor
dination and mobilization capacities. Finally, the key to suc
cess in Mansfield was a combination of concern, coordina
tion and mobilization, augmented by a realistic plan to solve
problems and a determination to use the resources of several
agencies of government. The study showed that even long
term government support, especially if uncoordinated, is no
answer for any community. It also showed that a community
with its own goals and objectives can use resources available
from local, state, and federal agencies to make the adjust-
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ment easier for workers and the community and to imple
ment an appropriate long term development plan.
To plead for increased coordination of services in the
aftermath of a plant closing has become a cliche. To praise
those communities that have developed coordinated
responses is common. What this indicates is that community
coordination, which means improved communication and
relaxation of territorial tensions, combined with planned
organizational and social change is a tough task. While we
know from organizational behavior research that a crisis
often produces such coordinated responses, only recently has
an action research project focused on a plant closing. In a
study which is already a classic, a team from the University
of Michigan's Institute for Social Research developed a
community-based program for reducing the social impact of
a plant closing. 23 While the authors, Taber, Walsh, and
Cooke, recognize that the impact of the effort cannot be ful
ly evaluated, their experiment drew together management,
the union, and community representatives into a temporary
inter-organizational system designed to mobilize available
human services. After the plant shutdown, the coordinating
effort in which the research team took a facilitating role as
change agents increased and enhanced the competence of the
community. However, the difficulties encountered and the
lack of total success reported provide evidence that, even
with the provision of skilled assistance in a major crisis,
communities and community agencies are not equipped to
identify and coordinate all available resources.
In summary, communities are as vulnerable to the plantclosing crisis as the displaced workers. The costs to com
munities have not been adequately assessed, but those costs
are considerable. Communities can respond passively to the
23. Thomas D.Taber, Robert A. Cook, and Jeffery T. Walsh, "Developing a CommunityBased Program for Reducing the Social Impact of a Plant Closing," Journal of Applied
Behavioral Science, Vol. 15(2), 1979.
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crisis, but if they take an active role in assisting those com
munity members most affected and thus reestablish the com
munity's vitality, they provide relief to those in need and a
central focus for the community itself. Communities must
perceive the problem, must mobilize and coordinate
resources, must form a plan best adapted to that
community's situation, and must win the support of com
munity members in implementing that plan. Difficulty can
be expected at every stage of the process, as the evidence in
respect to coordination of community services shows. Yet
communities that have experienced crises and developed cop
ing skills are far better prepared to meet future crises.

Legislative Initiatives in
Response to Plant Closings
Over the past decade, a great deal of political activity has
centered on the issue of plant closings. This activity has not
been able to promote legislation on the national level,
although workers have been enabled to buy facilities
threatened with closure through legislation originally
developed for rather broader reasons. Efforts at the state
level have been somewhat more successful, but most of these
are too recent for studies concerning them to have appeared
in the literature. What does surface are studies of employeeowned firms, displaying a strategy to combat plant closings
favored by a significant group of scholars, political activists,
community leaders, and growing numbers of labor leaders.
Much of the legislative activity and even more of the
literature concerning the politics of plant closings question
whether capital mobility should remain unrestricted. Despite
its underpinning of a significant research effort, the
quintessential political document embodying the perspective
is the Bluestone and Harrison study, Capital and Com-
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muni ties. 24 It is, however, only one of the studies now being
made by 15 or 20 individuals or groups who are concen
trating on plant-closing problems and the development of
political action to combat them. These researchers come
from unions, universities, and nonprofit social action or
research groups.
It is probably appropriate to identify the most radical
critics of the status quo with objections to unrestricted
capital mobility. However, the radical critics are joined in
their intervention efforts by other groups less obviously
critical of the disinvestment process. Despite differences in
political orientation and economic philosophy, the beginning
of a national coalition could be discerned in the early 1970s.
Efforts to save jobs for the Youngstown steel workers
enlarged and strengthened such organizations as the Ohio
Public Interest Campaign as well as the wider network of
persons and groups concerned about economic dislocation.
This alliance includes individuals who have held either con
servative or liberal positions on other matters but who have
been drawn to the plant-closing campaigns through cir
cumstance or, as in the case of several major academic
figures, because of a long-standing interest in research on
employee-ownership, employee-participation in decisionmaking, or the overall effects of plant closings. Whatever the
political and ideological shifts and compromises that have
been made over the past few years, it is clear that groups
once committed to simple community organizing efforts
have been transformed into political action groups. Further,
because of their diligent efforts to clarify the problems and
issues for themselves and because of their abilities to build
networks with organizations sharing some similar concerns,
24. Barry Bluestone and Bennett Harrison, Capital and Communities: The Causes and
Consequences of Private Disinvestment (Washington, DC: Professional Alliance, 1980),
pp. 16-55.
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the informal and unofficial plant-closing network is not in
itself a major research resource.
The major product of this network, its associates, and its
political allies has been proposed legislation that has subse
quently appeared on both the state and federal level. 25 State
legislation currently exists in Maine, Michigan and Wiscon
sin. All three statutes are considered relatively weak, but for
different reasons. Michigan Public Act 44 requires notifica
tion so that assistance to those firms where an employee
buyout is possible can be offered by the Michigan Depart
ment of Labor. Maine's law simply requires that severance
benefits be paid to displaced workers. The Wisconsin statute
(109.07), enacted in 1975, requires 60 days' notification for
establishments having more than 100 employees and man
dates a fine of $50 per worker for noncompliance, but this
statute has not yet been implemented. It is significant that
new and stiffer legislation has been introduced in both Maine
and Michigan.
Other states currently contemplating legislation include
Ohio, Delaware, Oregon, New York, New Jersey, Illinois,
California, Rhode Island, and Pennsylvania. Legislation
may also be introduced in Montana, New Hampshire, and
Indiana within the next year or two. These legislative in
itiatives face great opposition; some of them have been in
troduced in different forms on several occasions, only to die
in committee or suffer defeat. However an important
phenomenon is increasingly associated with these proposed
bills: the growth and development of new plant-closing
public action groups. Patterned in part upon the Ohio Public
Interest Campaign and adopting its strategies, new groups,
such as the Pennsylvania Public Interest Coalition, the
Illinois Public Action Council, and the Oregon Plant
25. William Schweke, Plant Closings: Issues, Politics and Legislation Briefing Book
(Washington, DC: Conference of Alternative State and Local Policies, 1980), pp. 42-52.
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Closure Organizing Committee, have been formed. Public
hearings, such as those in Rhode Island, New York, and
California, continue to focus public attention on these
issues.
The state-level legislation can be very simple, requiring
only some advance notification to workers,the community
and the state and setting a major or minor penalty for noncompliance. Maine, for example, mandated severance
benefits of one week's wages for every year worked by those
employed for more than three years. Only civil damages are
countenanced by this bill. Ohio's proposed legislation, on
the other hand, includes a full range of provisions.
Employers not facing bankruptcy and falling outside certain
other acceptable levels of business contraction and employ
ing more than 100 persons in an establishment that has been
more than five years in operation are subject to several re
quirements. In one proposed version, advance notification
of two years is required, while a bargained-down version re
quires only one year. Severance benefits similar to those of
Maine, one week's wages for each year of employment, are
mandated, A community assistance payment is also part of
the proposed Ohio legislation, requiring the payment of 10
percent of the total wages of employees who lose their jobs
because of closing. Willful failure to comply can result in the
issuance of an injunction prohibiting closure. Other states,
New York for example, propose criminal sanctions and
punitive fines. New York, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode
Island, and California also include employee-buyout provi
sions in their proposed plant-closing legislation.
As the political action side of this network gains ex
perience with plant closings and with the legislative process,
there is a tendency for proposed legislation to become more
comprehensive and to include short-range remedies such as
community action assistance as well as long-range options
such as employee-community purchase of the plants. Occa-
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sionally, as in Michigan, an exception can be observed;
political consideration made a simple bill providing minimal
assistance for employee-ownership options feasible at a time
when other measures were unlikely to be passed.
The same mix of concerns and strategies is seen in national
legislation. Since 1974, Representative William Ford of
Michigan has introduced successive versions of a National
Employment Priorities Act. In the most recent version,
unlike earlier formulations, the emphasis is on financing of
severance pay by the employer rather than by federal funds.
Communities would be the beneficiaries of a mandated pay
ment to the local municipality of 85 percent of their tax loss.
Another feature of the current bill would establish a Na
tional Employment Priorities Administration within the
Department of Labor to conduct investigations of planned
closings and to offer financial and technical assistance to
prevent them. Other bills that have been introduced and have
died in committee have focused more narrowly on one issue
or another. For example, the Employee Protection and
Community Stabilization Bill of 1979 would have called for
the continuation of employee health benefit plans but would
have restricted federal financial and technical assistance to
employee-buyout situations by denying them the assistance
offered by the Ford Bill to ailing industries.
The only legislative victory the plant-closing coalition can
claim on the national level is the Small Business and
Employee Ownership Act of 1980, Title V of Public Law
96-302. By this Act the Small Business Administration is
given authority to make loan guarantees to employee trusts
for the purchase of a business or expansion of a business.
These trusts may be part of an employee stock ownership
plan (ESOP) or come from another type of employee owner
ship. At present, the Administration is entitled to guarantee
up to $500,000 in loan authority. The possibilities involved
in the Title I enactment, taken together with financial
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assistance available from the Economic Development Ad
ministration of the Department of Commerce, the Urban
Development Action Grant Program of the Department of
Housing and Urban Development, and the activities of the
National Consumer Cooperative Bank, made the prospects
for a continued trend toward employee buyouts seem
favorable in late 1980. The current climate in the new ad
ministration and Congress hardly seems conducive to con
tinued development in this direction for the next several
years.
The future of the plant-closing coalition is uncertain. Its
past, brief as that has been, is an interesting example of
coalition formation. The themes that draw individuals and
groups together are often superficially similar but fun
damentally different. A major concern with employee par
ticipation in decision-making predates the association of
plant closing with employee-ownership, yet at several points
these concerns have coalesced, as the work of William Foote
Whyte shows. Early notification, for which many could lob
by, often concealed fundamental differences about what
should be done during the time gained and even whether
management should have the right to make the decision
without constraint. Should the plant-closing coalition sur
vive and thrive, it will surely move more forcefully into elec
toral politics.
A major conclusion of this chapter, indeed of this volume,
is that very little that is new has been recorded in the plantclosing literature since 1963. That is not to say that nothing
new has happened. The newest program, and program is
meant here in the largest sense, has been political. Although
the goals of the supporters of the plant-closing coalition dif
fer markedly, and indeed are in direct contradiction at times,
a resource network has been assembled. A priority for plantclosing research must be the continuing study of the political
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action and community organizing groups that have mobiliz
ed around this problem.

European Responses to Plant Closings
While this volume is concerned exclusively with the
American experience in plant closings and industrial disloca
tion, the new directions in the area of political initiatives
have led the plant-closing research and action community to
look at the European examples available. While numerous
scholars have followed European employment and training
programs and efforts to promote job security and occupa
tional mobility, there has been a recent resurgence of interest
in European policy. Two studies in particular, a report to the
Federal Trade Commission by Carlisle and Redmond in
197926 and the joint Report of the Labor Union Study Tour
in the same year27 illustrate the new tendency to acquire
useful program and policy models. Carlisle and Redmond
made an extensive search of the literature and initiated con
tacts with individuals and organizations active in policy
research on plant closings and plant-closing legislation
throughout Western Europe, including France, Sweden,
Germany, Belgium, and the United Kingdom.
Most European countries, in contrast to the United States,
do have some form of legislation intended to mitigate the
hardships following a plant closing. Job training and job
search assistance is available in all countries; France and
Sweden have the most extensive programs, with relocation a
focus of Swedish policy. Compensation payments are
widespread throughout Europe, again as a matter of public
policy enforced through legislation, in contrast to the United
26. Carlisle and Redmond Associates, Plant Closings Legislation and Regulation in the
United States and Western Europe: A Survey, Report to the Federal Trade Commission,
January 1979.
27. Economic Dislocation: Plant Closings, Plant Relocations and Plant Conversions, Joint
Report of Labor Union Study Tour Participants, May 1, 1979.
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States where such payments are matters for collective
bargaining agreements. European payments are justified
either by the conviction that worker transition should be eas
ed or that compensation to the worker for loss of his invest
ment in the job should be made. Pre-pension programs, the
early retirement option, are particularly important in the
French scheme. There is little evidence in European legisla
tion of penalties for companies that move, although in some
cases there are national funds to ensure payment to workers
in case of noncompliance or company default on severance
payments. In Great Britain, an attempt at locational regula
tion is made through incentives and disincentives to induce
new industries to locate in certain affected areas.
Those who have studied European legislation tend to con
clude that European countries generally have adopted,
through a variety of approaches, an active and helpful
posture toward displaced workers. The keystone of these ap
proaches continues to be early notification, which enables
workers to make the necessary adjustment more easily and
enables government, which plays a major role, to provide
compensation, services, and transition assistance effectively.

Summary
The management role in plant closings, with the exception
of some employability development programming, remains
one in which management attempts to minimize the costs
associated with closing. The role of organized labor, con
strained as always by the relative failure of collective
bargaining to provide job security and/or substantial adjust
ment assistance, has recently moved toward a closingspecific posture. New attitudes and capacities are generating
aggressive bargaining that seeks to extract as much adjust
ment assistance as possible. Unions have also become, in
some cases, leaders or partners in community coordinating
groups. Communities, once the passive element in the plant-
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closing process, are demonstrating concern and are showing
success in coordinating services and in new capabilities for
organizing campaigns to retrain workers and channel
economic development.
Legislative initiatives, a new category of plant-closing
responses, have not yet proved very successful. But in the
process of developing such legislation, an active network of
plant-closing research and action specialists has developed.
Although its future is uncertain, this plant-closing communi
ty could become increasingly visible as it provides training,
technical assistance, and support to groups who hope to pro
mote legislation and community initiatives. The successful
management of plant closings in some European cases con
tinues to be a leading source of policy and program models
for the increasing number of labor leaders, researchers,
political figures, officials, and activists who feel that the
American response to plant closings has been too little and
too late.

Chapter 4
Labor Market Re-entry
and the Reemployment Experience
Without question, the vast majority of plant-closing
research has centered on the displaced worker. The
demographics, job search methods, resources, and needs of
the displaced have all received attention. Yet research into
the displacement experience can be separated into two broad
concerns: while most of the literature since 1963 has focused
on program impacts, a significant portion of plant-closing
research has continued to examine the job search methods
and reemployment experience of those workers who either
chose not to participate in formal programs or for whom no
intervention was initiated. This chapter will examine the sec
ond group, reserving a study of program participants for the
following chapter.

Workforce Demographics
The following examination of the demographics of
workers considered in the literature under review is designed
both to present a vivid picture of the worker faced with a
plant closing and to provide a basis for comparison with the
program participants.
Although plant-closing research has been concerned with
different industries and geographical regions, a number of
common characteristics of the workforce emerge. First, the
67

68

Labor Market Re-entry

age of the displaced worker is quite high, ranging from 53.8
years at Packard1 to about 40 at the Armour site, 2 due in part
to reverse seniority layoff. When a firm fails, or when pro
duction has been gradually cut back before an announce
ment of closing, reverse seniority layoff may mean that the
average age of the workforce at the time of the closing has
risen. Since age is often associated with high seniority and
since case study participants had an average seniority rang
ing from 11.3 years at Omaha3 to 30 at Roanoke, 4 it seems
likely that the younger, less senior workers were the first to
lose their jobs. Indeed, many of them had been released long
before the research team ever entered the plant.
Given the high age and seniority of the plant-closing
workforce, then, low educational attainment comes as no
surprise. Formal education was as low as 7.2 years at
Packard, 5 while averaging as high as 10 years at a number of
other sites. Obviously such low educational levels have a
severe impact on retraining and development.
The tendency among plant-closing researchers to examine
only male-dominated, heavy manufacturing industries has
resulted in an underrepresentation both of racial minorities
and of female workers. While racial minorities constituted
45 percent of the Packard workforce, 6 7 of the remaining
studies reported that minority workers comprised less than
1. Michael Aiken, Louis A. Ferman, and Harold L. Sheppard, Economic Failure, Aliena
tion and Extremism, (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1968), p. 178.
2. James L. Stern, Kenneth A. Root, and Stephen M. Hills, "The Influence of SocialPsychological Traits and Job Search Patterns on the Earnings of Workers Affected by a
Plant Closure," Industrial and Labor Relations Review, October 1974, p. 112.
3. Stern, Root, and Hills, op. cit., p. 112.
4. Joan M. McCrea, The Reemployment Experiences of Workers Displaced in the Closing
of the American Viscose Plant at Roanoke (Virginia Bureau of Population and Economic
Research, University of Virginia, 1968), p. 7.
5. Aiken, Ferman, and Sheppard, op. cit., p. 178.
6. George P. Shultz and Arnold B. Weber, Strategies for the Displaced Worker (New York:
Harper and Row, 1969), p. 102.
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10 percent of the workforce; 8 studies made no mention of
race at all. The findings for females were similar. Although
females comprised as high as 56 percent of the workers at
West Warick, 7 most of the studies (19 out of 27) dealt with
female participation of less than 10 percent or made no men
tion of the sex distribution. Therefore, it is difficult to draw
valid conclusions about the employment and job search ex
periences of women or of minorities. Yet certain conclusions
can be drawn from the few studies that do show significant
levels of both groups.

Job Search
Where the labor market assistance programs are
unavailable or have been refused by the worker, announce
ment of closing means a return to the job market. Between
announcement and closing the worker must plan a job search
strategy. The basic questions are when to begin a job search,
where to look, and how to look. Plant-closing research of
fers substantial findings bearing on each of these decisions.
The decision to begin an early job search appears to be
associated with the worker's occupational status and the
availability of severance benefits. Portis and Suys, 8 in study
ing the effects of early notice at the Kelvinator plant in Lon
don, Ontario, note that while only 26 percent of the produc
tion workers left Kelvinator before the closing, no more than
one-quarter of the office, managerial, and executive staff re
mained until the shutdown. It was found that 82 percent of
those staying until the shutdown date listed "to get all
severance benefits" as a cause, while 31 percent said they
had looked for a job but could not find one, and 22 percent
7. William Devino, Arnold A. Raphaelson, and James A. Storer, A Study of Textile Mill
Closings in Selected New England Communities (Orono, ME: University of Maine Press,
1966), p. 111.
8. Bernard Portis and Michael Suys, The Effect of Advanced Notice in a Plant Shutdown:
A Case Study of the Closing of the Kelvinator Plant in London, Ontario, (London, On
tario: School of Business Administration, The University of Western Ontario, 1970), p. 8.
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said that they had been assured of a job after the termination
date. Of those leaving early, 83 percent had a good job offer,
while 17 percent said they did not know that severance
benefits were being offered. Thus Portis and Suys conclude:
"It is difficult to tell whether employment opportunities or
severance benefits were really the more important in keeping
workers at Kelvinator."
A more striking difference in the way the job search was
conducted was found by Foltman9 in polling the workers at
Wickwire. There only 41 percent of the respondents had
tried to find another job before termination. Only 19 percent
had made "modest or diffident probes of the labor market,"
while an additional 19 percent engaged in a serious and ex
tensive search. However, of much greater interest was the
apparent dichotomy between white-collar and blue-collar
workers. While half the white-collar workers undertook
either modest or intensive job search before termination, on
ly 35 percent of the blue-collar workers chose to do so. Again
issues of seniority, severance benefits, and lack of available
jobs were given as reasons for staying, while a good job offer
constituted the primary reason for leaving.
These two studies offer three possible reasons for the ap
parent dichotomy. First, the much higher percentage of
workers receiving "good job offers" appears to be directly
related to their occupational status, a fact that implies that
fewer blue-collar workers would leave the company before
shutdown because they had received fewer offers. On the
other hand, it is quite possible that white-collar workers may
have undertaken a more rigorous search or may simply have
developed superior techniques for finding new employment.
The latter possibility is favored by Foltman, who points out
that white-collar workers are usually able to take time off
9. Felician F. Foltman, White and Blue Collars in a Mill Shutdown, (Ithaca, NY: New
York State School of Industrial and Labor Relations, 1968), pp. 45-46.
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from work to search for employment and that they are apt to
be in touch with better information channels than their bluecollar counterparts.
Leaving the job for job hunting is, of course, not
easy for blue-collar workers in factories. To be
sure, some employers sent representatives to
Wickwire where some blue-collar employees were
interviewed on company time, but otherwise, these
workers made their employment forays on their
own time. An employed white-collar respondent
who found a job in another state remarked: "Due
to my management position my feelings would
naturally be different from others who were in the
union rank and file; however, I feel that it would
have helped all types of personnel to have been
alerted to the gravity of the situation at a much
earlier date. Even though I felt certain that a shut
down would occur (as early as the fall of 1962) I am
sure that the local management was not actually
aware of the exact situation until June 1963. " 10
Finally, the high percentage of workers listing severance
pay as their reason for remaining to the end leads one to
believe that severance benefits may have a negative effect on
blue-collar job search. If the employee must remain until
layoff in order to become eligible for severance benefits,
such benefits may actually slow down the job search of these
workers. By reducing the sense of urgency and creating in its
place a false sense of security, the additional income provid
ed by severance payments may encourage the worker to act
against his/her eventual best interests. And if the blue-collar
worker, as Foltman suggests, has in any case a poorer
perception of the labor market than does the white-collar
10. Ibid., p. 46.
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worker, the lure of severance pay may prevent the realization
that early job search is necessary. 11
The decision about where to look for a job has received
more extensive attention in the literature. Unlike research on
when to begin looking, studies on job search mobility have
had a wider scope than just the impact of occupational status
and severance benefits. Unfortunately, with the exception of
Foltman, we have only quantitative results rather than actual
search patterns. Therefore, many of the characteristics
outlined below are associated only with actual relocations
and not with those workers who looked for a job that would
require a move. As a result, we risk reporting associations
between demographics and job search mobility when we may
actually have been observing an association between worker
demographics and reemployability. Yet there are theoretical
reasons for believing that such demographics may have an
impact on both reemployability and job search mobility.
Thus, we present the association below, fully aware of the
danger of establishing a spurious relationship. When a
characteristic is associated only with job search results, the
accompanying theoretical arguments for an association with
job search mobility will be provided as well.
Occupational status appears to have an impact on job
search mobility. Foltman, in studying the mobility patterns
of white-collar and blue-collar steelworkers, notes that while
only 22 percent of the blue-collar workers at Wickwire
sought jobs more than 50 miles from the plant, 33 percent of
the white-collar workers did so. 12 He asserts that occupa
tional status, which forms one of the strongest associations
between an individual labor market trait and job search
mobility, affects the climate of the worker's job search.
White-collar workers have the better informational channels
\\.Ibid., p. 62.
12. Ibid., p. 66.
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and job search opportunities. As Foltman notes, better job
market information makes the white-collar worker more
aware of actual labor market conditions so that he is better
qualified to market his skills. High occupational-status
workers, because their acquaintances are more geographical
ly diverse and because they enjoy search time allowance
along with general preferential treatment, are able to "scout
out" new localities and employers and to reduce the uncer
tainties involved in relocation. Turning Foltman's argument
around, it can be argued that blue-collar workers lack vital
informational channels and thus find it more difficult to
properly appraise the potential costs and benefits of job
search mobility. Faced with a higher degree of uncertainty,
the blue-collar worker may actually perceive the net benefits
as insufficient to warrant the effort or simply choose not to
explore the unknown.
A worker's sex has also been linked to geographic mobili
ty. Joan McCrea13 has observed that only 15 percent of the
displaced female workers at American Viscose, as compared
with 24 percent of the males, relocated. While McCrea offers
no data on the characteristics of the female relocation par
ticipants, David Lipsky, 14 treating relocation patterns of
workers in General Food's transfer program, describes the
small percentage of women participants as "single career
women" or women with husbands who were relocating.
Secondary income status of females, it can be argued,
reduces the opportunity for relocation and thus reduces their
job search mobility. Risking a primary income source to en
sure a secondary one is simply not a rational choice, and as a
result the job search mobility of secondary income earners
may be limited to the local labor market. Indeed, secondary
income status may explain the actual disparity in relocation
13. McCrea, op. tit., p. 20.
14. David B. Lipsky, "Interplant Transfer and Terminated Workers: A Case Study," In
dustrial and Labor Relations Review, January 1970, p. 194.
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rates and a potential disparity in mobility between males and
females. But other scenarios are possible. Women may be
more sensitive to risk factors, or they may value family or
community ties more than men and thus wish to remain in
the same locality. But until the data to validate any of these
hypotheses are obtained, no conclusions are possible.
Age is another relocation barrier mentioned in the
literature. While several plant-closing studies have noted the
negative effects of age on the worker's propensity to relocate
(i.e., Lipsky, Aiken, Ferman and Sheppard), McCrea gives
an especially vivid account. 15 While 32 percent of those
under 45 moved out of Roanoke, only 18 percent of those
over that age did so. A primary determinant of such im
mobility on the part of those over 45 at Viscose, and an ex
planation common to most research on the subject, was the
high level of community attachment of this group. About 75
percent of the Viscose workers had been employed at the
plant for more than 30 years and half the workforce had kept
the same residence for more than 20 years. Such commit
ment to the community increases the costs of relocation. The
costs of leaving home, family, and friends after two or three
decades is often prohibitively high. It must also be
remembered that for the vast majority of older workers at
any plant, the potential benefits are low. For the average
displaced worker over 50 years of age, future working life is
short. This decline cuts down the potential income disparity
between moving and successful or unsuccessful local labor
market search, thereby reducing the benefits of relocation.
High community attachment and low income disparity be
tween local and nonlocal employment certainly would reduce
the job search efforts of older workers outside the communi
ty. Activity outside the local labor market would thus be ex
pected to be minimal, but here again theories must remain
speculation until proper data are available.
15. McCrea, op. cit., p. 20.
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A final demographic associated with the relocation deci
sion is education. Lipsky16 observed a slight tendency among
the more educated to move more readily than their less
educated co-workers. While Lipsky does not offer any
theoretical explanation for this result, education may be
linked to relocation in an indirect manner. Since higher
education is often a valuable prerequisite for advanced oc
cupational status, the association between education and
relocation may be governed by the fact that a higher status
position carries with it more company-assisted relocation op
portunities and better information channels to conduct a
wide job search. Educational attainment is also a function of
a worker's age. Higher educational attainment may be
associated with younger workers (up to a point) and it may
be the worker's age and not his/her education that is the
critical factor. Whether the correlation between education
and relocation is indeed a spurious one has not been tested
by plant closing research. 17

Job Search Methods
Finally research has examined actual job search methods
of the displaced. While most methods appear to be informal,
a small group of displaced workers has utilized placement
agencies. In this section, we shall attempt to differentiate
between formal and informal job search patterns by the
demographic features of the workers and to emphasize the
apparent superiority of informal job search methods.
Nine of the twenty plant-closing studies provided informa
tion on the workers' propensity to utilize public or private
placement agencies as a means of supplementing or sup16. Lipsky, op, cit., p. 195.

17. Two other studies, Stern, Root and Hills, op. cit. and James L. Stern, "Consequences
of Plant Closure," Journal of Human Resources, Winter, 1972, report that the company
transferred workers had slightly lower educational levels than those who remained behind.
However, such differences were very small.
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planting their individual job search efforts. All but two of
the nine studies focused on the worker's response to aid of
fered through the local employment service or through a
joint effort between the Armour Automation Committee
and the appropriate state unit. The percentage of workers
responding to such assistance ranged from a meager 1 per
cent at Fort Worth18 to a healthy 70 percent at Plainfield. 19
Stern, Root, and Hills20 provide some information on who
these people are and why they chose to enlist the services of a
placement agency. For the workers in Omaha, the average
age of the displaced worker who used a public placement
agency was higher than that of the worker entering the
market on his own. The former had a mean age of 39.2,
while the latter had a mean age of only 37. This moderate
difference suggests that the age variable may have some ef
fect on the worker's decision to seek institutionalized
assistance. Constantly reminded of the difficulty that older
workers can have in finding adequate employment, the older
labor market entrant may perceive an advantage in enlisting
the help of a third party in dealing with potential employers.
The placement-assisted workers at Omaha also had greater
seniority than their unassisted counterparts, averaging 11.3
years of company service compared to only 10.8 years for the
latter. 21 This slight difference in mean seniority could be in
terpreted as a tendency for long-time workers, who have not
had to seek work over a long period of time, to seek
assistance when necessary; long absence from the job hunt
makes them the most likely candidates to benefit from
assistance. Workers with recent success in finding employis. George P. Shultz, "The Fort Worth Project of the Armour Automation Committee,"
Monthly Labor Review, January 1968, p. 55.
19. John W. Dorsey, "The Mack Case: A Study in Unemployment," in Studies in
Economics of Income Maintenance, Otto Eckstein, ed. (Washington, DC: Brookings In
stitution, 1967), p. 189.
20. Stern, Root and Hills, op. cit., p. 112.
21. Stern, Root and Hills, op. cit., p. 112.
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ment are more apt to be confident of their own job-finding
skills and thus less likely to feel that they need formal
assistance. Again, this theory has remained untested by the
current research.
Finally, 61 percent of the workers who sought formal
assistance were unskilled, 22 and it can be hypothesized that
they also were trying to offset a negatively correlated
reemployment characteristic by formal assistance. In fact,
the 40 percent minority composition of the assisted group,
the .9 year differential in their educational attainment, and
the $151 yearly salary disparity at Armour may all be
evidence supporting the view that workers apply to place
ment agencies as a way of compensating for perceived disad
vantages with respect to reemployment.
If the workers freely applying to a placement agency do in
deed possess characteristics that put them at a disadvantage,
this may partially justify the low success rates of placement
programs in general. Excluding the Sioux City program
where 450 out of 600 workers were placed, 23 placement has
ranged from one-third of the participants at the oil firm in
Hammerman's study24 to a meager 5 percent at Plainfield. 25
If no other efforts had been made by the applicants, 66 to 95
percent of the job seekers dealt with in these studies would
have remained unemployed. While we have no employment
data on those workers the employment service failed to
place, it is fairly safe to assume that a substantial number of
them found employment without formal assistance or in
spite of the placement program. It is also worth noting that,
in one study, those reemployed through a placement service
22. Stern, Root and Hills, op. cit., p. 112.
23. Eaton H. Conant, "Report and Appraisal: The Armour Fund's Sioux City Project,"
Monthly Labor Review, September 1965, p. 1300.
24. Herbert Hammerman, "Five Case Studies of Displaced Workers," Monthly Labor
Review, June 1964, p. 664.
25. Dorsey, op. cit., p. 189.

78

Labor Market Re-entry

have had lower post-shutdown earnings than the unassisted
workers. Stern, Root, and Hills26 note, in the only study
comparing the post-shutdown earnings of these groups, that
assisted workers averaged $7,120 per year while unassisted
workers averaged $7,875 per year. While it is true that the
assisted workers also had lower pre-shutdown earnings than
the unassisted, the disparity has grown since the shutdown
(from $251 before closing to $946 by 1971). Given the low
participation rates among displaced workers in agency pro
grams and the low rates of agency success generally in
lower-paying jobs one can only conclude that public and
private employment agencies play a relatively minor role in
finding jobs for the displaced.
For most job hunters, informal methods have proved
relatively successful. Portis and Suys27note that 38 percent of
the displaced Kelvinator workers found new employment
through direct application, 21 percent through a lead provid
ed by a friend or relative, 9 percent through newspaper ads,
and 8 percent through company contacts. Only 19 percent
found employment through a placement service. While all
displaced workers use informal channels to some extent,
Foltman notes a significant difference in job-seeking
behavior between blue-collar and white-collar workers:
From the responses on job hunting before termina
tion it appears that white-collar respondents ap
proached their problem in a more logical and
systematic fashion than the blue-collar
respondents; they [white-collar workers] embarked
on a job search, sent letters and resumes of ex
perience to employers, and used other public and
private services. On the contrary, many of the bluecollar respondents, rather than determining in ad26. Stern, Root and Hills, op. cit., p. 112.
27. Portis and Suys, op. cit., p. 19.
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vance what employer needs actually were, applied
in person, knocking on doors almost at random to
indicate their availability. 28
Foltman also notes that while white-collar workers tended to
maximize their efforts to find the best job available, bluecollar workers, faced with the prospects of continued
unemployment, tended to take the first job offered them.
This was especially true of blue-collar groups who were
older, less educated, and whose finances were severely
strained.
Palen and Fahey, 29 in comparing the job search efforts of
displaced workers under and over the age of 50, note a
decrease in effort among older workers. While 40 percent of
the displaced Studebaker workers had applied for 5 or more
jobs and 25 percent had applied for from 10 to 20 jobs,
workers over 50 generally made fewer job applications. The
authors contend that this tendency on the part of the older
worker is not due to a lack of interest, but rather to his ac
ceptance of the situation; it is unclear whether or not this is
indeed the case, for both factors could be involved here.

Job Search Summary
In summary, the white-collar worker, presumably better
informed about the labor market and often able to look for a
job on "company time," may concentrate search activities
into a period shortly before or after announcement of im
pending closure. In contrast, the blue-collar worker, less able
to search while still employed and presumably strongly
motivated by a desire to secure severance pay, is less likely to
look seriously for another job before termination. In addi28. Foltman, op. tit., p. 68.
29. J. John Palen and Frank J. Fahey, "Unemployment and Reemployment Success: An
Analysis of the Studebaker Shutdown," Industrial and Labor Relations Review, January
1968, p. 239.
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tion, some displaced groups seem more likely to step outside
the local labor market for employment. We have a little data
on job search mobility, but there are strong theoretical
grounds for arguing that white-collar, young and male (or
primary income) workers are the most far-ranging in their
search. Finally, displaced workers have the opportunity to
use formal employment organizations, but participation has
remained small for the most part and shows a slight tendency
to be comprised of older, high seniority, minority, low-skill
workers with inferior education. If the data on the Omaha
workers can be generalized, it appears that workers with
some disadvantage as compared with others are more likely
to choose formal assistance as a way of compensating. While
such assistance has provided a modest number of the ap
plicants with jobs, a majority of workers find jobs through
other means. While all workers make applications in person
and/or rely on friends for leads, white-collar workers under
take a more systematic and organized job search than do
their blue-collar counterparts, and older workers appear to
make the fewest contacts of all in their efforts to find a job.

Reemployment Experiences
The measure of a successful job search is employment.
While we have noted that several worker demographics ap
pear to have an impact on job search, it is equally important
to remember that the characteristics of a worker also have an
impact on the opportunity for stable employment with com
parable income. This section outlines those environmental
and personal characteristics that relate to the worker's
reemployment opportunities and describe the quality of the
worker's post-closing employment.
Other factors besides job search methods and intensity
play a large role in the reemployability of displaced workers.
Of primary importance is the condition of the local labor
market. When demand for labor is high, the displaced
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worker can of course secure a new job much more easily than
in times of scarcity. In many cases the closing of a large
employer in a relatively small labor market, may mean that
the number of displaced workers far exceeds the number of
available local jobs. As a case in point, Dorsey30 reports that
the number of workers displaced (as a percentage of the total
nonagricultural employment in the local labor market) was a
determinant in the duration of the unemployment of Mack
workers. The worker, no matter how intensive or resourceful
his job search, may fail to find a job if few are available.
The strongest association established in the literature be
tween a worker demographic and reemployability has been
that of age. In virtually all the studies to date that examine
the determinants of reemployability (Dorsey; Aiken, Ferman
and Sheppard; Hammerman; McCrea; Shultz and Weber;
Turner and Whitaker; Stern; Portis and Suys) the conclusion
has been the same: age is negatively related to reemployabili
ty. Hammerman31 notes that, in four out of five case studies
he undertook, workers over 45 years of age had significantly
higher unemployment rates than did those below that age. In
the fifth case, many of the laid-off older workers voluntarily
retired, only to reenter the labor force by the time the survey
was taken. Where narrower age breakdowns were available,
Hammerman found the highest unemployment rates in the
55 to 59 age group. Similar findings were noted by Lipsky: 32
workers over 55 displaced from the Baker plant were
unemployed for an average 23.6 weeks, while the average
worker remained without work for 18.6 weeks.
Several explanations have been offered, one of the most
common being discrimination. Turner and Whitaker33 could
30. Dorsey, op. tit., p. 199.
31. Hammerman, op. tit., p. 667.
32. Lipsky, op. tit., p. 199.
33. Robert G. Turner and William M. Whitaker, "The Impact of Mass Layoffs on Older
Workers," Industrial Gerontology, Winter 1973, p. 21.
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Summary of Attempts to Quantify the Impact
of Selected Demographics on Unemployment
Variable
Age
Sex (1 = female)
Race
Seniority

Lipsky3
.3331
(.1246)
4.2261
(2.9696)

-3.9408
(1.9133)
-1.8621
(1.7703)
-2.3444
(1.8338)

Unskilled

White collar
Foreman
Area impact
Single female
Occupation
Married female
husband not
working

.291

-.085

Semiskilled

Severance pay

Palen &
Faheyc

-.2655
(.2635)

Skilled

Number of
dependents
Other weekly
income
Wage before
termination
Education

Dorseyb
.1514
(.0235)

-1.0547
(.6302)
.0196
(.0227)
-.0448
(.0791)
-.5553
(.4850)
.0003
(.0018)

.005

-1.5809
(.6402)
-1.2467
(1.8054)
-1.4032
(2.3444)
57.3002
(21.6100)
-5.1254
(1.9553)
-.079

-2.7719
(.9371)
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Variable

Lipsky3

Single male
Married male
wife not working
R2

.19

Dorseyb
-2.7340
(1.3194)
-4.9338
(1.2002)
.298
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Palen &
Faheyc

.132

SOURCES: David B. Lipsky, "Interplant Transfer and Terminated Workers: A Case
Study," Industrial and Labor Relations Review, January 1970, p. 204.
John W. Dorsey, "The Mack Case: A Study in Unemployment," in Studies in the
Economics of Income Maintenance, Otto Eckstein, ed. (Washington, DC: Brookings In
stitution, 1967), p. 199.
J. John Palen and Frank J. Fahey, "Unemployment and Reemployment Success: An
Analysis of the Studebaker Shutdown," Industrial and Labor Relations Review, January
1968, p. 242.
a. Dependent Variable is number of weeks unemployed. Standard errors are in paren
theses.
b. Dependent Variable is number of months unemployed. Standard errors are in paren
theses.
c. Dependent Variable is the probability of being unemployed. Regression coefficients are
beta weights. Standard errors were not given.
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find no significant difference in the education or training
backgrounds of displaced workers within the 55 to 70 and
the 45 to 54 age groups that could account for the differences
in their respective employment rates. They conclude that age
discrimination is still a leading problem for older job
seekers, and that it may take several forms. First, employers
commonly see the older worker as less productive than a
younger one. While several interest groups and a small body
of research have come to the conclusion that this is a
misconception on the part of the employer, many employers
perceive increasing age as a signal of reduced productivity
and are unwilling to hire an older worker. Even if the older
worker escapes the unproductive label, he may still have to
contend with the stigma of being "untrainable." While
Whitaker and Turner34 and Conant35 point to the willingness
of older workers to undertake retraining, many employers
and administrators still believe that "you can't teach an old
dog new tricks."
Furthermore, an older worker may be perceived by the
company as a "poor investment." The older worker lacks
the long-run potential of the younger, and may be denied a
job on that ground alone. Financially, the older worker will
cost the company in pension contributions and accident in
surance coverage rates. Al Slote is concerned with this finan
cial perspective in his book, Termination, based on personal
interviews with workers displaced in the 1965 closing of the
Baker paint plant. Here he speaks of Henry Burns, a healthy
58-year-old displaced worker, who is looking for a new job:
"The first place I went to was another paint plant,
Riis-Moran. I figured they could use a man with
paint plant experience but they were all fill' up,
they said. Over at Fisher Body I saw they had an
34. Ibid., pp. 14-21.
35. Conant, op. cit., pp. 1300-1301.
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opening for a jitney driver. Well, if anyone was
qualified to drive a jitney I was the man. I drove
jitneys at Baker for almost twenty-five years. . . .
They read over my record and told me to come in
and take a medical test. The M.D. gave me a test
and said my blood sugar was too high. They
wanted to know whether I had a history of
diabetes. I told them no, but they said they couldn't
take a chance on me because of my blood
sugar. ..." One Saturday shopping with his wife,
he ran into a guy who used to work at the Baker
plant. The guy told Burns he ought to put in
another application at Riis-Moran. They were hir
ing more guys. "Call them again," he said. "It
won't cost you anything to call them." Burns
decided his friend was right, even though it had on
ly been two months since he'd inquired at RiisMoran and they had checked over his twenty-six
years put in Baker and felt sorry and didn't have a
job for him. Still he had nothing to lose, so he
telephoned down there Monday morning and talk
ed with the personnel man. They pulled out his old
application and after a few minutes studying it,
told him to come down and see them. ... To his
amazement they hired him on the spot. . . . When
he reported to work the next day there were more
papers to sign. And among the things he had to sign
he found a waiver of any claims to a pension at
Riis-Moran. It was in their labor contract that a
man had to have at least ten years' seniority to be
eligible for a pension. And compulsory retirement
was sixty-eight years of age. "I had just turned
fifty-nine two weeks before. So I would just miss
out on ten years if I worked to sixty-eight. I'd miss
out by two weeks. After twenty-six years I missed
out on a pension at Baker by one year, and now if I
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live that long, I'll miss out by two weeks on a pen
sion at Riis-Moran." Burns, who prides himself on
planning carefully, on thinking things through,
does not see any connection between Riis-Moran
turning him down two months ago when he was
fifty-eight and signing him on now that he's fiftynine.-36
While such a scenario may help to explain part of the
discrepancy found between certain groups of older workers,
it does not entirely account for the disparity. Yet in some
situations, union-negotiated benefits may hurt the older job
seeker: pension and medical benefits make the older worker
a greater risk or increase his cost to the employer, who ac
cordingly finds him a less attractive candidate for employ
ment.
An increasing number of researchers, especially Lipsky37
and Portis and Suys, 38 find that seniority may also have a
negative effect on the workers' reemployment opportunities.
Not only does high seniority imply that a long time has elaps
ed since a job search, as mentioned before, it may also pre
vent the worker from looking for a job at the most advan
tageous time. When a plant closes, the last workers to be laid
off are those with the highest seniority. By the time they are
released, many lower-seniority workers have already covered
the local job markets and taken many of the available open
ings. While this is a plausible hypothesis, it can also be
argued that since the younger, low-seniority workers have
more education and other attractive labor market qualities,
they might have secured these jobs in any case. If this is true,
releasing high-seniority workers first may not help offset the
problems they encountered in finding new employment.
36. A. Slote, Termination: The Closing of Baker Plant (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill,
1969), pp. 191-194.
37. Lipsky, op. cit., p. 202.
38. Portis and Suys, op. cit., pp. 13-14.
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An association has also been established between educa
tion and reemployability. While Aiken, Ferman and Sheppard, 39 and Turner and Whitaker40 find no association be
tween these two variables, primarily due to the unusually
similar educational levels among the workers at these two
plants, other researchers have found a positive association.
In their study of the unemployment determinants of displac
ed Studebaker workers, Palen and Fahey41 noted that the
greatest portion of the Studebaker unemployed had only a
grammer school education. Similar findings were reported
by Hammerman,42 Lipsky,43 and Portis and Suys. 44 Ham
merman noted that displaced workers who had completed
high school had substantially lower unemployment rates
than those who had not, but observed only a slight difference
in the unemployment rates among those who had not finish
ed high school.
While educational attainment is obviously associated with
many other variables that affect reemployability (i.e., age
and occupational status), Palen and Fahey45 draw some con
clusions as to the effect of education that are consistant with
their own findings and those of Hammerman as well. Since a
high school diploma is often used as a screening device by
employers to weed out workers perceived as untrainable,
undesirable, or underqualified, many workers may be ex
cluded without careful consideration being given to their
abilities. Thus lack of a formal education may greatly reduce
the reemployment opportunities of the displaced worker and
increase his length of unemployment.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

Aiken, Ferman and Sheppard, op. tit., pp. 31-32.
Turner and Whitaker, op. tit., p. 17.
Palen and Fahey, op. tit., p. 240.
Hammerman, op. cit., p. 667.
Lipsky, op. tit., p. 199.
Portis and Suys, op. tit., p. 15.
Palen and Fahey, op. tit., p. 240.
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A worker's race may also have a critical effect on his
reemployment potential. Palen and Fahey46 note that at the
Studebaker plant in South Bend, Indiana nonwhites had
significantly higher unemployment rates than whites. While
39.9 percent of the whites were unemployed four months
after the shutdown, 60 percent of the nonwhites were still
looking for employment. Aiken, Ferman and Sheppard47
note a similar result: almost 40 percent of blacks were
unemployed 19 months after the closing, compared with
only a quarter of the white workers. Almost twice as many
whites as blacks obtained jobs immediately following the
closing of the Packard Plant.
The most common explanation here is racial discrimina
tion. According to Shultz and Weber, 48 several well-qualified
black welders were unable to find employment in the Fort
Worth area, although white welders of equal training had lit
tle difficulty in doing so. Shultz and Weber could only con
clude that racial discrimination was still prevalent in the job
market. While one might contend that differences in jobsearch techniques exist, both Ferman and Harvey49 and
Shultz and Weber50 point out that minority workers are
usually more willing to accept lower-paying or part-time jobs
immediately following the shutdown than are whites. This
would account for a possible disparity in post-shutdown
earnings between whites and blacks, but not a significant
employment disparity in favor of whites, given the abun
dance of low-paying jobs found in the American economy.

46. Palen and Fahey, op. cit., p. 238.
47. Aiken, Ferman and Sheppard, op. cit., p. 133.
48. Shultz and Weber, op. cit., p. 168.
49. Louis A. Ferman and Scott Harvey, "Job Retraining in Michigan," in Retraining the
Unemployed, Gerald Somers, ed. (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1968), pp.
213-253.
50. Shultz and Weber, op. cit., pp. 97-125.
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Racial minorities often carry with them the same stigma as
older workers. Many minorities are thought to be less pro
ductive than whites by misinformed employers. Also, racial
minorities (like older workers) tend to be cast as hard to train
or "untrainable," and employers choose white applicants
under the assumption that they will avoide excessive training
costs. Both these beliefs are sheer illusions, but they can be
difficult obstacles to a minority worker seeking reemployment.
Despite the tendency of plant-closing research to center on
male-dominated industries, differences in the post-closing
employment status of men and women have been observed.
In two of the five case studies of displaced workers where
meaningful comparisons were possible, Hammerman51
found female unemployment rates almost three times as high
as those of men. In one case, seven out of eight women had
been out of work six months or more, compared with one
out of three men. In another case, two out of three women
were unemployed as compared to one out of four men. And
such findings are not unique to Hammerman. Lipsky" notes
an equally clear disparity at General Foods, where
unemployment lasted on the average 24.8 weeks for females
and only 16.5 weeks for males. Robert Brandewein, 53 in his
study of displaced defense workers, reports the average
length of unemployment as 14.3 weeks for men and 23.4
weeks for women.
Whether females carry the same stigma with them as the
older or minority worker has not been explored by plantclosing research. It is also possible that supplementary in
come status may affect job search intensity and thus
reemployment success. However, this seems much less likely,
51. Hammerman, op. cit,, p. 667.
52. Lipsky, op. cit., p. 199.
53. Robert Brandewein, "Employment Experience of Discharged Defense Workers,"
Monthly Labor Review, October 1965, p. 1213.
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since one would assume that the same factors that lead these
workers into the labor market initially would remain un
changed by the closing of the plant and may indeed inten
sify if the woman's spouse was also employed at the plant.
On the other hand, women may have less information about
the local labor market and may be experiencing disadvan
tages similar to those experienced by blue-collar workers
relative to their white-collar counterparts. Until plantclosing research deals with these problems directly, we can
only conclude that females do experience some form of sex
discrimination in their search for post-shutdown employ
ment.
Not only do women experience longer periods of
unemployment than men, they appear to be discriminated
against on the ground of age at a much earlier point in their
lives. Hammerman54 records that the highest level of
unemployment reached by men was between the ages of 55
and 59, but that women experienced peak unemployment
between 45 and 54.
Another important characteristic in the search for
reemployment is the possession of a transferable skill or
skills. In Foltman's study of displaced steel workers, 55 81
percent of the professional and other white-collar
respondents obtained jobs, against 56 percent of the bluecollar workers. Of the latter group, 36 percent of the skilled
respondents found employment as opposed to only 20 per
cent of the unskilled. Hammerman56 also found a higher
unemployment rate among the less skilled workers in each of
his five case studies. When hourly earnings were based on
skill, it was found that the workers with the highest
unemployment rates were those with the lowest earning
54. Hammerman, op. cit., p. 668.
55. Foltman, op. cit., p. 110.
56. Hammerman, op. cit., p. 668.
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levels. Aiken, Ferman and Sheppard57 found that skilled
workers averaged seven months unemployment, as com
pared to 11.5 months for the semi-skilled and 13.8 months
for the unskilled worker.
While such employment differentials may be a function of
the different occupational status groups, there is no denying
that the possession of a transferable skill, in and of itself is a
great asset to the displaced worker. Such qualities tend to
reduce the on-the-job training time necessary for these
workers to begin producing on a profitable basis for their
employer. This obviously puts the skilled or high occupa
tional status workers in an advantageous position relative to
their unskilled counterparts. It should also be noted that
skilled workers qualify for both skill-related and unskilled
employment thus increasing the changes of their reemployment relative to the unskilled workers.
In conclusion, it is again worth noting that these distinct
demographic characteristics are interrelated. Older workers,
simply because of their birth dates, are likely to have less
education than their younger co-workers. Because they are
also likely to have more seniority, they are apt to be among
the last to be released from their job. Thus more than one
deterrent to reemployment may be exhibited by a single
worker. Such multiple characteristics may also exist for
racial minorities, who may not only confront labor market
discrimination but may also have received less education
than their white co-workers. Females may face sex
discrimination in the labor market, and have often been
denied access to valuable manufacturing trade skills as well.
Such multiple disadvantages undoubtedly reduce the
reemployability for each group.
In evaluating the overall economic consequences of local
labor market re-entry, it is worth noting that the average
57. Aiken, Ferman and Sheppard, op. cit., p. 32.
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length of unemployment for all demographic groups is
substantial. In the closings surveyed by this review, the
average length of unemployment ranges from 22 weeks for
the American Viscose worker to some 16 weeks for workers
in the Hammerman study, 58 while Aiken, Ferman and Sheppard found that the average white Packard worker had 10
months of unemployment in the two years following closing.
These statistics are in part a reflection of the state of the local
economy during the shutdown period. Unemployment was
as high as 8.8 percent of the Roanoke workforce during the
closing, while Hammerman notes a substantial unemploy
ment rate of approximately 6 percent in all five SMSA's
related to this study. Yet, even in times of prosperity, many
displaced workers have had difficulty securing employment.
Palen and Fahey write that while unemployment in South
Bend was only 2.4 percent at the time of the first layoffs, 42
percent had not found work four months after the closing
and the unemployment rate had climbed to 9.1 percent."
Clearly, unemployment is a possibility for all displaced
workers.
If the displaced worker is fortunate enough to secure a
job, it is often in a different industry or occupation. Stern60
notes that only 24 percent of the Armour workers found jobs
in the meat industry, while the rest found employment in
other areas; McCrea61 notes that about two-thirds of the
Viscose workers found a job in another industry. Such find
ings are expectable since both studies deal with closings in
contracting industries virtually disappearing in this country,
many of the displaced workers had little choice but to change
industries.
58. Hammerman, op. tit., p. 666.
59. Palen and Fahey, op. cit., p. 237.
60. James L. Stern, "Evolution of Private Manpower Planning in Armour's Plant Clos
ings," Monthly Labor Review, December 1969, p. 26.
61. McCrea, op. cit., p. 19.
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Yet, even when workers were displaced from industries
still dominant in the American labor scene, many of them
changed occupations and industries. And, as Hammerman
(who echoes the findings of Aiken, Ferman and Sheppard;
and of Lipsky) points out, such changes, especially for un
skilled and semi-skilled workers, were usually changes for
the worse:
Many of the displaced workers experienced a
downgrading of skills. This was more true of semi
skilled than of skilled occupations. While the
change in jobs for a majority of workers in the
more skilled maintenance occupations generally
meant no change in occupations group, in no case
did as many as one-third of the machine operators
obtain jobs in the same occupational group.
Substantial proportions of the operators who were
reemployed were working as laborers or custodial
workers. 62
A few studies Palen and Fahey, McCrea, and Portis and
Suys have also found that some workers became selfemployed. The most substantial movement of this sort was
at Studebaker, where 17 percent of the displaced workers
were self-employed for a time. 63 The authors found that selfemployment was no more likely among white-collar workers
than blue-collar workers, but that middle-aged workers as
opposed to the younger ones were the most apt to go into
business for themselves. Unfortunately, we have no
documentation as to their relative financial status.
Many displaced workers who secure employment not only
experience an occupational downgrading, but a significant
income loss as well. Stern, Root and Hills, 64 note that while
62. Hammerman, op. cit., p. 670.
63. Palen and Fahey, op. cit., p. 250.
64. Stern, Root and Hills, op. cit.
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the average pre-shutdown income for Omaha workers was
$8,003, by 1970 their income averaged only $7,359. As one
would suspect, the magnitude of a worker's post-closing
financial success is directly related to the demographics of
the worker. In attempting to quantify the relationship be
tween worker demographics and post-closing income, James
Stern65 undertook a multiple regression analysis of the Kan
sas City workforce. Age, sex, seniority, and race were all
negatively correlated with post-closing earnings while educa
tion and skill level showed positive correlations. While each
additional year of age cost the worker $50 a year, another
year of seniority meant a $63 loss, while females made
$2,123 less than males with similar characteristics and blacks
made $204 less than whites with the same characteristics.
Every year of education improved post-closing income by
$122, while skilled workers averaged $1,570 more per year
than unskilled workers with the same characteristics. Thus,
these characteristics are not only correlated with unemploy
ment duration, but reemployment earnings as well.
The earnings loss described above is not surprising when
one considers that the loss of a job often requires that the
worker begin at the bottom of the organization again. In
beginning with a new employer, the displaced worker loses
his/her seniority status and those wage benefits that have ac
crued to him through his long years of company service. It is
also important to note that many workers displaced from
manufacturing industries, find employment in the service
sector or take a job that requires less skill. Such changes
bring with them an unavoidable income decline. While in
those few cases where the displaced employee was receiving
the highest wage in the area, as was the case at the Mack
plant, any subsequent employment in the local labor market
will result in an income decline.
65. Stern, "Consequences of Plant Closure," op. cit., p. 9.
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A significant number of displaced workers work at more
than one other job before arriving at permanent employ
ment. Aiken, Ferman, and Sheppard66 say that in the two
years following the closing of the Packard plant, 35 percent
of the workers had been employed twice, while 9 percent had
had three different jobs. Other researchers see a similar out
come. Fifty-two percent of displaced Mack workers had
secured two successive jobs in the period under study, 67 as
had 21 percent of the Wickwire workers. 68 Clearly, for a
substantial number of displaced workers, employment
security is not necessarily restored when a new job is found.

Summary
Plant-closing research has uncovered a number of rela
tionships among demographics, job search, and reemployment experiences of the displaced worker. While a number
of factors appear to affect either the timing, the mobility,
and/or the method of job search, many of the same factors
also affect reemployment opportunities. High occupational
status workers seem not only to engage in a more organized,
intense and mobile job search than other groups, but they
also have the greatest reemployment potential; other groups,
such as older workers, who engage in late-starting, lowmobility and low-intensity job searches also seem to have
low reemployment potential. Yet, despite the diversity in job
search strategies and reemployment opportunities among
demographic groups, the rather high age and seniority levels
coupled with the low educational attainment and marketable
skills characteristic of most residual workforces involved in
plant-closing studies may be responsible for the long periods
of unemployment and low-paying, less stable employment
experienced by most plant-closing victims.
66. Aiken, Ferman and Sheppard, op. cit., p. 43.
67. Dorsey, op. cit., p. 196.
68. Foltman, op. cit., p. 78.

Chapter 5
Program Participation
and Impacts
Several of the plant-closing studies covered in this
monograph deal with the impacts of public or private at
tempts to aid the displaced worker. Four plant-closing pro
grams have received much attention transfer, retraining,
retirement and early retirement, and early notice; other pro
grams, such as blue-collar employment development or ex
tended health insurance coverage, have been suggested or set
in motion, but never evaluated. To evaluate properly the
results of such efforts, plant-closing research has focused on
more than program activities. By examining the unique
characteristics of program participants and contrasting their
experiences with those of the rest of the workforce, re
searchers have hoped to assess the true impact of plantclosing policies on displaced workers. Although such
assessments have been plagued both by the complexities of
the real world and by underutilization of sophisticated
statistical techniques, there is still a great deal that can be
said about such programs.

Transfer
As a manpower tool, relocation assistance aims to reduce
costs and improve benefits associated with transfer and so
increase worker mobility. The collectively bargained or
company-based transfer assures the displaced worker of a
97
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job should he decide to relocate with the same company.
While this assurance greatly reduces the uncertainties of job
search, it does not eliminate them, for the displaced worker
must still evaluate his chances of finding a job on his own
against the company's offer. The question for the displaced
worker now is: What are the chances of my finding a better
job than the one the company is offering in an acceptable
time period? In other words, Is the company's offer the best
I can do? The displaced worker may also be confronted with
other difficult uncertainties. While assured of a job, he or
she may have little information on what the new job would
entail or even what the wage rate would be. Crucial privileges
gained through seniority may be an issue under negotiation
when the decision to relocate must be made. It is clear that a
transfer policy may be as problematical as a job search.
Indeed, plant-closing research does offer an instance
where the transfer policy implemented created just this sort
of uncertainty. At the Mack plant in Plainfield, New Jersey
the transfer arrangement that was implemented guaranteed
nothing more than a job at Mack's new plant in Hagerstown,
Maryland. 1 Management notified the soon-to-be displaced
workers that the incentive pay issue would not be resolved
for at least two years, that seniority issues would be deter
mined after the move had been completed, and that produc
tion standards at the new plant would "be established by the
company at a workpace considerably higher than that now
prevailing in Plainfield." Faced with such forbidding
possibilities and under considerable company pressure to ac
cept termination instead of transfer, only 10 percent of the
workforce at Plainfield made the move to Hagerstown. The
assurance of a job, in light of a hostile company policy, was
not enough to promote increased workforce mobility.
1. John W. Dorsey, "The Mack Case: A Study in Unemployment," in Studies in the
Economics of Income Maintenance, Otto Eckstein, ed. (Washington, DC: Brookings In
stitution, 1967), pp. 178-182.
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Other transfer arrangements have often been more attrac
tive than those offered at Mack. In his study of the Armour
closing at Omaha, Nebraska James Stern2 credits the im
plementation of "flowback rights" with the improved
transfer participation rates of Omaha workers over previous
Armour shutdowns. By giving displaced workers the option
of changing their minds during the first few months of
employment at the new plant and accepting separation pay,
Armour further reduced the risks inherent in transfer by
allowing the workers to scout out their new environment and
so eliminate the potential cost of lost severance pay should
the worker reject transfer. While it was hoped that this ar
rangement would encourage more workers to accept perma
nent relocation by offering it on a trial basis, the 17 percent
participation rate achieved at Omaha impressive as com
pared to previous Armour experiences cannot be taken as a
valid measure of flowback success. As an evaluative
measure, comparative participation rate analysis ignores the
potential variations in demographic characteristics of the
workforce. While it is true that the implementation of
flowback rights coincided with an increased relocation rate,
variations in age, sex, occupational status, or education
might have had some bearing on the rate. Unless the Omaha
workforce had the same mobility-relevant characteristics and
the same mobility-relevant environmental factors as in
previous closings, the isolated effects of flowback rights can
not be properly evaluated. This might better be accomplish
ed by a controlled experiment or some other design capable
of isolating flowback rights.
Examination of worker response to seniority retention
provisions has led to more significant results. In his examina
tion of General Foods' interplant transfer arrangement,
2. James L. Stern, "Evolution of Private Manpower Planning in Armour's Plant
Closings," Monthly Labor Review, December 1969, p. 23.
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David Lipsky notes the effects of seniority retention provi
sions:
It is clear that seniority was an important correlate
of relocation. Only by transferring to Dover could
the General Foods worker retain the privileges at
tendant on long service. Seniority also can be view
ed as a measure of the worker's loyalty to the com
pany. The plant relocation was a test of his attach
ment to the company vis-a-vis his attachment to the
community. There was a tendency for long years of
service to dominate long years of residence in the
old area, and thus for seniority to be a crucial
variable among those found to be associated with
relocations. 3
Thus General Foods raised the benefits associated with
relocation by continuing the worker's accumulated rights.
Insignificant in the early years of employment, such rights
increase with years of company service and, if Lipsky's
analysis is correct, may offset community attachment. As a
result, seniority retention may improve the mobility of the
long term employee and of the older worker with these
characteristics. While the large disparity in community at
tachment between transferees and terminees (29.9 years
residence to 41.6) seems to weaken Lipsky's claim, both the
higher mean seniority of the transferees (16.1 compared to
13.1 years for terminees) and the relatively low age differen
tial between those who did and did not participate, supports
this hypothesis. 4 If Lipsky's findings are valid for most
displaced workforces of high seniority, the mobility gains in
duced by seniority retention provisions could be significant.
3. David B. Lipsky, "Interplant Transfer and Terminated Workers: A Case Study," In
dustrial and Labor Relations Review, January 1970, p. 195.
4. Ibid., p. 194.
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The unusually small age disparity between terminees and
transferees and the highest participation rate described in the
literature (22.7 percent) experienced at General Foods,
despite the generally immobile character of the workforce, 5
suggests a need to tailor transfer policies to the specific
characteristics of the displaced workers. Yet, while General
Foods speaks of seniority retention and Armour of flowback
rights, plant-closing research lacks documentation of a fully
implemented transfer policy consciously designed to meet
the needs of a specific workforce. Despite the
characteristically high age, low educational attainment, and
relatively low skill level of the residual workforce (the
workers who withstood early contractions of the firm and re
mained until the closing and phase-out period), no combina
tion of transfer provisions designed to increase the participa
tion rates of all characteristically immobile groups within a
specific workforce has been documented. Despite the in
dustrial relations problems of implementing such a com
prehensive program and the relatively minor costs of per
suading low occupational status workers to relocate by the
use of flowback rights or the long term employee by means
of seniority retention, the costs associated with attracting all
immobile workers to relocation may be prohibitive. While
transfer arrangements have indeed furnished relocation
allowances ranging from $1,000 and one weeks' pay at
General Foods to $200 at Mack, it may not be possible for
any transfer policy to counteract all the obstacles to reloca
tion mentioned by Hammerman:
Two cases involving interplant transfer cast some
light on inducements and obstacles to worker
mobility. Only the guarantee of transfer with full
seniority rights was sufficient to induce substantial
numbers of displaced workers to relocate. Even in
5. Ibid., p. 193.
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this case, some four out of five did not accept
relocation. Relatively few workers were willing to
transfer with accumulated rights to pensions, vaca
tion, and other economic benefits, but with no
seniority rights on layoffs. A study of the
characteristics of the transferees indicates that
other inducements to relocate were the need to con
serve rights to pensions and other employee
benefits, fear of age discrimination, and the
economic pressures of large families. Obstacles to
mobility included the secondary role of the wife's
job in the family, home ownership, family and
social ties, children in school, fear of future
layoffs, and the high costs of transfer. Apart from
costs of relocation, many transferred workers
found it necessary or expedient to maintain two
homes and to commute between areas on
weekends, at least in the first year after transfer.
Some complained that tax laws worked in favor of
the companies which could write-off the cost of
their move, while transferring workers received no
deductions whatsoever. 6
A depressed housing market is common in areas losing a
major employer, and a transfer policy committed to high
worker participation may have to protect workers against
this contingency. The costs here are so heavy that attempts to
induce workers with strong attachment to their community
or to a growing family to move may be financially impossible
for the company. Unless all the costs are absorbed, the
transfer option, despite efforts to tailor provisions to worker
needs within budgetary constraints, is likely to continue to be
the optimal labor market strategy of only about 20 percent
of any given displaced workforce.
6. Herbert Hammerman, "Fire Case Studies of Displaced Workers," Monthly Labor
Review, June 1964, p. 668.
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As Lipsky notes, one problem associated with the evalua
tion of assisted relocation is that the workers who accept
relocation possess the characteristics most strongly
associated with successful reemployment, while those who
choose termination have the opposite characteristics. 7 Stern
attempts to resolve this difficulty by using a multivariate
regression analysis and concludes that, for those males who
transferred, relocation resulted in an annual income gain of
$3,093 over those males who reentered the labor market. 8
However, Stern admits that factors outside his regression
analysis may reduce this disparity. If transferees have some
skills outside the skill measure or other yet undetermined
qualities, the disparity observed at Kansas City may be
reduced. Handicapped by lack of conclusive research and
lack of theory, one can only conclude that the post-closing
incomes of transferees seem to be substantially larger than
those of their terminated co-workers. The determinants of
the disparity may not be completely identified.
Many workers do indeed return to their former locality
shortly after participating in a transfer program. Stern found
that 15 percent of the Omaha transferees exercised their
flowback options and returned home, as did 20 percent of
the transferees at Kansas City. 9 For these workers, the finan
cial benefits of relocation never compensated for the loss of
their familiar surroundings.
In conclusion, the decision to transfer prompts the worker
to assess the personal costs and benefits associated with it.
For those who are older, have a low occupational status, lit
tle education, or are secondary wage earners, personal bar
riers inhibiting job search mobility are unlikely to be over7. Lipsky, op. cit., p. 206.
8. James L. Stern, "Consequences of Plant Closure," Journal of Human Resources,
Winter 1972, p. 14.
9. Stern, "Evolution of Manpower Planning," op. cit., p. 23.
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come by even the best theoretically designed and well-funded
of transfer policies. On the other hand, for the worker who is
characteristically mobile and would probably be the most
successful in a job search should no assistance exist, transfer
programs allow maintenance of income, while allowing the
company to retain its most desirable workers. Such observa
tions and findings lead to our present conclusion, echoed by
David Lipsky:
If one can be permitted to generalize, the following
appears to be true: workers most likely to benefit
from the protection of an interplant-transfer
system were least likely to exercise the option of
relocation. Workers who least needed the protec
tion were most likely to move. It follows that if the
General Foods experience is any guide, the use of
an interplant-transfer system can serve only as a
limited way of avoiding the hardship of worker
displacement after plant shutdown. It would be
better from the viewpoint of the workers affected
by plant shutdowns to offer them greater protec
tion for the period following their displacement,
rather than to devote corporate resources to the
enhancement of relocation opportunities. In par
ticular, in such situations, companies and unions
should devise special policies to handle the prob
lem of the displaced older worker [and other disadvantaged groups] in the labor market. For example,
extension of company-supported health insurance
beyond termination would be a particularly
valuable form of protection for the older worker. 10

Retraining
In seven of the 27 closings, terminated workers were given
the opportunity to retrain. The decision to accept or reject
10. Lipsky, op. cit., p. 206.
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the training course may be regarded as a function of the costs
and net discounted value of any future income stream at
tributable to the knowledge and skills gained. As James
Stern writes:
Training seems less attractive to an individual when
there is a job available for him that in his opinion
will probably be as satisfactory as the job he might
obtain after training. 11
Therefore, in making his assessment, the terminated worker
must weigh his present saleable job skills against the im
provements in those skills that should be provided by retrain
ing; if this income-producing ability will be improved in ex
cess of costs, he then will accept the option. Notice that such
a decision does not assume a permanent job change or a
commitment to a new occupation following completion of
the course. The benefits of retraining may enlarge the spec
trum of job opportunities, since income gains may accrue
from alternating between jobs requiring his new and old
skills in response to market conditions. The appropriate
evaluation is determined by maximizing the future revenue
stream in the light of added opportunities. 12 But if the
worker believes that the benefits associated with training will
not offset his costs, theory suggests that he will reject retrain
ing.
While theory also suggests that certain demographic
groups would be more likely than others to accept retraining,
plant-closing research has established no relationship be
tween worker demographics and the decision to retrain that
parallels the degree of association observed between worker
demographics and the decision to relocate. The difference
may be due to two factors. First, only two plant-closing
11. Stern, "Evolution of Manpower Planning," op. cit., p. 24.
12. Herbert Chesler, "The Retraining Decision in Massachusetts," in Gerald Somers, ed.,
Retraining the Unemployed (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1968), p. 151.
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studies (Shultz and Weber, 13 and Stern, Root and Hills 14),
have devoted any resources to documenting this relationship.
Second, the data used in these studies describes the
characteristics of only those workers in training programs
and not of those who were genuinely interested in retraining
and would have accepted it if it had been offered. Both fac
tors must be considered when examining the relationship be
tween worker demographics and the decision to retrain.
The most statistically significant association between in
dividual characteristics and the decision to retrain establish
ed in the plant-closing literature is that of sex. While females
at Oklahoma City, Sioux City, and Fort Worth comprised
only about 15 percent of the total workforce, they comprised
35 percent of the retrainees at Sioux City and 40 percent at
Fort Worth and Okalahoma City. 15 Two possible explana
tions exist for this relatively high percentage. First, the costs
of retraining may be lower for females. If most of them are
not primary income-producers in the family, economic
pressures may be lessened and training more feasible. Sec
ond, Ferman and Harvey16 suggest that, with the increasing
demand for labor in the service sector of the economy,
retraining courses have often been geared to such jobs,
which often pay less and may be less attractive to a family
head. In other words, the unusually high percentage of
women in retraining programs may be a function of the type
of course offered.
Another pertinent characteristic of the retrainee is age.
While the displaced workers at Oklahoma City, Sioux City,
13. George P. Shultz and Arnold B. Weber, Strategies for the Displaced Worker (New
York: Harper and Row, 1969).
14. James L. Stern, Kenneth A. Root, and Stephen M. Hills, "The Influence of SocialPsychological Traits and Job Search Patterns in the Earnings of Workers Affected by a
Plant Closure," Industrial and Labor Relations Review, October 1974, pp. 103-121.
15. Shultz and Weber, op. cit., p. 8.
16. Louis A. Ferman and Scott Harvey, "Job Retraining in Michigan" in Gerald Somers,
ed., op. cit., p. 223.
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and Fort Worth had mean ages of 47, 46, and 49 respective
ly, Shultz and Weber found that workers enrolled in retrain
ing programs averaged only 45, 42, and 42 years of age. 17
This age disparity is also observed by Stern, Root and Hills;
the averge age of the Omaha workers was 39, while that of
the Omaha retrainess was only 36 years. 18
Explanations for this disparity come from outside the
plant-closing context. First, older workers, with fewer work
years left to them, have a shorter time to accumulate the
benefits of retraining and its incremental income gain.
Therefore, for the older worker, the income disparity at
tributable to retraining must be great enough to offset its
costs in a shorter time than for the younger worker. Second,
as Herbert Chesler points out, 19 relatively older workers
place a higher value on present income and consequently are
more reluctant than younger workers to forego income while
they retrain. Third, as Chesler also points out, the older
worker may reject the opportunity to change occupations
because of sociopsychological personality aspects. Often an
older worker has spent an entire working life at one trade or
occupation and is reluctant to change the job he has iden
tified with over the years. Finally, the probability that an
older worker will find training-related employment is much
less than in the case of a younger worker. Lack of experience
in a new occupation, if coupled with age, would place an
older worker farther back in an employer's labor queue than
a younger trainee, who may lack experience but offers the
employer potentially a longer period of service. In summary,
increased age not only reduces the benefits associated with
retraining but increases the costs. With less time remaining
and less chance of training-related employment, the older
17. Shultz and Weber, op. tit., pp. 127-132.

18. Stern, Root and Hills, op. cit., p. 112.
19. Chesler, op. cit., p. 153.
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worker cannot realize the maximum benefits of retraining,
and attachment to a familiar occupation and to a present in
come increases the costs to be taken into account.
Educational status may also have an impact on the deci
sion to retrain. Retrainees at both Sioux City and at
Oklahoma City were slightly better educated than either
workforce as a whole, with an average ninth-grade education
as compared to .3 years less for the total workforce. 20 Such a
mild disparity is also reported by Stern, Root and Hills for
Omaha, where the average retrainee had 10.2 years of educa
tion compared to 9.9 years for the workforce as a whole. 21
While such small discrepancies may indeed be statistically
insignificant, there are sound theoretical reasons (again
developed outside the plant-closing context) for suspecting
that better-educated workers are more amenable to retrain
ing because they are more aware that education is important
for success. Thus the better-educated workers tend to place a
higher value on retraining, seeing it as a way to improve their
qualifications and their chances for higher-status jobs.
Although plant-closing research has yet to establish this con
nection, at least for those displaced workers, however few,
who have received a good education the perceived benefits of
retraining may be higher, thereby increasing the likelihood
that the worker will accept the retraining option.
On the other hand, the differences in age and education
noted above may be due to the training program's screening
policy. Less educated or older workers may be viewed as
poor risks by program administrators and may be denied
retraining in favor of better educated or younger workers
whom administrators feel have a better chance to complete
the program and secure stable training-related employment.
If this is the case, the observed difference in age and educa20. Shultz and Weber, op. cit., pp. 102-128.
21. Stern, Root and Hills, op. cit., p. 112.
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tion between the training group and the workforce as a
whole is not related to worker preferences, but instead to ad
ministrative decisions.
Other demographic variables, unexplored in the plantclosing context, may also influence the retraining decision.
The way in which the displaced worker perceives his own
education is important, and such perceptions are based on
past experience. Those workers who were refused a job in the
past because they lacked the necessary skills for the job are
more likely to place a higher value on retraining. The worker
who realizes the necessity of being properly equipped to
enter the job market has an increased appreciation for train
ing. But the displaced worker, suddenly cast into the job
market after several years of employment with the same
company, may have no such awareness, since he has func
tioned as an accomplished wage earner, whatever his educa
tion. 22 If the worker entered his last job without a high
school education, why should he not repeat the perfor
mance? Under such conditions, the perceived benefits of
retraining are likely to be very low, and if so, the chances of
his accepting retraining are apt to be small.
It has been hypothesized that married men may be less
willing to retrain than unmarried men, although if the latter
have working wives the generalization does not hold true. No
evidence yet presented supports this hypothesis. Weber23
finds that the majority of retrainees are married, but
Chesler24 finds no relationship between marital status and
acceptance of training. Chesler regards the final decision to
enter retraining as a personal one rather than one based on
22. Average seniority in the studies covered by this monograph ranges from about 30 years
at Roanoke to 11 at Omaha.
23. Arnold B. Weber, "Experiments in Retraining: A Comparative Study," in Gerald
Somers, ed., op. cit., p. 266.
24. Chesler, op. cit., pp. 157-159.
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status as a single unit, as economists often define the married
state.
In conclusion, there are several groups of workers who
may be identified as likely to accept retraining. Like job
search mobility, these demographic characteristics affect the
perceived costs and benefits that the worker associates with
retraining. For the older, poorly informed, poorly educated
or family head, the benefits of retraining are seen as relative
ly low and the costs relatively high. Since significant
numbers of displaced workers show at least one of the
characteristics negatively correlated with the decision to
retrain, retraining program administrators have introduced
several policies designed to reduce costs or increase benefits.
One feature common to all the retraining programs discussed
in the literature is predisplacement counseling, which serves
two purposes. First, counseling has been used as a screening
device, matching "retrainable" workers' interests and
capacities; Shultz and Weber25 found this device necessary to
maximize program resources and worker potential. Counsel
ing can, of course, also be used as an educational tool to in
crease the worker's awareness as to the value of retraining,
and may actually swell the numbers of workers entering
retraining. This latter hypothesis has yet to be tested.
Placement is another benefit-increasing policy explored in
retraining. Placement of a worker during the training period
offers the additional benefit of having an agent who will
assist in an early job search. As Shultz and Weber note
below, such assistance can be of great value to the trainee,
particularly in a new field.
Following an initial failure to obtain a trainingrelated job, a worker was reluctant to follow-up
any subsequent opportunities calling for his newly
25. Shultz and Weber, op. cit., pp. 150-153.
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acquired skills. Several persons who had found
unrelated jobs failed to follow-up such leads from
the committee and other sources, but chose instead
to keep the jobs they had. Inertia, uncertainty, and
the usual range of factors favoring immobility ob
viously overbalance any anticipated gains from a
job more closely related to training. Ideally, then,
intensive efforts to place the retrainees on ap
propriate jobs should begin before the worker ven
tures out into the labor market. Otherwise, a
cautious self-interest may cause him to retain any
job which affords some income and security. 26
Obviously any benefits perceived by the workers are
related to faith in the placement program and its ad
ministrators. Without a successful placement record, the
program might look to the potential retrainee like an empty
promise until it has proved its value.
Policies have also been designed to reduce the costs of
retraining. Tuition payments, subsistence stipends, travel
allowances, and loan guarantees have all been used to reduce
retraining costs. At Armour, the only extensive retraining
programs documented in the literature, enough aid was
usually distributed by the Automation Committee to offset
the entire costs of tuition and transportation. Yet the finan
cial benefits proved insufficient for some family breadwin
ners even after subsistence allowances were added. As Shultz
and Weber describe:
The most significant addition to the financial
resources available to retrainees consisted of sub
sistence allowances. Under the provisions of
MDTA, workers enrolled in an approved govern
ment course who were also heads of households
26. Shultz and Weber, op. cit., pp. 164-165.
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drew a "training allowance" equal to the average
unemployment benefit amount paid in the state in
the quarter preceding payment of the allowance.
This allowance was payable for a maximum of
fifty-two weeks and averaged approximately $32
per week for trainees in Iowa. These allowances
had an extremely salutary effect; among other
things, they made it possible for trainees to pursue
a full-time program without jeopardizing an impor
tant source of income. Nonetheless, as originally
constituted, the subsistence allowance was not an
unmixed blessing. First, allowances were the same
for each trainee regardless of the number of
dependents. For persons with large families, $32
was generally insufficient support over the long
period required to complete many of the courses.
Second, if a retrainee sought to augment his income
by part-time employment, deductions were made
from his allowance on the basis of the number of
hours worked. 27
Just how effective these forms of financial assistance have
been in improving retraining participation rates is difficult to
evaluate. Without a control group, we can make few in
ferences. While participation at Sioux City was slightly
greater than at other Armour closings, any significant dif
ferences in the workforces could invalidate the apparent im
pact of the program. 28
Still other policies have been tried in an attempt to reduce
the costs of retraining, the most common of which has been
reduction of training time. The more rapid the retraining
course, the less time a worker may have to forego full-time
27. Shultz and Weber, op. tit., p. 148.
28. Shultz and Weber, op. tit., p. 134.
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employment. Another cost-reducing measure is to offer
evening courses, making it possible for many trainees to
work during the day, or to collect unemployment benefits.
Many states refuse to pay unemployment insurance to
members enrolled in day training courses because they are
not available for work. Since no systematic evaluation of
either of these policies has been made, it is not known
whether they have increased retraining participation rates.
While the actual effect of each benefit-increasing or costreducing policy is unknown, it is clear that most displaced
workers do not turn to retraining. Participation rates range
from 16.4 percent at Fort Worth29 to only 6 percent of the
workforce at Kansas City. 30 Low participation rates may be
due in part to the financial and emotional strain of retraining
and to the inadequate financial support offered:
. . .Training is generally an arduous experience for
the unemployed worker, and can scarcely be con
sidered institutionalized malingering. Even with the
financial support available to trainees in Sioux
City, many men and their families were forced to
make genuine sacrifices in order to capitalize on
this opportunity for self-improvement. Moreover,
the hard economic facts indicate that this price of
low support in a lengthy program is a high dropout
rate, which wastes the resources already invested
from public or private funds and by the trainee
himself. 31
Simply put, unless they are given substantial financial sup
port, the number of retrainees is likely to be small and the
number of dropouts high. Such an investment would be wise
only if the social benefits of retraining are greater than the
29. Shultz and Weber, op. cit., p. 130.
30. Stern, "Evolution of Manpower Planning," op. cit., p. 26.
31. Shultz and Weber, op. cit., p. 150.
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social costs. Evaluating retraining programs has been dif
ficult because information is often lacking about the specific
goals or intended benefits of a program. However, even
where program administrators have a sound understanding
of potential benefits, we still have no research that presents a
cost-benefit analysis of any retraining program for displaced
workers.
To the terminated worker interested in reemployment, the
only relevant criterion for the value of retraining is the in
cremental benefits it provides over other options. Despite the
dangers in comparing nonequivalent groups, studies do note
that retrainees are unemployed for a shorter time than nonretrainees. At Fort Worth, 90 percent of those workers com
pleting retraining were employed within a year to 18 months
following completion of their courses, while non-retrainees
maintained a 40 percent unemployment rate at the end of
this period. 32 A disparity was also found at Sioux City, but a
smaller one: only 28 percent of the non-retrainees were
unemployed after 18 months, compared to 20 percent for
retrainees. While such data appear to support the benefits of
retraining, it is again unclear as to whether the unemploy
ment differential is due to the value of retraining or to the
favorable characteristics of the retrainee group. Shultz and
Weber do break down the data on employment rates of
retrainees over non-retrainees by age and race, but other
demographic factors need to be isolated and studied.
In defense of the proposition that retraining improves
employment opportunities, Stern33 found that 88 percent of
the employed trainees in Omaha found work directly or in
directly related to training. Results are almost as impressive
at Fort Worth, where Shultz and Weber34 indicate that 77
32. Shultz and Weber, op. cit., p. 157.
33. Shultz and Weber, op. cit., p. 25.
34. Shultz and Weber, op. cit., p. 163.
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percent of the trainees found work in a training-related field,
while Conant35 documents that in Sioux City 55 percent of
the retrainees had the same experience. Although these
figures illustrate substantial occupational mobility, they do
not prove that the retrainee would not have found a job, or
even the same job, without training. Nor does it prove that
the training-related job was the one with the greatest poten
tial that the worker could obtain. Given these uncertainties,
to draw any conclusions about the effectiveness of retraining
as an unemployment-reducing or employment opportunityexpanding tool would be unwise.
Only limited work has been done on the impact of retrain
ing on worker income. While Shultz and Weber36 note a
$2.00 per week gain in income for Sioux City retrainees over
non-retrainees, the only multivariate analysis of such a rela
tionship was done by Stern at Kansas City. 37 There it was
found that the average Kansas City retrainee had an income
of $303 a year less than those who chose the market option!
Such a result, Stern writes,
. . .Raises the suspicion that short-term training
may lead more of these individuals into low-paying
occupations than would have occurred without
retraining. 38
An alternative hypotheses also exists. When there is little
demand for labor, retraining may simply delay entry into the
workforce and thus prevent the worker from competing for
the few high-paying jobs available. Therefore, it is possible
35. Eaton H. Conant, "Report and Appraisal: The Armour Fund's Sioux City Project,"
Monthly Labor Review, November 1965, p. 1301.
36. Shultz and Weber, op. cit., p. 169.
37. Stern, "Consequences of Plant Closure," op. cit., p. 12.
38. Stern, "Consequences of Plant Closure," op. cit., p. 8. It should also be noted that
part of this result may be due to the fact that Stern's analysis uses retrainees who sought
placement services. See p. 17.
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that Sioux City trainees may have benefited from an improv
ing economy at the end of their training,39 while trainees at
Kansas City may have been released into the job market at a
time of local contraction40 at least a plausible partial ex
planation. Alternatively the Kansas City program may not
have had a firm grasp of local labor market needs. In fact,
the literature mentions attempts by other administrators to
analyze labor needs in the local community, but such efforts
are so often hampered by lack of time that they may finally
consist of scanning the want ads. Without foresight into
future needs, the retraining program is in the precarious
situation of training workers for jobs that may not exist by
the time the program ends, a situation that may also be
responsible for disparities between programs.
Retraining programs have not overcome the classic income
differentials experienced by distinct demographic groups. As
Shultz and Weber found, men undergoing retraining earned
more than females and whites earned more than minorities:
. . .There was also considerable variation in the ex
perience of different elements in the retraining
group. As indicated above, women fared con
siderably worse than men. Moreover, for the
minority groups at Forth Worth, decrease in earn
ings was more precipitous than retrainees who did
not face discriminatory barriers. Thus, the average
hourly earnings of Negroes and Latin Americans
were consistently below those of white trainees.
Some of these may reflect differences in education
and in the nature of the retraining program
selected. 41
39. Shultz and Weber, op. tit., p. 166.
40. Stern, "Consequences of Plant Closure," op. cit., p. 17.
41. Shultz and Weber, op. cit., p. 168.
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Such a statement opens up the issue of whether certain
demographic groups are steered into low-paying trainingrelated courses more often than others.
In summary, retraining provides those workers who are
younger, slightly better educated, and relatively secure finan
cially the opportunity to learn additional skills that can be
used to secure a new job. However, despite the attractive
provisions included in the most worker-responsive training
programs, the unfavorable demographics of the displaced
workers, coupled with inadequate financial assistance for
them, have limited participation to about 15 percent. Just
how successful retraining programs have been in reaching,
the goals of reduced unemployment, increased job potential
and improved earning ability is unknown. While much
evidence has been presented in the literature in support of
each of these objectives, the fact is that the few available
evaluations (with exception of Stern) are methodologically
adequate and do not permit a decisive statement about the
benefits of retraining the displaced worker.

Retirement and Early Retirement
Plant-closing research has, for the most part, considered
retirement and early retirement as ways to provide the older,
long-service worker with some form of income maintenance.
Stern states:
. . .This benefit [special 1.5 retirement benefit] in
stituted in 1961 to help older long service workers
who were expected to have greater difficulty find
ing new employment than younger short-service
workers, has proved very helpful/2
As with relocation and retraining decisions, the decision to
retire can be considered a cost-benefit analysis of this
42. Stern, "Evolution of Manpower Planning," op. cit., p. 23.
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specific labor market strategy. The decision to accept retire
ment benefits does not require that the individual retire from
the labor force completely. Since none of the pension plans
surveyed imposed restrictions on the type or number of
hours of work a displaced worker accepting retirement
benefits could undertake, the worker qualifying for the
retirement plan simply receives a guaranteed income flow
after displacement from the plant. Therefore, within the
plant-closing experience, the decision to accept retirement
benefits and the decision to retire are two separate issues.
First, the decision to accept retirement benefits, requires a
very simple analysis if the worker is well informed about the
benefits available. Since there is no benefit to be gained from
rejecting the company's offer, nor any costs associated with
accepting it, it is unlikely that any qualified individual would
decline retirement benefits. The only demographic
characteristics associated with the decision are those
necessary to qualify the worker for its acceptance. At Ar
mour, this option was open to workers between the ages of
55 and 65 with a minimum of twenty years of service. The
pension plan covered 101 workers at Fort Worth, 110 at
Sioux City, 100 at Mason City and 260 at Omaha.43
For those workers between the ages of 55 and 62, who had
the same required seniority, the pension benefit was 50 per
cent greater than the amount normally paid to employees in
this age category. The income allowance, which provided
qualified Armour workers at Omaha with $150 per month,
was used by 46 workers at Fort Worth, 54 in Sioux City, 68
in Kansas City, and 126 at Omaha. 44 Although this is a
sizable sum, many Omaha workers deemed it desirable to
supplement their retirement benefits with a wage. Thirtythree of the forty-two 1.5 pensioners who found employment
43. See Stern, "Evolution of Manpower Planning," op. cit., p. 23 and Shultz and Weber,
op. cit., pp. 151-153.
44. Stern, "Evolution of Manpower Planning," op. cit., p. 23.
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with other Omaha firms reported an average post-shutdown
wage of $2.22 per hour. For those workers who were able to
find a supplementary job, the total monthly income from
their two sources was only slightly less than that earned on
the pre-shutdown Armour job. 45 For these workers then, the
combination of pension and job put them at an income level
appreciably higher than the average worker who accepts
training or direct labor market entry.
Stern46 points out that the 1.5 pension benefits offered to
workers between the ages of 55 and 62 did not seem to cause
appreciably more people to withdraw from the labor force
than otherwise would have been expected in a relatively tight
labor market. The statement implies that even the 50 percent
extra benefit was not enough to maintain the worker's ac
customed standard of living and that labor market re-entry
was still essential. While the benefit surely alleviated some
financial burdens faced by the displaced worker, apparently
a number of people felt it did not completely compensate
them for loss of employment. Pension benefits may provide
the worker with some income maintenance, but for many of
them it simply was not enough.
But in the cases of 84 of the 1.5 pensioners and an un
disclosed number of the regular retirees who either did not
look for work or failed to find it and subsequently retired,
plant-closing research offers no explanation for their deci
sion. The number of retirees who fall into each of the above
categories is unknown, but we do know something about
their characteristics. The most interesting of these applies to
the worker who, for some reason or another, decides not to
look for new work after receiving pension benefits following
displacement. Barfield and Morgan47 identify some of the
45. Stern, "Evolution of Manpower Planning," op. at., p. 23.
46. Stern, "Evolution of Manpower Planning," op. tit., p. 24.
47. Richard Barfield and James Morgan, Early Retirement the Decision and the Experience
(Ann Arbor: Institute for Social Research, The university of Michigan, 1969).
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characteristics associated with the decision to retire per
manently. While these decisions do not deal with a plantclosing experience, many of them may be tentatively applied
to workers who did not look for a job after accepting retire
ment benefits.
Of primary importance is the worker's perception of ade
quate financial resources, including retirement benefits.
Those workers who see their financial resources as providing
them with a comfortable retirement are of course the ones
most likely to retire. Perceived financial security, then, put
into terms of a cost-benefit analysis, reduces the costs of
retirement by relieving financial pressures. Barfield and
Morgan note that the retirees and potential retirees surveyed
in 1967 felt it necessary to be assured of approximately
$4,000 a year before they could enter retirement. 48 While
such a threshold figure is not constant, it does give some idea
of the figure the worker feels he should have at retirement.
A closely related factor is the number of dependents the
worker must support after retirement. While Barfield and
Morgan considered this point less statistically significant
than financial resources in the decision to retire, the effect
was expectable: the more dependents the worker had, the less
likely he was to retire.49 This is a characteristic that demands
a retirement income sufficient to support the customary
standard of living of the retiree and his family.
Another correlate with post-retirement security and the
retirement decision is the presence or absence of a home
mortgage. Mortgage payments increase the financial costs of
retirement and often postpone a worker's retirement until
the debt is paid off. Here too there was a much weaker
association with the decision to retire than in the case of ex
pected post-retirement income.
48. Ibid., p. 14.
49. Ibid., p. 14.
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However, a worker may still choose to retire even if he
feels his financial resources are inadequate to support a
customary standard of living. A critical determinant in the
decision to retire is the worker's perception of health. For
those workers perceiving themselves to be ill, the decision
may be forced upon them. Furthermore, a worker may reject
retraining programs, relocation, and labor market re-entry
on the grounds that the physical demands would be too
great. This characteristic reduces the benefits associated with
all other labor market strategies and leaves only retirement
as an acceptable choice. If many mental health and health
researchers are correct in believing that job displacement is a
stressor that may actually cause illness to surface, 50
theoretically the number of displaced workers falling in this
category could be substantial. No firm evidence exists, but if
such outcomes are significant among displaced workers,
perhaps some sort of medical insurance should be provided
in the hope of easing the financial burden of health care and
facilitating the return of the worker to the workforce.
Unsuccessful job seekers constitute a second group of
displaced workers who accept retirement benefits and then
withdraw from the labor force. Faced with extended periods
of unemployment after displacement, unwilling to accept the
stigma of unemployment, and lacking other alternatives,
these workers simply withdraw into premature retirement.
Workers who customarily find it difficult to become
employed, as we shall discuss in the next section, are more
likely to fall into this category than their more advantaged
co-workers.
In summary then, three groups of workers accept retire
ment benefits and then choose not to return to the labor
force. First, those workers who perceived benefits as ade50. M. Harvey Brenner, Mental Illness and the Economy (Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 1973).
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quate to support their customary standard of living, given
the number of dependents and financial obligations they
have at the time the decision is made. Second, those who,
faced with perceived disability, remain out of the workforce
for "health reasons" and accept retirement as the only solu
tion to their displacement. Third, those who do not find a
new job and resign themselves to retirement through sheer
discouragement and low self-esteem.
While we have virtually no information on the economic
outcomes for workers who choose retirement after being
displaced from their jobs, the findings of Barfield and
Morgan51 allow us to speculate on the subject. Of primary
importance to the plant-closing experience is the relationship
between post-retirement security and pre-retirement plan
ning. Simply put, those workers who are able to plan for
retirement are much more likely to have an enjoyable retire
ment than those who are forced into it either through per
sonal illness or company action. Given the limited time per
mitted by most plant closings for the worker to plan for the
future, the displaced worker will be less prepared for retire
ment than the average worker, and therefore more likely to
have an unsatisfactory retirement. For the worker who is
sick or unable to find employment, retirement is not a solu
tion but another facet of the problem.
Even the worker who retires from the labor force after
careful consideration and with adequately perceived finances
cannot count on security. Since the retiree depends on fixed
pension payments, unexpected inflation can greatly reduce
buying power and put a financial strain on retirement in
come. Many retirees have attempted to re-enter the labor
force under these conditions only to find that their retire
ment status has added to their undesirable labor market
characteristics to such an extent that securing another job is
51. Barfield and Morgan, op. cit., pp. 53-59.
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almost impossible. Therefore, while retirement may seem an
affordable luxury to some displaced workers, in the long run
it may prove the wrong course for many of them.
In conclusion, two types of workers accept pension
benefits. The first sees the benefits as providing some income
maintenance but believes it necessary to continue to work in
order to maintain financial stability. The second, either
because benefits are perceived as adequate or for other
reasons, decides to retire from the labor force. Although Ar
mour workers of the first sort achieved an income level after
displacement comparable to their former level, 52 evidence in
the retirement literature indicates that the second type may
fare less well. The plight of the ill, unemployed, or inflationstricken worker remains one of income deficiency despite the
aim of pension plans to provide a subsistence income. Pen
sion plans, while they have helped to reduce the financial
burdens of the retired, are sometimes inadequate.
Three policies are needed to relieve the financial pressures
displacement brings to these groups. For the ill, or those who
perceive themselves as ill, some form of medical insurance
may reduce the costs of health care and help bring a speedy
recovery and allow the worker to return to the workforce.
For the inflation-stricken retiree, unable to find a sup
plementary job, a cost of living clause in the retirement ar
rangement would seem the optimal aid. 53 And finally, for
those workers characterized by long periods of unemploy
ment, there is no adequate substitute for jobs; perhaps
employment subsidized or sponsored by the government is
the answer. Until further research is undertaken in this area,
programs and policies will be based on informed guesses and
will have limited effectiveness.
52. Stern, "Evolution of Manpower Planning," op. cit., pp. 23-24.
53. The UAW has sought just such a clause in its recent bargaining round.
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Early Notice
The subject of early notification has arisen in several con
texts throughout this volume. The fact that advance notifica
tion, as it is also called, is a recurrent topic reflects its impor
tance as a rhetorical rallying point, rather than its
demonstrated effectiveness.
It is generally supposed that two kinds of benefits to
displaced workers are associated with early notice. The first
is directly. Early notification gives necessary lead time to
agencies and groups that provide vital services to the displac
ed workers. Lead time is crucial in the development of ap
propriate needs assessments and inventories of resources for
both workers and the community. Without it, the quality of
the planned intervention will be diminished and the benefits
to the displaced worker proportionately limited.
It is also argued that early notice has a direct positive ef
fect. It can give workers a chance to find new employment
before the permanent layoff and thereby reduce or avoid a
period of unemployment. Of course, this hypothesis assumes
that workers will use the early notice period to conduct job
searches; otherwise the advantage of early notice would be
lost.
Substantial variations can be found in the 27 closings ex
amined in this review with respect to early notice. Only the
Armour studies consider the effects of advance notice on
program implementation and effectiveness. Both Stern and
Conant speak of the importance of the ninety days' early
notification for the development of the Automation Fund
program, arguing that this period allowed time for a perma
nent program staff to be assembled and for placement
possibilities to be explored before the closing. However, just
what impact this arrangement actually had on the success of
the Automation Fund's program is not clear. A

Impacts

125

methodology is needed to isolate the effects of advance
notice on the Automation Fund's program and one to assess
the operation of an identical program without early notice if
we are to evaluate the benefits claimed by Stern and Conant.
Portis and Suys provide some data about the direct effect
of advance notice in a plant closing where no specially
developed programs to assist displaced workers were
mounted. At Kelvinator in London, Ontario the year-long
early notification period was not utilized by all workers in
the same manner. Approximately 26 percent of the produc
tion workers found jobs during that period and left before
closing. Some 15 percent of the workers used the period to
line up jobs which they took directly after the closing. 54 The
authors stress the fact that production workers over 40 find
it difficult to find new employment under ordinary cir
cumstances, and they attribute the relative success in job
search here of an older group (average age 44 years) to ad
vanced notification. 55 While it is obvious in the Portis and
Suys study that the early notice period was useful for con
cluding the closing agreement, it is difficult to attribute
benefits, particularly job search success, to early notification
in this instance. Without a comparative perspective, notably
an assessment of the success of job search among similar
workers without advance notification, no firm conclusions
can be reached. Moreover, within the study itself, no men
tion is made of the local rate of unemployment, normally a
powerful variable in reemployment.
Therefore, while advocates of advance notification con
tinue to press for the adoption of this strategy by manage
ment and even argue for its being required by law, more in54. Bernard Portis and Michael Suys, The Effects of Advanced Notice on a Plant Shut
down: A Case Study of the Closing of the Kelvinator Plant in London, Ontario (London,
Ontario: School of Business Administration, The University of Western Ontario, 1970), p.
8.
55. Portis and Suys, op. cit., pp. 14 and 21.
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formation is required. Not only do we need an effective
evaluation methodology to assess the benefits of advance
notification, but also a comparative evaluation with cases
where no notice and no programming have been provided.

Chapter 6
The Effects of Job Displacement
on Mental Health
One schematic representation of the consequences to in
dividuals of job loss, from whatever circumstance, might
present the following progression:
A

Macroeconomic Change

B

Job Separation
\
C Economic Cons equences of Job Loss
'r
D Noneconomic Consequences of Job Loss
E

Evidence of Individual Pathology1

This diagram is designed to show the hypothetical relation
ship between large-scale economic change and the indicators
of individual distress, as seen specifically in admissions to
mental treatment facilities. 2 The diagram may be broken
down into a number of propositions.
1. Louis A. Ferman and John Gardner, "Economic Deprivation, Social Mobility and Men
tal Health," in Mental Health and the Economy, Louis A. Ferman and Jeanne P. Gordus,
eds. (Kalamazoo, MI: The W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research, 1979), pp.
193-224.
2. Ralph Catalano and David Dooley, "Does Economic Change Provoke or Uncover
Behavioral Disorder?" in Ferman and Gordus, op. tit., pp. 321-346.
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Economic Status, Economic Change,
and Mental Health
While this schema is applicable to the mental health out
comes of plant closings, most research is focused on other
types of unemployment. There are several important tradi
tions of unemployment research to be considered. Some of
these traditions can be identified by the connections made
between points considered. One standard sociological ap
proach, dating back to Durkheim's study of suicide, 3
establishes connections between indicators of
macroeconomic change and aggregate indicators of social
and psychological disorder (A-E). Brenner's4 study of admis
sions to mental hospitals as well as more recent work
centered upon indicators of mortality, morbidity, and
criminal behavior have stimulated another type of research
involving data collection such as work by Catalano and
Dooley, 5 more recently by Ferman and Gardner. 6 In one
sense, such massive longitudinal studies and large-scale
surveys bracket research that is focused upon job loss, on its
noneconomic consequences, and on evidence of individual
pathology (B-C-D). Standard studies in this field (Bakke,7
Komarovsky8 and Angell9) explore, in a nonquantitative
fashion, the relationships found in unemployment resulting
from massive layoffs (B-C-D-E). One essay, a study of the
3. Emile Durkheim, Suicide: A Study in Sociology, J.A. Spalding and G. Simpson,
translators (New York: The Free Press, 1951).
4. M. Harvey Brenner, Mental Illness and the Economy (Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 1973).
5. Catalano and Dooley, op. cit.
6. Ferman and Gardner, op. cit.
7. E.W. Bakke, The Unemployed Man (New York: E.P. Dutton and Company, 1934).
8. Mirra Komarovsky, The Unemployed Man and His Family (New York: The Dryden
Press, 1940).
9. R.C. Angell, The Family Encounters the Depression (New York: Charles Scribner and
Sons, 1936).
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Baker plant by Al Slote, 10 documents those relationships in
two particular plant closings and is actually an outgrowth of
an epidemiological study to be considered in detail in a later
section. A significant literature has recently developed which
is small-scale, modestly longitudinal in nature, and depen
dent upon a combination of surveys, case studies, and
clinical evidence, all of which stress the relationship between
job separation and individual pathology.
Taken together, these three traditions, archival research,
surveys, and case studies, provide evidence that these con
nections exist, on both aggregate and individual levels; but
the relationships between the connections are less firmly
established. Finally, the schema assumes that economic
change and job loss precede the appearance of individual
pathology, while it makes no provision for other possible
connections between socioeconomic status, unemployment,
and mental illness, for example.
Perhaps because research on plant closings must begin
with a single event, that event is contrued not only as taking
place before individual distress, but is identified as causative
of the disorders subsequently observed. In contrast, crosssectional studies often reverse the order of the schema and
construe individual disorders as preceding and capable of
causing negative labor market experiences. This tradition of
research includes the work of Hollingshead and Redlich, 11
the classic study of New Haven in which the concepts of
psychiatry and sociology are joined to produce a convincing
argument that the incidence of mental illness is significantly
related to social class and that treatment modalities are also
related to socioeconomic status and class, so that longer and
more frequent hospitalizations are inflicted on persons of
10. Al Slote, Termination: The Closing at Baker Plants, (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill,
1969).
11. August B. Hollingshead and Frederick C. Redlich, Social Class and Mental Illness: A
Community Study (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1958).
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lower status. The Midtown Manhattan study presents over
whelming evidence of the relationship between mental
disturbance and social class and it implicates childhood
poverty as well. 12 Other major studies, such as those of
Gurin, Veroff and Feld, 13 emphasize the connection from
another perspective. Even more recently, Turner and Gar
trell14 developed from their investigation a construct of
social competence that encompasses measures of occupa
tional status, marital status, educational level, and work per
formance. Low social competence is considered interactive
with psychopathology and accepts the association of low
economic status and mental disturbance without assigning a
causative role to unemployment.
No conclusive argument can yet be made as to whether an
unfortunate labor market experience triggers individual
disturbance or vice versa. Well-designed studies are needed
that will incorporate (1) the cross-sectional approach that
connects mental illness to low socioeconomic status, and
(2) longitudinal studies that often associate job separation
with mental disorder. The two approaches will have to be
mounted together and include a series of case studies that
take other significant variables into account.

Plant Closings and Mental
Health Outcomes
Yet, even without such conclusive studies, it must be ad
mitted that sufficient study of the mental health outcomes of
unemployment has been conducted for discussion to proceed
12. Leo Srole and Thomas Langner, Mental Health in the Metropolis: The Midtown
Manhattan Study (New York: Harper and Row, 1975).
13. Gerald Gurin, Joseph Veroff, and S.C. Feld, Americans View Their Mental Health
(New York: Basic Books, 1960).
14. R.J. Turner and J.W. Gartrell, "Social Factors in Psychiatric Outcome: Toward the
Resolution of Interpretive Controversies," American Sociological Review, June 1978, pp.
383-404.
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on a relatively sophisticated level. Recent developments
stand in marked contrast to the scholarly consideration given
to the problems of the displaced worker only 15 years ago.
At that time, studies associating social class with mental ill
ness had been made, but virtually no large-scale studies were
in print; only a few on the mental health effects of job loss
were even in preparation. At that time, the only available
data dealing with the mental health status of workers af
fected by plant closings as distinct from unemployment
resulting from other causes were found in the study by
Aiken, Ferman and Sheppard of former employees of the
Packard Motor Car Company. 15
A morale scale was used there to measure mental
health or more properly, well-being or its absence. The
five-item morale score was based on situational variables,
but it was chiefly an attitudinal determination. The
measurements made a clear distinction between displaced
workers who had economic security (savings, other sources
of income, a readily marketable skill, or some combination
of these resources) and those who did not. The former group
had higher scores on the morale scale than workers who lack
ed such resources. Whether this measurement did in fact
show something about the response to unemployment of
those faced with little or no economic deprivation compared
with those less fortunate was not then clear. It was possible
that workers with outside resources were so endowed
because of certain personal characteristics that enabled them
to cope with life and its difficulties more successfully than
their coworkers.
These points remain unsettled still, although the ways in
which the questions are asked have changed. Furthermore,
the fact that there are plausible alternative explanations sug15. Michael Aiken, Louis A. Ferman, and Harold L. Sheppard, Economic Failure, Aliena
tion, and Extremism (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1968).
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gests an important issue in plant-closing research that of
the methodological dilemma. Much is lost to plant-closing
research because the sample of unemployed workers studied
is not necessarily a random sample, and may not contain
those persons whose unfortunate labor market experiences
can be regarded as related solely to their own physical and
psychological predispositions. While there is no doubt that
such samples have their own biases workers are probably
older and working in a declining industry and/or declining
geographical area, for example the workers have, on the
other hand, usually been long term employees with stable
work histories. The difference in samples will prove crucial
to a balanced understanding of the research findings.
Moreover, any study which focuses on the impact of plant
closings on individuals will uncover many of them whose ex
periences escape the path described by the schema. It is ob
viously inappropriate in those cases where reemployment is
immediate and satisfactory or even where reemployment is
delayed but occurs before difficulties have been en
countered. Basically, the schema is concerned with those
cases in which difficulties do arise for individuals, particular
ly difficulties associated with prolonged or recurrent
unemployment. While this path from unemployment to ill
ness has been described in many studies of unemployed per
sons, it has not been a major focus of plant-closing studies.
However, in this specific respect the two genres of research,
unemployment and individual reactions to plant closings,
come together in the Cobb and Kasl study, Termination: The
Consequences of Job Loss. 16
The fact that the Cobb and Kasl work is comprehensive,
well designed, and significant would set it above many other
studies of the unemployment experience. Its scope and focus
16. Sidney Cobb and Stanislav V. Kasl, Termination: The Consequences of Job Loss,
DREW (NIOSH) Publication No. 77-24 (Cincinnati, OH: U.S. DHEW, Division of
Biomedical and Behavioral Sciences, 1977).
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are unique, as other work on individual responses to plant
closings make clear. Mick, 17 in his 1975 assessment of the
social and personal costs of plant shutdowns, devotes only
two sentences to noneconomic personal outcomes and refers
to Aiken, Ferman and Sheppard for the first and to Cobb
and Kasl for the second. More recently, Holen18 focuses her
review on those studies concerning adjustment and
reemployment, no doubt in part because so little is available
in other areas. While several studies of the correlates of the
negative outcomes of unemployment are in progress, they
are devoted either to unemployment not specifically at
tributable to plant closings or to correlates less psychological
of physiological.
The Cobb and Kasl study was undertaken in 1969 and field
studies continued for several years. Two plants about to shut
down permanently and lay off all employees were identified
by the research team. Among the workers at these facilities,
the target group for study was comprised of married bluecollar workers, aged 35 to 60, who had worked at the plants
for more than three years. Close to 80 percent of those
selected for study agreed to participate.
Displaced workers for the study were drawn from both
plants. One was an urban establishment, a paint manufac
turing facility, where work was relatively light for all
classifications of employees. The second plant, located in a
rural community, employed operatives who ranged from
skilled and semi-skilled to unskilled, in a somewhat more
heavily industrial enterprise. A major strength of this study
was the use of a control group, a methodological necessity
often omitted from plant-closing studies. Workers in the
control group came from four establishments, chosen not
17. Stephen S. Mick, "Social and Personal Costs of Plant Shutdowns," Industrial Rela
tions, May 1975, p. 207ff.
18. Arlene Holen, Losses to Workers Displaced by Plant Closure or Layoff: A Survey of
the Literature, Public Research Institute, November 1976.
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only because they were comparable to the two target plants,
but also because they preserved the rural-urban spectrum.
In the study of ex-Packard workers by Aiken, Ferman and
Sheppard, 19 the importance of situational pressures as an in
fluence on mental health was established. Using an index of
economic deprivation as an indicator of situational
pressures, a close association between the existence of such
pressures and mental health was indicated. Respondents with
high scores had a greater indication of poor mental health
than respondents with low scores. It was interesting that
predisplacement statuses (e.g., age, skill status) and labor
market experiences (number of months of unemployment
and downward mobility) had little or no predictive value in
relationship to mental health, but the index of economic
deprivation was the most powerful variable as a predictor of
mental health. The authors suggest the following linkage:
- Predisplacement statuses predict labor market outcomes
(e.g., the older worker is more likely than others to ex
perience a long period of unemployment)
- Labor market outcomes are related to the occurrence of
economic deprivation (e.g., workers with long periods
of unemployment are more likely than others to ex
perience a loss of savings, an increase in debt and a cut
back in major expenditures)
- Economic deprivation is a predictor of attitudinal and
behavioral indicators of poor mental health (e.g.,
workers with high economic deprivation are more likely
than others to develop dissatisfaction with life and
reduce contact with kin and neighbors)

19. Aiken, Ferman and Sheppard, op. cit.
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The linkage pattern may be diagrammed as follows:
The Determinants of Anomia
Old age
Low skill
level
Low
educational
attainment

Difficulty in
finding and
keeping a job
Many
months of
unemploy
ment

High
economic
deprivation

High
feelings
of anomia

Low
economic
deprivation

Low
feelings of
anomia

Downward
job mobility
Young age
High skill
level
High educa
tional
attainment

Finding and
keeping
another job
Few months
of unemploy
ment
Upward job
mobility

The authors conclude that situational pressures in the
form of economic deprivation are the link between labor
market outcomes and behavioral and attitudinal states.
Predisplacement status and labor market outcomes are
necessary but not sufficient conditions to influence mental
health. The necessary ingredient is economic deprivation
(i.e., the extent of resource depletion). The older worker ex
periences longer periods of unemployment, and this in turn
reduces his available resources, which results in negative
psychological and behavioral states. The authors conclude
that the availability of resources is the most important single
factor affecting the morale and mental health of the worker.
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Why is money so important? Resource availability makes
continued social reciprocity possible, permits continued
membership in associations and makes possible an element
of control over the environment. These findings argue
strongly for the central importance of income maintenance
programs in the post-shutdown period.
The Cobb and Kasl20 study, which examined worker men
tal states at a number of points in time, confirms this rela
tionship between economic deprivation and social and
psychological indicators of pathology. They conclude that
the relationship is strongest at the anticipation period before
the plant shuts down and weaker at succeeding periods. This
may suggest that, as time passes, resources are brought into
line with demands a situation that does not occur prior to
the shutdown.
Data collected in interviews were subjected to a number of
sophisticated types of analysis, and numerous scales were us
ed to assess variables. Such measures as the CrowneMarlowe measure of the need for social approval, the Block
Scale, the CPI Scale and several others indicated not only the
crucial variables (such as general psychological adjustment)
but provided validity checks for certain kinds of response in
the self-reporting areas of the instrument. Such extensive in
terweaving of different measures of many variables points
up how far the apparatus of social-psychological study of
unemployment-related outcomes has come since the workers
terminated at Packard were studied. Still, it is significant
that major emphasis in analysis and interpretation was plac
ed upon two indices, Relative Economic Deprivation and
Relative Economic Change, both of which were adopted
from the Packard study.
20. Sidney Cobb and Stanislav V. Kasl, "Some Mental Health Consequences of Plant
Closing and Job Loss," in Ferman and Gordus, op. cit., p. 293.
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In the Cobb and Kasl study, unemployment experiences of
the terminated workers differed between the rural and urban
workers. On average, the men were unemployed for about 15
weeks during the two years of the study, and for most of the
workers these 15 weeks were concentrated in the period
directly after-the plant closing. In the urban situation, 25
percent of the workers experienced no unemployment during
the first year, since they were immediately reemployed, and
50 percent had less than two months of unemployment. It
was more difficult for workers in the rural setting to find a
job in the first year, and it was reported that one-third of
them were still unemployed after three or more months. Dur
ing the first year, the rural workers had an average twelve
weeks of unemployment, while urban workers had about
seven weeks. In the second year, the pattern was reversed,
and at the end of the study the jobless period over the two
years was about the same for both groups. Numerous
workers found themselves without a job more than once.
However, despite the early difficulties encountered by the
rural workers, their lives were less disrupted than those of
their urban counterparts. This may be explained by the fact
that the plant in the urban setting had been a kind of com
munity in itself, fulfilling many associative needs that rural
workers continued to derive from dependable community
associations.
While it was important that this study identified apprehen
sion before the fact as one stage of distress in the experience
of unemployment associated with plant closings, the general
findings did not confirm any consistent, ongoing, high level
of distress among all displaced workers from the time they
knew that unemployment was approaching until they were
reemployed. Indeed, a particularly valuable finding was the
presence after an early period of stress of adaptation to
prolonged unemployment. Those who underwent more than
one period of unemployment in the course of the study ap
peared to fare the worst.
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Thus, there is the anomaly that periods of employment in
the work history of a displaced worker may be more destruc
tive than prolonged joblessness. Prolonged unemployment
can be a more stable and predictable existence than the wild
fluctuations of periodic employment. We have been led to
believe, particularly in the literature of the 1930s, that pro
longed joblessness was the most destructive social ex
perience. The data both from the work of Aiken, Ferman
and Sheppard and Cobb and Kasl dispute this image.
The Cobb and Kasl data have been used by numerous
writers to support policy development regarding the social,
physical and psychological impact of plant closings. Their
quotations have been carefully chosen because the Cobb and
Kasl study does not blame job loss for all cases of distress or
deviant behavior that may follow unemployment. Cobb and
Kasl state explicitly:
". . .the mental health impact of job loss and
unemployment appears to be a limited one, both in
terms of its magnitude as well as in terms of its
duration." 21
Such findings differ somewhat from the earlier Packard
study, although the differences are more marked between the
Cobb and Kasl findings and the recent work of Brenner. But
again, Brenner (as well as those who revise Brenner, notably
Catalano and Dooley22) is studying unemployment in a
broader sense. The schema presented at the beginning of this
discussion indicates the underlying rationale of the Durkheimian approach used by Brenner and others. In the Cobb and
Kasl instance, individuals would experience job separation
resulting from macroeconomic change, and might (although
always depending upon reemployment and adjustment to
21. Cobb and Kasl, Termination, op. cit., p. 175.
22. Catalano and Dooley, op. cit.
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prolonged unemployment) proceed to a position of depriva
tion brought about by the economic consequences of job
loss. Cobb and Kasl attempted in at least four ways to relate
the two scales relative economic deprivation and relative
economic change to indicators of negative physical and
mental health outcomes with virtually no success. In fact,
they questioned whether physical and mental health pro
blems, when they appeared in their study group, were related
to the experience of job loss at all.
Despite the fact that this study was exemplary among
those of plant closings generally and unique in the extent of
its assessment of physical and mental health outcomes, pro
blems appear that may contribute to the variance between its
findings and the close correlations found by Brenner and
others between unemployment and other social and
psychological problems. It is likely that the psychic invest
ment of unskilled blue-collar workers in their jobs, quite
apart from the financial aspect, is smaller than the invest
ment of other groups of more skilled and more profes
sionalized workers. Cobb and Kasl themselves speculate that
low-skilled, blue-collar workers may have weak attachments
to the work role. Kanter23 and others have demonstrated that
weak attachment may result from blocked opportunity and
similar structural features of the workplace that are par
ticularly common in large manufacturing enterprises. Conse
quently, the argument goes, the trauma accompanying
detachment from a valued social role may very well have
taken place many years before the plants closed in the
worklives of the participants of these studies. The hope of a
valued work role was relinquished at that time, and the
primary attachment to the job then became economic and, in
the case of the urban workers, affiliative. At best, therefore,
the conclusions reached in this study are only suggestive and
23. Rosabeth Moss Kanter, Men and Women of the Corporation (New York: Basic Books,
1977).
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suggestive only for other workers with a similarly weak at
tachment to the work role.
There is another factor peculiar to plant-closing studies
but not to unemployment studies. Unemployment resulting
from plant closings carries with it less self-condemnation
than more generalized unemployment does. Whether or not
an individual was in any way responsible for the loss of a job
in any particular case, it is highly probable that the worker
who is laid off while others remain on the job suffers a loss
of self-esteem. Although there may be no rational reason for
self-blame, the unemployed individual sees himself or herself
as somehow inferior. Clearly, as noted above, a general
plant shutdown offers much less opportunity for blaming
one's own shortcomings. The very nature of a mass layoff
provides the newly unemployed with an opportunity to join
with others similarly afflicted, even for a short time, for
discussion, mutual support, and solidarity.
The data in the Packard study clearly indicates that skid
ding in the labor market (in the form of reduced status and
hourly wage on succeeding jobs) was related to poor mental
health (high anomie scores, low satisfaction with life and
reduced contact with kin and neighbors). Ex-Packard
workers who returned to jobs with status and wages equal to
or higher than the old Packard job had the highest mental
health scores while those who had reduced status and wages
had the lowest scores. What is suggested here is that work in
and of itself is no cure-all for job displacement. Work that is
downwardly mobile can be more destructive than no work at
all. As a matter of fact, the ex-Packard workers who remain
ed totally unemployed for the 27-month period had mental
health scores subjectively higher than the workers with
downwardly mobile jobs.
Moreover, even if the major problem identified in the
plant-closing studies by Cobb and Kasl was the impact of
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economic deprivation on jobless workers, the negative aspect
would be moderated somewhat by severance pay. The
periods of unemployment experienced by these workers were
not excessively long. It is suggested that there may well be a
certain period of joblessness required before negative effects
begin to appear. Only studies that follow workers over a
period considerably more than two years can begin to assess
the long term effects.
This necessity is dramatically highlighted by the work
histories derived from the data provided by the plant-closing
studies analyzed in this review. In general, the average
seniority is considerably more than a decade, often fifteen
years. The plant closing means, for these individuals, the
possibility of a downward journey through the labor market,
a long process which Cobb and Kasl assert may change an
unemployed person into an unemployable one. 24 Such
"bumping and skidding" is associated with economic
deprivation, and both these factors are associated with
negative mental health outcomes for displaced workers. In
deed, the cross-sectional studies, as well as the genre of
research focusing upon class, the Midtown Manhattan
study25 and Hollingshead and Redlich, 26 with their emphasis
on the close relationship between mental illness and
socioeconomic status, all document the possible end of a
work history first disturbed by a plant closing, followed by
economic deprivation and recurrent bouts of unemploy
ment, broken only by reemployment at lower and lower
levels.
The emphasis in this section has been upon mental health
and mental illness, although Cobb and Kasl consider
physical health outcomes as well. Brenner, who began his
24. Cobb and Kasl, op. cit., 1979, p. 289.
25. Srole and Langner, op. cit.
26. Hollingshead and Redlich, op. cit.
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research in this area with mental hospital admissions as the
indicator, has recently worked on morbidity and mortality
and, indeed, made projections on a national scale. The
research done on the connections between unemployment
and physical disability are traditionally an outgrowth of con
cerns about the relationship between physical well-being and
environmental factors in the workplace, and about the ef
fects of occupational stress upon physical health. The com
plexities of measuring physical health outcomes attributable
to plant-closing unemployment are illuminated by the com
ments of James House:
"On the whole, there is already considerable
evidence that occupational stress is a factor which
increases morbidity and mortality from physical
disease, especially heart disease. The complexity of
this evidence suggests that different forms of oc
cupational stress may have differential effects on
varius subgroups of the total population defined in
terms of standard characteristics (such as age, oc
cupation, and sex), personality (such as "Type A")
or social situation (such as social support.)27
Given the problems of measuring work-related physical ill
ness and of confusing work-related with unemploymentrelated illness, and given the fact that plant-closing research,
however carefully designed, often lacks adequate baseline
data for comparative purposes, it is not surprising that the
area of occupational disability remains largely unexplored.
While Cobb and Kasl did not find a significant increase in ill
ness in their sample, it must be emphasized that the same dif
ficulties limited follow-up period (24 months) and the
possibility that unemployment in the present may have an
impact on an individual's well being that will not be evident
27. James S. House, "Effects of Occupational Stress on Physical Health," in Work and
the Quality of Life (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1974), p. 161.
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from some years found in unemployment-related mental
illness research are exacerbated in unemployment-related
physical illness research.

Job Loss and Family Changes
Attention has also been focused upon the psychosocial ef
fects of unemployment upon families. From the earliest
studies of unemployment during the Depression, 28 emphasis
has been placed on the disorganizing effect that such a major
event can have upon family structure and roles, and this
theme has surfaced again and again with variations. A par
ticularly important analysis was made by Elder29 in a massive
longitudinal archival study of families whose functioning
had changed during the Depression. While Elder makes a
convincing argument for locating the major impact of
unemployment crises at the point where the individual, the
family, and the social environment meet, his analysis is not
based upon plant-closing unemployment nor does its
longitudinal emphasis relate the family's experience of
joblessness either to the work history of the principal worker
or to the family's own stage in the life cycle.
It might be expected that some of these difficulties would
be rectified in recent research by Walter G. Strange based
upon case studies of thirty workers who lost their jobs after a
plant closed in Saltville, Virginia. 30 While Strange em
phasizes that his study concentrates upon the individual
rather than the community, it is clear that he adopts a
perspective rather like Elder's, since marriage and family
28. Bakke, op. cit.; Angell, op. cit.; Komarovsky, op. cit.
29. G.H. Elder, Children of the Great Depression: Social Change in Life Experience
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974).
30. Walter G. Strange, Job Loss: A Psychosocial Study of Worker Reactions to a PlantClosing in a Company Town in Southern Appalachia (Blacksburg, VA: Virginia
Polytechnic Institute, 1977).
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loom large in the adjustment of these Appalachian workers
to the closing of their plant. While acknowledging the impor
tance of the work done by Cobb and Kasl and the associated
analysis of that data by Susan Gore, 31 Strange places his
stress upon a model of job loss that perceives that loss as
analogous to the grief over the death of a loved one or to
other major losses in adult life.
Following the conceptualization by Robert Weiss32 of
emotional and social isolation as loneliness, Strange
hypothesized that mechanisms rather like those suggested by
Weiss and others in his tradition could probably be expected
to become manifest in Saltville. 33 As its underlying rationale,
the study asserted that the closing of the plant at Saltville had
"stripped that community of what had been its principal
mechanism of social integration." 34 It is here that the major
problem with this approach appears, for in assigning to the
plant the foundation for the sets of relationships that define
community and community function, Strange set the stage
for a social cataclysm. Such an exaggerated view of the
plant's symbolic and actual importance in a rural setting pro
vides a framework in which anything short of catastrophe
would be anticlimactic. Moreover, considering the compell
ing arguments given by Cobb and Kasl and by Gore's
analysis of the importance of social support in rural en
vironments in that larger study, such a conceptualization ap
pears unnecessarily simplistic. And, as one might expect, the
findings of the study indicate that the family, in particular
the wife, is both vulnerable to the adverse changes in family

31. Susan Gore, The Influence of Social Support and Related Variables in A meliorating the
Consequences of Job Loss, Doctoral Dissertation, University of Michigan, 1973.
32. R.S. Weiss, Loneliness: The Experience of Emotional and Social Isolation (Cambridge:
MIT Press, 1973).
33. Strange, op. cit.
34. Strange, op. cit., p. 31.
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resources and roles brought about by the closing, and in
strumental in bringing some new order to at least a portion
of the ensuing chaos.
In effect, Strange is viewing the family as a social support
mechanism, particularly strong in this traditional communi
ty, but one that demands much at the same time that it pro
vides much. There is sufficient resemblance between the
responses of individuals in this study and the general phases
of grieving to permit the identification of part of the in
dividual and family adjustment to plant closing as a kind of
grief. The fact that this plant shutdown took place in a set
ting in which attachment to the land, springing from long
standing family residence in the area, is particularly strong
gives rise to another pair of contradictory impulses. Rational
economic decisions might well dictate that these workers
move elsewhere to seek jobs, but most of them chose to ac
cept the loss of a job and its attendant distress and to reject a
move that would have entailed, in Strange's terms, another
loss, conceivably much more traumatic. This study provides
indirect and inadvertent support for a hypothesis that places
the family in a critical position during catastrophic
unemployment, but it does not analyze the processes at work
here because they are not central to the conceptual
framework. Grieving places the individual in the center,
although there is reason to suppose (and studies already cited
indicate) that much of what occurs after a plant closing is a
social and family process.
It seems fortuitous then, given the fact that most studies
are suggestive yet inconclusive about the family and the
psychosocial response to plant shutdowns, that when Ken
neth Root undertook research on the 1975 Mason City, Iowa
closing of the Armour plant, he placed a specific focus on
family. 35 The closing provided a substantial unemployed
35. Kenneth Root, "Workers and Their Families: Some Attitudinal and Behavioral
Responses to a Plant Closing," National Institute of Mental Health research prospectus.
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population, although the list from which the sample was
chosen was not ideal. In total, a sample of 103 individuals
with families were chosen for study, and subsequent
followup dealt with a reduced sample of 77 persons. Con
sidering the emphasis on age-related reemployment dif
ficulties encountered by workers in other plant-closing
research, as well as the differing needs and perceptions of in
dividuals and families according to their places in the lifecycle, it is particularly unfortunate that this study was
hampered at the outset by the refusal of both management
and union to provide the researchers with lists of essential
demographic information. Still, as the sample was finally
drawn, it would have been possible to emphasize age and
age-related phenomena.
Another problem with this set of studies is its orientation
toward a strongly positive view of plant closings. It is more
than likely that this emphasis accounts for the style of inter
viewing evident in some lengthy quotations, 36 a style design
ed to elicit positive rather than negative responses. On the
basis of these interviews, Root constructs a typology from
the study sample, identifying three types of plant-closing
participants: "winners," "losers," and "marginals." About
40 percent of the sample indicated that they felt the closing
had been good for them and their families, thus qualifying
them as "winners." Another 30 percent indicated that the
closing had been bad overall, making them "losers," while
about 27 percent were "marginal," with another 2 percent
indicating that they were not yet certain what they felt their
personal outcomes were. A critical variable in this study was
the announcement by Armour that another plant would be
opened in Mason City, although it would employ only about
one-fourth as many workers as the old plant. However, at
that time the Mason City area generally was not a seriously
36. Kenneth Root, Perspectives for Community and Organizations: On Plant Closings and
Job Dislocations (Ames, I A: Iowa State University Press, 1979).
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jeopardized labor market, and aggressive efforts by local
economic development agencies and business groups
ameliorated the employment situation in objective terms.
To some extent, the Root findings and the interpretation
of them are a logical extension of the work of Cobb and Kasl
and of Strange as well. Root emphasizes discontinuity with
earlier studies, but does not account for it sufficiently.
Earlier plant-closing studies had concluded that almost
everyone was a victim, that nearly all workers were
casualties. Some recent studies present a more positive view,
finding that support in family and community buffers the
costs to individuals and indeed provides an environment in
which positive changes can take place. While Cobb and Kasl
find stress and clear evidence of adverse reaction in the early
post-announcement, pre-closing period, Root finds, in some
cases, a sense of relief and a positive attitude toward the
change. But, it must be noted that the ease with which many
workers were reemployed and the accompanying perception
that jobs could be found are correlates of age, skill, and a
total resource package, factors insufficiently investigated in
this study. Only a major longitudinal study, carefully design
ed, controlling for job histories and labor market conditions,
can answer the questions these discontinuities raise.
To return once again to the schema set forth at the begin
ning of this section, it is clear that the points noted are not
only discrete events in themselves but that they can also be
construed as junctures at which intervention can take place.
Much research, from Durkheim through Brenner and the
new generation of epidemiological researchers, has focused
in its quest for indicators, on the last point, evidence of in
dividual pathology. At this stage, intervention is often forc
ed or inevitable, and the quality of services provided for the
troubled and ill and the costs of such services become a ma
jor concern. More recently, emphasis has been placed upon
the processes alleged to take place between job loss and ill-
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ness, so that intervention can take place earlier at mental
health centers, counseling centers or health maintenance
organizations, or through the "natural" systems offered
through networks of lay helpers or an individual's social sup
port system. 37 Depending upon who is describing social sup
port, this often intangible good can turn up with very tangi
ble accouterments like training or various subsidized pro
grams and the concept can even include transfer payments
or other forms or sources of income maintenance. 38 These
intervention points can be geared, again depending on
definition, to the economic or noneconomic consequences of
job loss, or even both. Moving back another step ensures the
appearance of organized labor as well as various policy and
planning groups with proposals for the delay and indefinite
postponement of job loss or the creation of new jobs. 39 In
terventionists of this type point to arrangements in other
countries that ensure more job security and cushion workers
from the impact of economic dislocation. Finally, other
planners and economists would seize the chance to intervene
at a still earlier stage, to guide and channel macroeconomic
change so as to cause the least possible perturbation in local
labor markets.
The available studies of the physical and mental health
outcomes of plant closings, few as they are, offer a rather
skimpy needs assessment for one or another of these in
tervention strategies. However, unemployment studies
generally, whether case studies or large-scale sociological
enterprises, provide strong incentives and arguments for
developing powerful public policies to cope with negative ef
fects, while neglecting those areas where relevant processes
37. Elizabeth Bott, Family and Social Network, 2nd Ed (New York: The Free Press, 1971).
38. G. Ramsay Liem and Joan Huser Liem, "Social Support and Stress: Some General
Issues and Their Application to the Problem of Unemployment," in Ferman and Gordus,
op. cit.
39. S.M. Miller, "Unemployment and Mental Health: An Interpretive Summary," and
Gar Alperovitz, "Strategy and Policy," both in Ferman and Gordus, op. cit.
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might be seen and specific intervention tactics suggested. In
other words, unemployment studies in general demonstrate
that there is a need for intervention to alleviate social costs
but do not provide much information about where such ac
tion had best be taken. Plant-closing studies concentrate on
likely intervention points but do not make a convincing case
for massive intervention.
Clearly, both the research efforts, as well as the policy and
programs designed to alleviate problems associated with
plant closings in the area of mental health, have proceeded
without certain crucial items of information. Some of the
missing information depends upon circumstance. For exam
ple, the mental health effects of plant closings may very well
resemble the mental health effects of large-scale counter
cyclical unemployment in situations where these two occur
simultaneously. To date, no plant-closing study has taken
place in an area where the unemployment rate is over 10 per
cent, although the increasing incidence of plant closings in
the rapidly changing northeastern quadrant of the country
will provide ample opportunity for such research. Because a
plant closing may be the point at which individuals enter
upon downward job mobility and prolonged and/or recur
rent bouts of unemployment, always coupled with relative
and sometimes actual economic deprivation, it is obviously
necessary that plant-closing studies be designed to follow in
dividuals for a much longer period than a year or two.
Perhaps a more productive research strategy for the future
would focus less on an individual plant closing and em
phasize more those several instances in which the experience
and success of various intervention strategies might be
documented and evaluated.

Chapter 7
New Directions for Research,
Policy, and Program Development
The purpose of this review of selected plant-closing studies
was to summarize and synthesize the results of research
undertaken over the past 20 years. Interest in plant closings
and industrial relocation increases and decreases in direct
relation to the prevailing economic situation. Such research
depends, in part, upon the availability of plants in the pro
cess of shutdown, a phenomenon more common in bad
economic times than in good, in declining industries, and in
declining geographical areas. Moreover, the problems are
most obvious at such times, and since steps are often con
templated to relieve the consequences of closures, studies are
often performed in association with such programs. To some
degree, then, this review reflects yet another economic
downturn, another set of opportunities for study and action.
The further purpose of this review was to provide a compen
dium of information useful to those studying closures at this
time and helpful to policy makers and planners who might
wish to review past efforts in order to find directions which
might profitably be taken in the present and future.
However, this review can, at best, be only as useful as the
research which it summarizes. Plant-closing research has
been so limited in scope and conceptualization that the pre
sent review is limited as well. Moreover, partly because of
the narrow conceptualization and total lack of an overall
151
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research framework, research in this area has also been
characterized by methodological inadequacy. In these con
cluding pages, emphasis is placed on this set of conceptual
and methodological problems for two reasons. First, this
focus highlights the need for a new research agenda and
clarifies the problems which need to be addressed. Second,
the utility of this review as basis for policy recommendations
is directly related to the degree of confidence which can be
placed in the synthesis and summary of the research conclu
sions. Therefore, only an evaluation which is critical of the
research reviewed will be useful for further research, policy
recommendations and program planning. Four major points
will be stressed in these pages: the problems of past research,
a new research agenda, conclusions about the impact of
plant closings, and some suggested policy developments. The
first two points are closely associated with a major theme of
this report the assertion that, despite the continuing
research in this area, we are still missing critical information.
They deal with what specific types of information are lack
ing, and what barriers conceptual, methodological, and
practical have prevented gathering such data. What steps
can be taken to rectify the situation is the topic of the follow
ing two sections.

Conceptual and Methodological Problems
of Plant-Closing Research
Plant-closing studies, including the present review of those
studies, are captives of their own tradition. From the earliest
studies through several of the more recent analyses, the in
dividual and community consequences of industrial reloca
tion have been clearly and compellingly revealed through the
preferred method of investigation case studies.
These case studies have been conducted when oppor
tunities for research were presented and their appearance in
the literature is sporadic. There is no reason to suppose that
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the plant closings studied are typical cases; for example,
closures which are studied are usually unionized
establishments. There are additional conceptual difficulties
associated with plant-closing research. There is no
framework for such study that permits an estimate of extensiveness of the problem; there is no adequate longitudinal
base from which studies are made; and usually only a single
phase of the shutdown process is scrutinized. All of these
problems are intertwined with program and policy issues
which have served to limit the general field of plant-closing
studies to the point where reality may very well be severely
distorted.
First, while few will quarrel with the assertion that plant
closings cause severe problems for individuals and com
munities, particularly for those with fewest resources and ad
vantages, legitimate questions can be raised about the extensiveness of these problems. While the national interest is
perceived to be served by the accumulation of information
crucial to policy formation in the area of employment,
underemployment, and unemployment, these categories
have only recently been subdivided. The subdivisions of cur
rent interest, the employment problems of youth, minorities,
women, and disadvantaged persons, have been
demonstrated to be extensive.. In the absence of evidence to
the contrary, plant closings can be considered unfortunate
but isolated events whose seriousness is reduced because they
are not perceived to be common, recurrent, and significant
on the national level. The results of this isolation have been
to minimize policy and program initiatives designed to assist
older industrial areas and to minimize transitional program
ming for older workers whose educational levels and skills
added to their high wage aspirations inhibit their reemployment. No national policy concerning plant closings has
developed because extensiveness of the problem has not been
demonstrated, yet it is unlikely that research of a type ap-
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propriate for measuring extensiveness will be designed, sup
ported, and utilized until at least some steps toward a na
tional policy have been taken. Possible methods for approx
imating extensiveness are discussed below.
A second circularity which has developed through the
isolation of plant-closing research is related to the failure to
establish an appropriate longitudinal dimension.
Throughout the literature we find needs assessments of a
sort; the studies clearly indicate that some actions designed
to promote rapid reemployment and community economic
development should have been taken. Other studies describe
the implementation of one or another intervention, retrain
ing or relocation, and document the relative success or
failure. Since no systematic implementation takes place, no
systematic evaluation takes place and the results of each in
dividual program do not provide any guidelines, based on
rigorous study, for future interventions. The displaced
workers are seldom followed, with or without intervention,
for more than a couple of years. Without a good
longitudinal assessment of lost income and revenue, such
losses might seem relatively limited. The costs of developing
programs or doing evaluative research might appear high
when data are not available about the costs of failing to
choose these alternatives.
A third research problem with significant policy and pro
gram ramifications focuses upon the point at which study
begins. Throughout this volume, specific difficulties
associated with the starting point are discussed. For instance,
we know little about those individuals whose jobs were lost
in the waves of contraction common before a major closing.
Even more critical issues are obscure because research begins
too late. A plant closing is an economic and social process
with many actors and many dimensions, yet very little is ac
tually known about the process. More important still, little is
known about how the process of a closing affects the out-
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come. Only in the studies we have which do not begin to
represent the types of closings which have occurred are at
tempts made to ascertain whether, in fact, early notification
conduces to early reemployment when certain programs are
implemented. While this research problem does not have as
costly a solution as the problems of extensiveness and dura
tion, it is fraught with equal difficulty. Only in cases where
management has pledged cooperation can such studies be
mounted early; there are only a few cases in the literature
and a few situations of this type currently in progress. The
utility of even these few cases can be doubted because the
type of labor-management climate which permits such incur
sions is unfortunately not common.
Several of the more serious methodological problems of
plant-closing research are directly related to the conceptual
and practical problems of undertaking this research. For ex
ample, it is not possible to extrapolate the findings from one
plant closing to another because plants studied are not
selected from a national sample of manufacturing facilities.
At best, the research from one case can provide some indica
tion of what can be expected in similar industries, similar
communities, and in similar groups of workers. Those plantclosing studies which are evaluations are, in general, un
satisfactory. In some respects, their limitations reflect the
general difficulties of performing such research on a case by
case basis. Evaluations of training programs can only pro
vide convincing results when random samples of other
unemployed workers from plant closings are taken and the
outcomes for both groups those for whom training was
provided and those who did not have such training are
measured. The methodological problems of plant-closing
research also reflect the fact that in this area, research, policy
and programming are closely interwoven. While the impres
sion prevails that plant closings are among the less critical
employment-related problems and this impression will no
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doubt continue to prevail unless research on extensiveness is
begun other efforts to bring plant-closing research up to
the conceptual and methodological standards appropriate
for social science research will be unsuccessful.

A New Framework for
Plant-Closing Research
A proposed research agenda for the study of industrial
relocations and plant closings would focus on these problem
areas; extensiveness, duration, scope of the study, and plan
ning and coherence of research efforts.
Determining the extensiveness of the plant-closing
phenomenon is a major priority. We do not know the
prevalence of plant closings, the regional patterns in which
closings occur, nor the comparative effects of closings on
different communities. Currently, any estimate of the
number of plant closings must depend upon Dun and
Bradstreet data, which are not always the appropriate type
of data to be used. It is possible that linkages can be
established between different types of administrative data
bases to provide at least numbers of closings and numbers of
affected workers. Clearly, this type of data collection and
reduction done on a regular basis would be an improvement
over the current situation. However, administrative data
provide only beginnings. A national survey, either a free
standing study, or a substudy linked to a major data base in
some way, would have the advantage of capturing much
more information than even the most creative exploitation of
current administrative data bases. Suggestions have been
made, usually in the context of the discussion of legislation
for full employment or job security, that managements of
facilities planning major changes, especially closures, be re
quired to inform some agency of government and in the
course of that notification to present an economic impact
statement similar to those required when federal defense
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establishments are to be closed. Such reports would obvious
ly have the advantage of continual open access for re
searchers and could form a rich administrative data base
about plants, industries, regions, workers, and other sub
jects crucial to the understanding of the plant-closing pro
cess.
An ideal arrangement would feature the following studies:
(1) required economic impact studies;
(2) the inclusion of plant-closing questions in national
studies, e.g., the Parnes data base, the Current Pop
ulation Survey, even the Census; and
(3) at least one major national detailed study extending
over at least four years.
This arrangement would reduce but not eliminate the prob
lems induced by the isolation of plant-closing research.
Not only does no truly coherent conceptual framework or
estimate of prevalence exist, but no data are available to
measure that entire preclosing phenomenon which may be
characterized by continual contraction. Therefore, any clos
ing studied may always be a study of a residual worker
population older, less educated, less mobile, subject to
some costs but not others, appropriate for some programs
and not others, and whose experience prior to study has been
much affected by continuing contractions in the workplace.
An appropriate strategy would be the initiation of a study
of plants in industries where closings are quite likely. When
closings occur, the entire process could be studied, not just
the death rattle. This suggested strategy would remedy
another major methodological and conceptual problem
associated with plant-closing research. No other area of
social science research displays such a lamentable lack of
that essential ingredient of any respectable research design, a
control group. Of all the studies reviewed, the vast majority
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stand by themselves. Several studies purport to be com
parative case studies, yet the rigor introduced is only a
similar methodology used by the researchers, not a serious
and sustained attempt at selection of a sample. The position
of the study by Cobb and Kasl as a landmark in this field is
related, to a large degree, to the fact that both Baker and
Dawson plants are matched with other similar plants.
Despite the fact that this is, for plant-closing research, a ma
jor step forward, a matching exercise is a relatively simplistic
and unsatisfactory method of sampling.
Within the genre of plant-closing studies, the attempts at
study vary widely. To a large extent, a review such as we pre
sent here confers a unity upon a series of studies which differ
widely in quality, approach, and focus. There is a danger
that such studies might be considered appropriate for a type
of cross-study generalization. These studies were not design
ed in concert with one another; they capture the plantclosing process at different points; they emphasize different
measures and different variables. Their one point of unity is
the phenomenon they study, an occurrence which can differ
dramatically, depending upon the concerns, priorities,
resources, responses and interactions of the impacted
groups.
Several other important questions have been raised in the
course of this review and these issues merit study. The em
phasis in this review, and in the studies generally, has been
upon the workers and communities. Little research has been
done to validate the general assumption that plant closings
do promote economic efficiency. No follow-up studies have
been done of facilities that moved; it is not known whether
such moves always do increase profits. More important, no
evidence has been adduced to show whether, in fact, some
closings, characterized perhaps by acrimony, are more costly
than others. Emphasis has been placed, for example, on the
use of transfer rights by workers, but no comparative studies
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have been done to indicate whether facilities with additional
workers who have transferred from a closing plant encounter
any special problems as a result of the tranfers.
Yet other economic studies remain to be done. Opposition
to plant closings centers on costs incurred by individuals and
communities. A modest beginning has been made in the area
of assessing such costs, yet the level of sophistication does
not yet approach the level required for economic impact
statements for defense establishments. The whole differen
tiation between private profit versus individual and public
costs should be set aside so that models can be developed to
assess the total cost-benefit package, public and private, of a
plant closing.
Still other research questions surface as the responses to
plant closings change. The development of new, private sec
tor firms, specializing in employability development pro
gramming, demands that evaluation of such efforts be
undertaken evaluations designed to measure outcomes
over at least one year, and measure them against outcomes
of public-sector programs. Community responses, par
ticularly those which develop from the grassroots and which
involve numerous groups in the community, should be
analyzed and assessed with respect to the functional social
support they offer displaced workers and the possible func
tion they may have with respect to community economic
development. Such unofficial programming appears to be
relatively common in communities, but the effectiveness of
such programming is seldom monitored. Another area which
requires investigation is the process and outcome of plantclosing bargaining in different industries. Experience with
closings and with union representatives reveals that this in
dividual bears heavy responsibilities; yet the role of the
union representative, and indeed the area of union support
services, has been neglected. Further, nonunionized closures
must be studied closely because they have been completely
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ignored in the past and because, even in the current state of
research, some comparisons and contrasts between facilities
with unions and without bargaining units can be made.
Finally, the problem of closures no longer affects manufac
turing plants only. While some studies have been done of
professional and technical workers whose jobs have been
abolished, the wholesale closing of service facilities in the
public sector mental health institutions, agencies of local,
state and federal departments, as well as employment and
training agencies will provide an opportunity for careful
study of major shifts in employment. This is a new and im
portant phenomenon.

Consequences of Plant Shutdowns
If one conclusion of this review was that much critical in
formation is lacking, another or at least part of it is more
reassuring. We do know a great deal about some of the con
sequences of plant closings and we understand the impact of
such events much better than we did two decades ago. We
know, for example, that the decision to close a manufactur
ing facility is a process which is still concealed from the view
of researchers and others, although the causes of such in
dustrial relocation are becoming more obvious and more
complex. Not only are shifts from north to south in search of
cheaper land and labor continuing, but those shifts are often
further afield, to less developed nations where labor costs are
cheaper still. Such shifts are made possible, in part, by
technological changes. Those technological threats, the vi
sions of automata replacing workers, which prompted pro
gram development and research twenty years ago, appear to
have been premature then. Now, however, the completion of
that technological revolution is underway, in concert with
demographic, geographic, and economic change, a set of
developments which promises to change the American in
dustrial scene.
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We also know that while management may, in response to
market changes, decide to close or relocate, other groups are
affected and respond to this action. Research indicates that
labor unions have not succeeded at insuring employment
continuity for members. In many cases, such employment
protection has not been featured as a prominent bargaining
demand, partly because threats to employment seemed dis
tant, and pressures for other concessions in wages and
benefits were intense and proximate. Unions with a history
of continuing job loss due to technological change continued
to bargain for security while other unions found that benefits
designed for short-term layoffs, supplemental unemploy
ment benefits, could be utilized in plant-closing situations.
Unions attempt to secure favorable closing bargains when
all else fails. And relatively recently, unions have begun to
assume some role in other broader coalitions whose efforts
are aimed at other points in the closing process. Coalition
formation for the achievement of common goals has long
been a strategy employed by organized labor, and some
beginnings of coalition formation for the purposes of serving
displaced workers, assisting such workers with plans to
relocate, and even in a few cases of developing employee
stock ownership plans (ESOP) can be seen. Most strategies
used by unions are still relatively traditional and it is too ear
ly to assess the success of the newer approaches.
Communities also experience the consequences of plant
shutdowns. Within the past 10 years, the image of the
passive town has gradually changed. Whether this image was
ever accurate is unknown. Recently, communities have acted
and the research evidence indicates that communities are
well-advised to take action, for the economic costs to local
areas are substantial. The research also indicates that it is no
easy task to mobilize a community to do anything in a coor
dinated fashion, although a community, such as
Horseheads, New York, can learn to mobilize effectively and
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that learning remains and enables the community to respond
rapidly and effectively at a later time.
While we still lack the base of information needed to in
dicate how serious and widespread plant closings have
become in the past five years, it is surely clear that communi
ty and political activists, as well as legislators from impacted
areas, believe that impressionistic evidence is sufficiently
compelling to indicate that there is a major problem and that
the problem requires legislative remedies. The flood of plantclosing legislation across the northeast and midwest states is,
in itself, evidence of concern at levels higher than the af
fected workers and their local communities.
But the primary focus of plant-closing research remains
where it has been for the past 50 years, squarely on the
displaced worker. In the most general terms, we do not know
who that displaced worker is; once again the limitations of
plant-closing research restrict our conclusions to those few
instances among numerous closings the few cases which
have been studied. However, we do know quite a good deal
about workers in plants which have been studied.
The job search behavior of blue-collar workers displaced
by plant closings tends to be late, geographically limited, and
carried on through informal channels. Such behavior is in
sharp contrast to the more effective job search behaviors of
white-collar workers. More highly educated, presumably
better informed about the labor market, younger and more
mobile, white-collar workers also tend to look for jobs
earlier than blue-collar workers do. Various reasons can be
advanced for this behavior, including the desire of bluecollar workers to secure severance pay which is often tied to
remaining on the job until closure.
The reemployment experience of blue-collar workers is
usually accompanied by declines in income, in status, and
almost invariably in seniority, which usually cannot be
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transferred. This experience is in contrast to white-collar
workers, who fare rather better. However, those same fac
tors age, lower levels of skills and education, less will
ingness to consider geographic or occupational
mobility which affect the reemployment experience also af
fect the job search pattern. So far, no opportunity has arisen
for research which permits the separation of job search pat
tern from reemployment experience for similar types of bluecollar workers. So whether it is job search, or other im
mutable characteristics such as age, race and sex, the result is
that blue-collar workers displaced by plant closings ex
perience substantial periods of unemployment followed by
lower paying, less stable employment.
A number of alternatives, besides local job search and
reemployment, can be available to displaced workers. The
transfer alternative is available most often because transfer
rights have been collectively bargained. While management
can either impede or facilitate participation in transfer pro
grams, some characteristics of workers appear to become in
superable barriers to transfer. Workers who are older, with
lower occupational status, little education, and presumably
fewer personal resources are less likely to take advantage of a
transfer policy. For somewhat similar reasons, women often
cannot and most often do not use a transfer right. Those,
therefore, most negatively affected by the closing are those
least likely to reduce the impact of the closing upon
themselves and their families by transferring. Those who, all
other things being equal, might seem more likely to become
reemployed relatively easily, those with better skills, better
education, and more youthful, take advantage of transfer
policies.
When geographic mobility is rejected as an alternative, oc
cupational mobility is another attractive course. Retraining
programs aim to enhance the employment potential of
displaced workers. Once again, those who seem to need such
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interventions least, those who are younger, slightly better
educated, and possessed of slightly more resources than their
coworkers, seem to participate the most. Still, participation
in retraining continues to be very limited, about 15 percent,
and it is not clear how effective retraining programs have
been.
Retirement, either early or regular withdrawal from the
labor force on a pension, appears at first glance to be a
relatively positive outcome for the older displaced worker.
Still, unplanned retirement, even when resources are ade
quate, is closely associated with negative mental and physical
health outcomes, and resources which depend upon fixed
pension payments often are far from adequate shortly after
retirement in a time of inflation.
Generally, the results of plant-closing research indicate
that these particular displaced workers have age, low skills
and little education as strikes against them. It also shows that
neither geographic nor occupational mobility is attractive to
such workers, and in many cases, may actually be or be
perceived to be impossible alternatives. The most powerful
influence upon the outcome of a plant closing is the local
unemployment rate. Yet even when the unemployment rate
is relatively low, displaced workers do not become
reemployed rapidly (perhaps by intention) and do not regain
their old status, seniority, and wage rate after reemployment.
Unemployment is generally conceded to be a significant
stressor capable of producing negative mental and physical
health outcomes for individuals so affected. The case studies
reviewed illustrate human costs in rather general and
unspecified terms. In general, the negative physical and men
tal health outcomes to be expected from plant closings are
not quite so severe as we might have expected. Still, since the
two major mediating factors between the unemployed in-
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dividual and illness are financial resources and social sup
port, the lack of overwhelming evidence of such bad health
outcomes is not surprising. It takes time, longer than the
study period, to exhaust benefits plus severance pay. When
resources are exhausted, problems do arise. Particularly
significant is the fact that rural workers, who maintained the
same networks after the closing as before, suffered least. The
irony which emerges from the study of the mental health of
displaced workers is that, for a time at least, their former
stable work histories, their community attachment, and their
family stability, provide some safeguard against the early
onset of serious difficulties. Yet these very same factors are
those which often impede their successful search for new
employment which, ultimately, will provide the only secure
safeguard against the negative outcomes which have been
demonstrated to be consequent upon unemployment.

Some Policy Recommendations
We do know more about plant closings than we did 20
years ago, but we are, in general, doing about the same
things in response to plant closings that were done then. It is
clear from our analysis of relocation, retraining, and local
job search and reemployment that these strategies have been
generally unsuccessful. Moreover, we know now, in some
detail, that such industrial shifts are costly in economic and
social terms.
Prescriptions which lean heavily upon ideology provide
policies which are unlikely to be adopted. Legislative at
tempts to restrict plant closings or to delay them will prob
ably continue to fail, not only because they are designed to
impose controls which will be resisted, but also because no
mechanism has yet been suggested to cope with the ultimate
results of the inevitable, albeit delayed and penalized, plant
closing. Attempts to cope with results of present and conti
nuing shifts in capital, production, and technology must pro-
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ceed on different levels with different programs which are
subject to some type of coordination.
Just as priorities have been acknowledged in the area of
youth unemployment, a major national employment and
training priority should be developed, preferably during the
reauthorization process for the Comprehensive Employment
and Training Act, for older workers displaced by plant clos
ings. Such a priority is particularly crucial as the drains on
the national and state unemployment funds continue and as
the only alternative for many older workers is retirement,
itself a major drain on the nation's retirement resources.
However, when a major program direction is developed for
displaced workers, attention must be directed toward
analysis of earlier failure and the reasons for them.
Therefore, national policy development must begin with a
set of research tasks. To mount effective retraining and
relocation efforts, several continuing studies are required.
Regional labor forecasts, particularly those which assess
labor shortages, should be supported fully and results
disseminated rapidly to planners and program developers.
Studies should be developed which assess the feasibility of
some types of relocation programs; it may be that supported
relocation, together with retraining, is not prohibitively ex
pensive if the program is well-designed and closely targeted.
When retraining programs are offered, they should be
designed to provide skills which will be in demand. A major
problem encountered by displaced workers is a lack of
knowledge of the local labor markets, other labor markets,
and the job search process. The employability development
programs which have been signed for the hard-to-employ
can be adapted and used for displaced workers with con
siderable success. Moreover, in a time of tight resources, in
come maintenance programs beyond unemployment in
surance and severance payments, such as Trade Adjustment
Assistance, should have such carefully developed training
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programs funded, available, and then required for par
ticipants in order to maximize the utility of the transfer
payments. Programs once set into operation should be
evaluated rigorously and the results of these evaluations con
tinuously fed into the program planning and development
process.
While the research and some of the planning function of a
new national priority for displaced workers should be
located on the federal level, service delivery should take
place on several levels. Again, in a time of institutional con
traction, there are several important yields on the local level
to be realized from the utilization and attendant upgrading
of vocational education programs in local educational agen
cies, particularly community colleges. Moreover, community
colleges, with their traditional tripartite structure around
general education, vocational education, and community
service, have the capacity to respond quickly to local needs
while having the assets of linkages in the local community,
throughout the state, and through their associations,
throughout the nation. Close coordination with other local
agencies and providers of services should be a major objec
tive of any local program.
If the information and goal-setting function lies with the
federal government and service delivery depends upon local
and state efforts, a major role for the local community is the
development of an effective community response to any type
of large-scale dislocation. The formation of coordinating
groups which minimize duplication of services and activities
while insuring the allocation of resources for neglected ser
vices such a short term health care is essential. From such
a coordinating group, allied perhaps with other local
economic development agencies and groups of concerned
community members and businessmen, can develop the local
planning and implementation capacity for economic
redevelopment.
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The research results give us some idea of how such a pro
gram might be designed. Let us suppose that a market shift,
obsolescence, and the demand for technological innovation
indicates that the best course for a specific company is a
move from a community which was, for jobs and for tax
support and indirect economic activity, highly dependent
upon that facility. An ideal strategy for management to
adopt in such a case would be early notification of workers
and local leaders, accompanied by an indication of will
ingness to help support some minimal fact-finding activities
to aid the community and some additional assistance to
workers. If possible, transfer rights could be offered. Super
visors and other managers could permit some time off for in
terviewing and some assistance with job search. Recently,
companies have been retaining the services of plant-closing
teams which offer employability development programs for
displaced workers before the closure. Such services can be
costly, but similar activities could be provided by local
employment and training agencies if sufficient latitude in
submission of plans to regional and federal offices were
allowed and if offering services to displaced workers became
a priority nationally and for such agencies. The lead time
would also be helpful for local groups, including community
agencies and service providers, to begin planning and coor
dination activities to provide transition assistance for those
who will be jobless for a period of time. Labor would ob
viously have considerable interest in exploring options for
possible transfer and might also assume responsibility of
seeking information from outside groups, if necessary,
about the current condition of the labor market locally and
elsewhere. Labor would also continue to bargain for the best
possible termination settlement, and might consider working
with other groups in the community should employee owner
ship appear a feasible option or should there be some
possibility of attracting other industry using similar types of
skilled workers to the area and perhaps even to the facility
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itself. Such union activities would, of course, reduce
management's apprehension about possible damage to the
physical plant and equipment. Community groups, par
ticularly local educational agencies, could facilitate job
placement and provide training opportunities; in-fact, ap
propriate new training could actually be developed for the
local labor market. Such training, which must be designed
with knowledge of present labor needs and some sense from
forecasts of future labor market trends, could become one
basis for continuing economic development. A pool of train
ed workers is obviously one important selling point in a cam
paign to attract new industry to an area.
A program such as this differs from those described in the
literature in several important respects. First, it offers more
than one activity designed to facilitate reemployment for
displaced workers; it provides, when possible, transfer,
employability development assistance, and retraining. It also
serves to coordinate services for personal, family, and health
problems during the transition period. Third, it relies upon
local agencies to develop retraining, while it also emphasizes
the necessity for good information about labor market
trends. Finally, these initiatives have long term potential
beyond the important first task of facilitating reemployment
for displaced workers; it begins to provide trained workers,
and community coordination and development efforts, all
important factors in attracting new business. Obviously such
a coherent program is an improvement over those which of
fer only one or two program elements. Still, the success of
such a program depends in large part upon the local
unemployment rate, and to a lesser degree on the economic
condition of the region and the country.
It is to be hoped that the "new industrial relations," the
reduction of areas of conflict between labor and manage
ment and the concomitant enlargement of areas of coopera
tion, will set a pattern for such collaborative action in plant
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closings to come. Despite the lack of precise quantative data,
few will deny that plant closings are unfortunate and costly.
Many, however, will point to current economic conditions of
slow growth as reasons to refrain from intervention. Yet in
terventions need not be particularly costly, nor should all
costs and activities be associated with federal programs.
Resources are available in local agencies and educational in
stitutions, as well as in management, labor unions, and the
local community. In fact, unfavorable economic conditions
dictate a cautious, careful, and informed use of all resources.
Given the national priorities which have emerged recently,
what has traditionally happened to displaced workers cannot
be permitted to continue. Long term survival on income
maintenance programs is destructive for individuals and
does not provide needed contributions to the economic
growth of the nation.
The literature reviewed here, despite the shortcomings
described, remains an important resource for future policy
development and program design. It is not so much what we
have learned to do that is critical for the future. It is more
what we have seen does not work and what the reasons for
failure have been. But most important of all, the research
reviewed bears eloquent witness to that often quoted remark
of the theologian Paul Tillich: "Not to decide is to decide."
Indeed, we have not yet decided what to do about plant clos
ings and industrial relocation in America and until an in
formed decision is made, we will continue to live with the
economic stagnation and human misfortune that our failure
to decide has permitted.
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